Towards an enabling NGO regulatory framework in Uganda: comparative experiences from Eastern and Southern Africa by Sewanyana, Livingstone
 
 
TOWARDS AN ENABLING NGO REGULATORY 
FRAMEWORK IN UGANDA: COMPARATIVE 
EXPERIENCES FROM EASTERN AND SOUTHERN AFRICA 
 
Livingstone Sewanyana (SWN LIV 001) 
 
Thesis Presented for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 
 
In the Department of Public Law 
 Faculty of Law 
UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
 
Supervisor:  Professor Hugh Corder (University of Cape Town) 





















The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 















I, Livingstone Sewanyana, hereby declare that the work on which this thesis is based is my 
original work (except where acknowledgements indicate otherwise), and that neither the 
whole or any part of it has been, is being, or is to be submitted for another degree in this or 
any other university.  I authorise the university to reproduce for the purpose of research either 
the whole or any portion of the contents in any manner whatsoever.  
 
 
Signature:                                               Date: 





Towards an Enabling NGO Regulatory Framework in Uganda: Comparative 
Experiences from Eastern and Southern Africa 
Uganda, like many other sub-Saharan African countries, has experienced a rapid increase in 
the number of NGOs since the 1990s.  This growth can be attributed to the democratic 
reforms introduced by the National Resistance Movement (NRM) Government since 1986.  
Among these reforms was the promulgation of the Uganda Constitution, 1995, with an 
extensive bill of rights.  
The increase in NGO activities brought two important challenges: the challenge of their 
legitimacy and competition for political space.  The Uganda Government reacted by imposing 
a state-led NGO regulatory framework seemingly to ensure the accountability and 
transparency of NGOs.  
This thesis investigates the existing regulatory models for NGOs and explores possible 
reforms to establish an appropriate NGO regulatory framework that upholds internationally 
accepted human rights principles in Uganda.  The thesis investigates these issues within the 
historical context of Uganda and Africa in general, as well as theories of democracies that 
stresses participation, accountability and respect for individual liberties, in particular, the right 
to freedom of association.  
The thesis concludes that the regulatory framework of NGOs in Uganda does not meet the 
basic requirements for the right to freedom of association as provided in Uganda’s 
Constitution, and the international and regional human rights treaties to which Uganda is a 
party.  
The thesis finds that Uganda’s NGO regulatory framework is controlling, and burdensome, 
and does not create a conducive environment for inclusiveness and public participation.  The 
thesis proposes a state-NGO led regulatory model that allows for self-regulation alongside 
minimal state regulation of NGOs.  This model would entail the establishment of an 
autonomous NGO regulatory authority in Uganda composed of members selected 
autonomously by NGOs  and ‘decriminalisation’ of NGO activities, reducing the powers of 
the state-led regulatory model, and increasing the involvement of NGOs in the state-led 
regulatory framework.  
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1. 0.  BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
The 1990’s witnessed the blossoming of a global associational revolution.
1
 Among the new 
players were Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) who in the last two decades have 
become a distinctive sector within civil society.  NGOs have been engaged in all sectors of 
social life such as relief, rehabilitation, health, education, development, peace, human rights 
and environmental issues just to mention but a few.
2
 According to Kjaerum NGOs have four 
functions: 
 to articulate citizen demands through active participation and consciousness raising, 
 to encourage diversity and growth of different opinions, 
 to assist in integrating groups in civil society and within the political process, and 





NGOs, it has been argued, are increasingly becoming an important force because of claims 
that they are efficient and effective, innovative, flexible, independent and responsive to the 
plight of the poor at the grassroots level.
4
 
The neo-liberal theory of economics considers that state-centred development is not 
productive since it results in inefficient resource allocation and there is not sufficient 
economic incentive for public sector management to remedy the situation.  With the cutting 
back on public sector spending in many sub-Saharan African countries, NGOs have carried 
                                                          
1
 L M Salamon, SW Sokolowski and R List ‘Global Civil Society: An Overview’ in L M Salamon, S W 
Sokolowski and Associates (eds) ‘Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Non-profit Sector, Volume 2 (John 
Hopkins University, Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, 2004) 1.  
2
 Arupa Gunlugu ‘Historical Evolution of NGOs: NGO Proliferation in the Post-Cold War Era (2003) 4 Journal 
of Turkish Weekly 299-326. 
3
 Morten Kjaerum ‘The Contributions of Voluntary Organizations to the Development of Democratic 
Governance’ in Ann McKinstry & Birgit Lindsnaes (eds) The Role of Voluntary Organizations in Emerging 
Democracies : Experiences and Strategies in Eastern and Central Europe and in South Africa (New York and 
Copenhagen: Institute of International Education and Danish Centre for Human Rights,  1993) 15-16.  
4
 Gunlugu op cit note 2.  
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out functions that were previously managed by the state.  This has had implications for the 
NGO sector.  Among these is the rapid rise in the number of NGOs.  For example, in the field 
of human rights, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (African 
Commission) has granted observer status to over 231 human rights organisations since 1989
5
, 
the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) had accredited 3172 NGOs with 
UN Consultative Status by May 2009
6
, while the Council of Europe has to date granted 
participatory status to over 400 NGOs
7
.  
In the area of democracy promotion, NGOs are increasingly acting as a counter-weight to 
state power when they monitor human rights violations, promote civic consciousness and 
advance political pluralism.  NGOs have taken on a watch-dog role in pursuit of liberal values 
and the advancement of the ‘liberal democracy model’.  This model, built around rule of law 
principles and constitutionalism, is very much anchored in western liberal values and makes 
NGOs a key feature of the liberal tradition.
8
 The liberal democracy model advances the theory 
of a liberal democratic state whose values are good government, better delivery of services 
and political empowerment.  Under the liberal democracy model, emphasis is on protection of 
the individual against the state.  It presupposes that the African state is liberal yet most sub-
Saharan states do not fully and consistently follow a liberal ideology.  Edward and Hulme 
have argued that ‘NGO expansion is seen as complementing the counter-revolution in 
development theory that underpins the policies of structural adjustment favoured by official 
donors.  NGOs are seen as the ‘private non-profit’ sector, the performance of which advances 
the ‘public bad’ and the ‘private good’ ideology of the new orthodoxy’.
9
  
 The state-NGO relationship is therefore one of uneasy co-existence.  The state sees itself as 
the embodiment of popular wishes and best placed to determine what individual rights are and 
therefore resists any attempts by NGOs to open up the political space.  To governments in 
transition, the NGO action to advance human rights is clearly a political struggle.  The state 
sees itself as the repository of sovereignty and key actor within its borders.  The NGOs do not 
                                                          
5
 Resolution on the Cooperation between the African Commission on Human  and Peoples’ Rights and Non-
Governmental Organizations Having Observer Status with the Commission (Banjul 31 October 1998) ,available 





 Council of Europe Participatory Status, available at http://www.coe.int/t/ngo/particip_status_intro_en.as 
 
8
 Antonio Cassese ‘The General Assembly: Historical Perspectives’ in Philip Alston (ed) The United Nations 
and Human Rights: A Critical Perspective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) 26, 31. 
9
 M Edwards and D Hulme Making a Difference: NGOs and Development in Changing World (London: Earth 
scan, 1992) 20. 
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contest this central role but insist on the receptivity of the state to the popular wishes of the 
people they claim to represent.  
States in emerging democracies are still weak.  They have not built strong institutions to 
guarantee the aspirations of the people they govern.  They do not therefore know what to 
make of these human rights NGOs which demand accountability and responsive government, 
and more so how to relate to them.  The reaction to NGO actions therefore varies from 
suppression and co-option to partial independence.  Mutua argues that ‘it seems fair to 
conclude that a settled culture of state-civil society relations remains experimental, at best 
they are in a state of flux’.
10
  
Beyond the contest for political space, NGOs face a challenge of legitimacy.  The rapid rise in 
the number of NGOs has not been matched by an increase in the quality of their work, 
resulting in many common problems regarding accountability and transparency.  NGOs have 
been accused of failing to put public resources to proper use, to be ethical in the conduct of 
their business, to account to the communities they serve and to uphold principles of 
democratic governance in the management of their internal affairs.  Some NGOs have not 
been able to provide information on the money that they receive and where they have done so, 
they have provided inaccurate figures.
11
 NGOs have come under strong scrutiny in East and 
Southern Africa.  Difficult questions are being asked.  What are their agendas?  Are they 
independent, fair and credible? Are they accountable and democratic? 
 States have continually sought to regulate the operations of NGOs in a bid to promote their 
effectiveness, transparency and public accountability.  However, states are imposing 
restrictive legal frameworks that have the effect of undermining the space that these NGOs 
seek to open, their autonomy and independence, important elements to effective human rights 
advocacy.  In many African countries, NGOs that play an advocacy role are subject to 
complicated regulations aimed at suppressing them.  The state has the power to regulate but 
how to achieve this without undermining the very ethos of a democratic society and 
undermining the existence of these NGOs is the dilemma.  To what extent can states regulate 
the operations of NGOs without undermining the individual’s right to associate? What 
                                                          
10
 Makau Mutua ‘Human Rights NGOs in East Africa: Defining the Challenges’ in Makau Mutua (ed) Human 
Rights NGOs in East Africa: Political and Normative Tensions (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2009) 15. 
11
 Barr, Fafchamps and Owen Non-Governmental Organizations in Uganda: A report to the Government of 
Uganda (Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University, 2003) 21. 
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 The key issue is how to ensure effective citizen participation, to make the state more 
accountable and responsive to citizen demands and to uphold democracy without undermining 
state authority.  Mindful of the overriding goal of African human rights NGOs, which 
according to Wiseberg is ‘to open or keep open the political system of their countries, keep 
the governments accountable for their actions, document human rights abuses perpetrated 
against victims and press governments for corrective action’,
13
 how does one ensure 
harmonious power relations between the two? 
1. 1.  OUTLINE OF RESEARCH PROBLEM  
 
Human Rights NGOs have made important contributions to the struggle for human rights and 
democratic development in sub-Saharan Africa.  They hold states accountable for their 
actions, promote civic consciousness, and involve citizens in decision-making processes.  
Indeed, NGOs enjoy an enviable position in advancing the human rights discourse. 
Inspite of the invaluable contribution NGOs make to democracy and the human rights 
movement, they are faced with the challenge of credibility and effectiveness.  NGOs are 
plagued with a challenge of legitimacy, which raises questions about their mandate, 
independence, funding, and accountability.  
States in East and Southern Africa have, however, ratified international and regional human 
rights treaties that provide for the right to freedom of association and which impose 
obligations on the state to respect and protect the enjoyment of the right.
14
 States have also 
domesticated these human rights treaties and afforded protection to these rights in their 
national constitutions.  For example, Uganda’s Constitution recognises the right of every 
                                                          
12
Nelson Kasfir ‘Civil Society, the state and Democracy in Africa’ in Nelson Kasfir (ed) Civil Society and 
Democracy in Africa: Critical Perspectives (Newbury, London: Frank Cass Co. Ltd, 1998) 41.   
13
 Laurie Wiseberg as quoted in ‘Civil Society and Human Rights NGOs: Themes for the late 1990s in Africa’ in 
Claude Welch, Emerson (eds) Protecting Human Rights in Africa: Roles and Strategies of Non-Governmental 
Organizations (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania Press, 1995) 42-74 at 73.  
14
 Article 20 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948),UN General Assembly Resolution 217 a 
(111), available at UN Doc A/810 at 71 (1948), Article 22(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (1966), UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A(XXI) 16 December 1966 available at 21 UN General 
Assembly Ordinary Resolution Supplement (No 16) at 52 UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171,   Article 5 
of the UN Declaration of Human Rights Defenders (1998), UN General Assembly Resolution 
A/53/144,available at E/CN,4/2000/95   and  Article 10(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(1981),available at OAU Doc.CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev.5,    
5 |  
 
person to the right to freedom of association,
15










As it is shown later, states have, despite these treaty obligations, reacted by imposing 
restrictive regulatory frameworks within which Government monitors and registers NGOs.  
For example, the NRM government enacted the Non-Governmental Organisations 
Registration (Amendment) Act of 2006 that restricts NGO activities and subjects them to the 
control of a Government Board comprising of government and security personnel.  
Subsequently, NGO Regulations No 19 of 2007 were adopted.  The regulations restrict NGO 
activities and bring into question the available space, functionality, and rationale for 
regulation of NGOs, and the application of international human rights principles namely, 
rights to freedom of association, right to operate free from unwarranted state interference,
20
 
and the state’s duty to protect.
21
 As the court observed in Christopher Mtikila v AG,
 22
 a law 
which limits or derogates from the basic rights of the individual must be lawful and be free 
from arbitrary abuse by those in authority and be reasonably necessary to achieve the intended 
objective. There is therefore a challenge of balancing the state obligation to regulate and the 
duty to uphold human rights principles.  Uganda like many other states in East and Southern 
Africa faces a similar challenge.  
This study therefore investigates the existing regulatory models and possible reforms to 
ensure an appropriate NGO regulatory framework that upholds the internationally accepted 
human rights principles in Uganda.  The thesis seeks to demonstrate two basic aspects: (a) 
that the existing NGO regulatory model does not meet the basic requirements of the right to 
freedom of association as prescribed in the Uganda Constitution of 1995, and international 
and regional human rights treaties to which Uganda is a party, and (b) identify areas of 
possible reform for an appropriate regulatory model.  The thesis argues for a more enabling 
regulatory framework that promotes NGO accountability while making it possible for the 
state to respect the right to associate.  The thesis is premised on the idea that achieving an 
                                                          
15
 Article 29 (1) (e) of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (as amended) 1995. 
16
 Article 36(1) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 
17
 Article 32 (1) of the Constitution of Malawi, 1994. 
18
 Article 58(1) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe (Amendment) No 20, 2013. 
19
 Article 18 of the Constitution of South Africa, 1994. 
20
 Article 3 of the UN Declaration of Human Rights Defenders (1998), Adopted on 16 December 1998, and UN 
General Assembly Resolution A/53/144, available at E/CN.4/2000/95. 
21
 Article 2 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,  UN General Assembly Resolution 
2200A (XXI) 16 December 1966 available at 21 UN General Assembly Ordinary Resolution  Supplement (No 
16) at 52 UN Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U. N. T. S.  171[accessed on 22 September 2010].  
22
 High Court of Dodoma, Civil Case No 5 of 1993. 
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appropriate regulatory framework will require reform in the existing law which takes into 
account principles of constitutional and international law relating to the right to freedom of 
association; global trends in NGO regulation,
23
and most importantly, the need to ensure the 
accountability, effectiveness and active participation of NGOs.  These factors are based on the 
requirements of the right to freedom of association that entitle an individual to the right to 
form an association, and to operate such association free from unwarranted state interference 




1. 2.  RESEARCH OBJECTIVE  
 
As noted above, the aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that Uganda’s NGO regulatory 
framework does not comply with the internationally accepted human rights principles, and 
more importantly, to suggest a model for ensuring compliance with these standards. 
 
1.3. SPECIFIC OBJECTIVES 
 To provide an historical account of the emergence, growth and relationship of NGOs 
with the state in Africa. 
 To examine the concept of democracy and provide a normative framework for its 
application in the regulation of NGOs in Africa. 
 To discuss the question of legitimacy of NGOs in Eastern and Southern Africa. 
 To examine the regulatory framework governing NGOs under international law. 
 To investigate the reason why states regulate NGOs using case studies of the legal 
framework in selected countries in Eastern and Southern Africa. 
 To discuss the regulatory regime and its impact on the functioning of NGOs in 
Uganda. 
                                                          
23
 The Criteria of countries chosen for comparative review are set out in below (section 1.7). 
24
 UN Human Rights Committee Resolution 15/21, http: // www.daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G10/166/98/PDF/G1016698.pdf? 
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 To make recommendations for an appropriate regulatory model for NGOs in Uganda.  
1. 4.  SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY  
 
The NRM government has made some reforms since it came to power in 1986.  Among these 
democratic reforms was the adoption of the Constitution of Uganda, 1995, that guarantees 
rights to association, expression and assembly.
25
 As Uganda continues on a democratic path, 
it is expected that the existing NGO regulatory framework will be subject to scrutiny and 
court challenge.  Already, the NGO Registration (Amendment) Act, 2006 has been a subject 
of court litigation in the case of Kaggwa Andrew & Ors v The Minister of Internal Affairs,
 26
  
where the applicants, being members of Caring for Orphans, Women, and the Elderly 
(COWE), an NGO registered under the Non-Governmental Organisations Registration 
Statute, 1989 challenged the powers of the National Board of NGOs to cancel their 
registration certificate in the ‘public interest’.  The applicants were aggrieved by the decision 
of the NGO Board to de-register their organization without an opportunity to be heard and the 
decision of the Minister of Internal Affairs to uphold the Board’s decision on appeal.  The 
applicants sought a declaration that the decision of the National Board to revoke the 
registration of COWE without a hearing and giving reasons was null and void.  The court held 
that the right to be notified of the charges against it and to be heard in response to those 
allegations is a fundamental requirement of natural justice and the failure to comply with it 
rendered the Board decision null and void.  The court granted the declaration and directed the 
NGO Board to re-instate the registration of COWE as an NGO.
27
 Presently, the Human Rights 
Network, a coalition of human rights NGOs, has petitioned the constitutional court, seeking a 
declaration that the NGO Registration (Amendment) Act, 2006 restricts the freedom of NGOs 
to operate freely and violates the constitutional provisions on the right to freedom of 
association.
28
 At the time of writing, the case had yet to be listed for hearing.   
Uganda is currently considering a review of all legislation that does not meet her 
constitutional obligations.  Where such review takes place, it should be comprehensive and 
well informed.  Such a review process can benefit from a wealth of experiences within the 
Eastern and Southern Africa sub-region as well as borrow any good practices from within the 
Council of Europe and the United Nations.  For example, the United Nations Human Rights 
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 Constitutional Petition No 9/2005.  
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Council has recommended that Uganda simplifies the NGO registration requirements and 
eases the heavy administrative burdens on NGOs, such as the yearly registration obligations.
29
 
It is hoped that this study will contribute such knowledge, on which the process of reviewing 
the current NGO Act could draw from.  
 
1.5.   LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
There is substantial literature on NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa but it mostly focuses on their 
emergence, growth and roles.  There is hardly any significant literature on the regulation of 
NGOs in Eastern and Southern Africa.  Much of the writing on the evolution of NGOs 
underscores how NGOs have drawn inspiration from the global economic crisis of the 1970s 
and the trend towards globalisation witnessed over the 1980 and 1990s.  Several authors 
attribute NGO growth to the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the failure of the post-colonial 
state in the 1980s.  State despotism and inspiration of the international human rights 
movement are singled out as causal factors in this upsurge of African human rights NGOs in 
the 1990s.  Zeleza, Tandon and Mohanty, and Welch make similar observations and hold that 




Although these authors agree on the historical development of NGOs, Cassese and Pinkney 
assert that the NGO revolution was a direct consequence of the western liberal tradition 
whose main preoccupation is the advancement of the liberal democratic state.
31
  None of these 
authors, however, directly addresses the issue of state regulation and its impact on NGOs, a 
subject of this study.  Critics of human rights and the liberal democracy model have been 
questioning the value of NGOs and have raised issues of legitimacy and pondered over state 
regulation.  Cassese, for example, has argued that liberalism, political democracy and human 
                                                          
29
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May 2014]. 
30
 Paul Tiyambe Zeleza ‘Introduction: The Struggle for Human Rights in Africa’ in Paul Tiyambe Zeleza & 
Philip J McConnaughy (eds) Human Rights, Rule of Law and Development in Africa (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2004),  Rajesh Tandon &Ranjita Mohanty ‘Civil Society and Governance: Issues and 
Problematics’ in Rajesh Tandon &Ranjita Mohanty (eds) Does Civil Society Matter (New Delhi: Sage 
Publications, 2004),  Claude E Welch Jr. ‘Human Rights and Development in Africa: Non-Governmental 
Organizations’ in Paul Tiyambe Zeleza & Philip J McConnaughy (eds) Human Rights, the Rule of Law and 
Development in Africa(Philadelphia: Pennsylvania Press, 2004) 198, 200.  
31
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and Human Rights : A Critical Perspective (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) 26, 31,  Robert Pinkney (ed) 
Democracy in the Third World (Boulder, Colo: Lynne Publishers, 2003) 10, 12.  
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rights are intrinsically part of the same historical and philosophical tradition.
32
 Although 
Cassese has argued that human rights are an imposition of western values on the rest of the 
world, and views NGOs as agents of foreign interests, he questions the capacity of the state to 
police itself given that it is the guarantor of rights and the main abuser.
33
 
Although the importance of NGOs is underscored by Donelly and Bratton to include 
documenting the plight of victims, pressing governments for corrective action, standard 
setting and speaking on behalf of those who suffer,
34
 Bratton raises the key question relevant 
to this study: how to balance central political control with the autonomy of civic 
organizations.
35
 There are many scholars whose writings are of value in understanding the 
NGO construct and why states are prompted to restrict their activities.  For example, 
Wiseberg who presents a case study of NGOs during the Derg regime in Ethiopia, and the 
communist view of development, puts the adoption of the Charities and Societies 
Proclamation of Ethiopia in a proper context.
36
 She sees the Proclamation as an inevitable 
consequence of their belief in group ideology and state domination.
37
   
NGO legitimacy has often been cited as an underlying reason for state control.  The lack of a 
strong social base, external dependence, as well as a predatory legal and regulatory regime 
contributes significantly to the crisis of legitimacy.  Chazan, Kasfir, and Gyimah-Boadi have 
noted the lack of a strong social base, patronage, and a weak material base as issues that affect 
NGO legitimacy.
38
 No in-depth discussion has been undertaken to propose how this crisis can 
be overcome. 
In the East African context, a recent book by Mutua helps us to understand the contemporary 
challenges faced by NGOs in this region.
39
 Although the study addresses a range of topics 
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Ltd,  1998)7, Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi ‘Civil Society and Democratic Development’ in E Gyimah-Boadi (ed) 
Democratic Reform in Africa, The Quality of Progress (Boulder,  London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004) 117.   
 
39
 Makau Mutua (ed) Human Rights NGOs in East Africa Africa: Political and Normative Tensions.  
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 2009).  
10 |  
 
touching on social and economic rights, gender, strategies for social change, and the challenge 
of the legitimacy of NGOs, it does not address the problem of state regulation and how it 
impacts on NGOs in the region.  
Bazaara’s studies on the growth of civil society in Uganda are helpful in understanding the 
link between civil society and democratisation in Uganda.
40
 The studies help in highlighting 
the nature of citizen efforts in engaging the state but fall short of showing how policy 
frameworks have impacted on the freedom of citizens to operate.  
The research by Mamdani and Oloka-Onyango is instructive.
41
 It demonstrates very clearly 
how the state has used the law to control the activities of civil society.  In a very analytical 
sense it shows how ‘draw back’ clauses have been used by the state to stifle fundamental 
freedoms enshrined in the constitution.  The research however falls short of proposing any 
possible areas for reform and suggesting how state regulation can be improved to promote the 
sustainability of NGOs.  
The writings of Barya are equally illuminating although they do not go far enough in the 
context of this study.
42
 The ‘statisation of civil society’, a major finding of this book, which 
the author decries, is helpful in raising the red flag about the dangers of such a model and its 
potential to stifle the growth of civic associations.  The research however fails to make any 
recommendations on what an appropriate regulatory model would be which renders the work 
to be of limited value to this study.  
Finally, Maria Nassali’s thesis on NGOs, Governance and Human Rights in Kenya, Tanzania, 
Uganda and South Africa focuses on internal governance and accountability of NGOs, in 
particular, on transparency and accountability of NGOs.  Although the thesis makes reference 
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to reporting obligations of NGOs under the NGO laws in those countries, it does not discuss 
the existing regulatory models and their impact on the functioning of NGOs. 
43
 
In light of the above observations, the relevance of this study is justified.  
 
1. 6.  LIMITATIONS TO THE STUDY 
 
This study encountered one major limitation.  This was the definitional challenge.  The 
‘terms’ used and the ‘meanings’ associated with the term ‘NGO’ in each country varied 
greatly.  The NGO laws define and apply the term ‘NGO’ differently in each country yet there 
is no international instrument that defines the term ‘NGO’.  Whereas in some countries, an 
‘NGO’ refers to a Non-Governmental Organisation, in others it could be a Public Benefit 
Organisation, a Trust, a Company or a Private Voluntary Organisation, making comparisons 
between countries more complex.
44
   
 
1.7. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND COUNTRIES CHOSEN FOR 
COMPARATIVE STUDY 
 
In responding to the problem statement, the thesis takes a descriptive and analytical approach 
of the NGO regulatory framework from a comparative perspective.  The study focuses on 
Uganda and makes comparisons with selected countries in Eastern and Southern Africa.   
The study has relied on primary and secondary sources to address the issues that arise from 
the problem statement.  At the primary level, data is drawn from international instruments and 
customary principles applicable to NGOs and binding upon states, as found in treaties, 
legislation (domestic and foreign), statutes, subsidiary legislation, case law, official records, 
government reports, archival records, United Nations and other intergovernmental 
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organization official documentation, aides memoirs, travaux preparatoires to treaty 
documents, Parliamentary hansard, and decisions of regional and international treaty bodies.  
The focus on national instruments is limited to those countries that have been profiled for the 
case study.  
At the secondary level, information has been obtained from books, journal articles, internet 
sources and to a limited extent newspaper articles.  Writings of academics, media, civil 
society organisations, commentators, and government officials have been useful.  
Although the thesis is not presented as a comparative study, there are several countries in 
Eastern and Southern Africa whose regulatory frameworks have contributed to shaping this 
thesis.  All the countries surveyed are mainly common law jurisdictions who have adopted 
NGO regulatory frameworks relevant to this study: Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, South 
Africa, and Zimbabwe.  Each country profiled was chosen based on whether it applies one of 
the three regulatory models: state regulation, state-NGO regulation or self-regulation.  
Ethiopia and Zimbabwe have adopted state regulation; Kenya and Malawi apply state-NGO 
regulation, with Namibia and South Africa bordering on self-regulation. There were many 
other jurisdictions to consider but for pragmatic reasons, these were chosen. 
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1. 8.  CONCLUSION AND CHAPTER SYNOPSIS  
 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters.   
This Chapter has introduced the study topic and provided the background to the study.  It 
provides a brief history of NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa highlighting the important role that 
they play in advancing democracy and human rights principles but hastened to warn of the 
uneasy relationship with the state.  It identified the two major challenges facing NGOs; one 
being the contest over political space, and second, the challenge of legitimacy and used them 
to justify why states regulate NGOs.  The chapter presented the research problem, the 
research objective, the significance of the study as well as the research methodology used in 
the study.  
Chapter 2 provides a historical account of NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa at different stages of 
Africa’s political development: the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods, and 
provides a working definition of NGOs.  It also provides a theoretical justification for the 
emergence and growth of NGOs in Africa, situating them in the global development 
discourse.  This is crucial for an understanding of the legal framework governing NGOs in 
Eastern and Southern Africa.   
Chapter 3 examines the concept of democracy and adopts a normative framework within 
which an assessment of the regulatory framework is done in Chapter 6.  Understanding the 
concept of democracy and the underlying principles and the enabling environment provides 
useful data against which the appropriateness of a particular regulatory model is determined.  
Chapter 4 discusses the vexed issue of the legitimacy of NGOs in Eastern and Southern 
Africa.  Aware of the identity of NGOs, it seeks to establish the underlying causes of state-
NGO tensions, and what the challenges to the credibility and effectiveness of NGOs are.  
Applying a human rights discourse to NGOs, that stresses accountability, transparency, 
participation, empowerment, and equity it proposes how these issues could be addressed in 
order to restore public confidence in the NGO sector.  
Chapter 5 examines the regulatory framework governing NGOs under international law.  In 
particular it discusses the international human rights framework within which NGOs operate.  
It takes a hard look at the regulatory framework for NGOs within the United Nations, the 
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African Union and the Council of Europe.  The chapter looks at the registration procedures 
within these human rights mechanisms to establish possible lessons or standards for an 
appropriate regulatory framework for Uganda.  
Chapter 6 investigates how and why states regulate NGOs.  Using case studies of the existing 
legal framework in six countries of Eastern and Southern Africa, the chapter undertakes a 
comparative review of the NGO regulatory framework in selected countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Malawi, Namibia, South Africa and Zimbabwe.  The study makes an attempt at drawing a 
link between democracy, civic space and the regulatory regime and draws conclusions on the 
suitability of each model.   
Chapter 7 examines the regulatory framework governing NGOs and its impact on the 
sustainability of NGOs in Uganda.  Taking a historical account of the NGO movement in 
Uganda, the chapter examines the nature of democratic spaces and how the regulatory regime 
has impacted on them.  
Chapter 8 revisits the major questions investigated in this study.  It summarises the main 
findings and conclusions set out in each of the chapters and sets out the key recommendations 
for the improvements for an acceptable regulatory framework of NGOs in Uganda. 
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CHAPTER 2  
 
 




Domestic human rights NGOs are a relatively new phenomenon in Africa.  They proliferated 
in the 1980s and have increasingly become important players in the defence of human rights.  
In an age of rights, they play a primary role in focusing the international community on 
human rights issues.  NGOs monitor the actions of governments and pressure them to act 
according to human rights principles.  Beyond monitoring human rights violations, NGOs 
educate, promote, challenge and defend citizen interests.  According to Korten, NGOs are 
seen as vehicles for democratisation and an essential component of a thriving civil society.
45
 
Korten argues that NGOs are increasingly acting as a counter-weight to state power, 
protecting human rights, opening up channels of communication and participation, providing 
a training ground for social activities and promoting pluralism.
46
   
But the growth of NGOs in Africa over the past two decades is also seen as a dilemma.  Not 
only have NGOs assumed a distinctive sector within civil society, but they have made claims 
of being efficient and effective, innovative, flexible and responsible.  As citizens exercise 
their rights to freedom of association, a wide array of organisations and associations that 
operate in civil society continue to grow in all areas whether political, religious, artistic, 
sporting or commercial.  
Protagonists have since the beginning of the century been engaged in a debate on the historic 
evolution of NGOs.  Difficult questions are being asked.  What are NGOs?  How have they 
evolved?  What explains their considerable growth? 
This chapter provides an historical account of the development of NGOs in sub-Saharan 
Africa during the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial periods.  The aim here is to explain 
                                                          
45
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their emergence, growth and relationship with the state.  This historic narrative is in no way 
exhaustive.  Equally important are the philosophical and theoretical principles that explain the 
emergence of NGOs across Africa in the 1980s and 1990s. 
The chapter has two parts.  Part One makes an attempt at defining NGOs within the broader 
context of civil society.  Part Two examines the nature of state-NGO relations at different 
periods of Africa’s political development.    
2. 1. NGOs AND CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
Defining the term ‘NGO’ outside the term ‘civil society’ is fraught with difficulties.  Not only 
are NGOs part of civil society, the term also finds expression in a wide array of associations 
including clubs, political groups, community based organizations, self-help groups, religious, 
artistic, sporting, professional associations and charities, among many others.  Civil society 
too is restrictive because it excludes every organ in society that operates outside government.  
What then is the meaning of civil society? 
2. 1. 1.  The Concept of ‘Civil Society’ in Africa 
 
The term ‘civil society’ is riddled with conceptual and definitional challenges.  According to 
Chabal, ‘civil society’ is ‘a vast ensemble of constantly changing groups and individuals 
whose only common ground is their exclusion from the state, their consciousness of their 
externality and their potential opposition to the state’.
47
  Chabal further argues that civil 
society ‘consists not just of those who are not part of the state but also all those who may have 
become powerless or disenfranchised; all who feel they are without due access to the state’.
48
 
Emerson holds a similar view.  He argues that ‘civil society’ is an arena where manifold 
social movements and civil organisations from all classes attempt to constitute themselves in 




Whereas it can be contended that civil society comprises non-state actors, the overemphasis 
on ‘exclusion from and opposition to the state’ that Chabal stresses is not entirely accurate.  It 
is not necessarily correct that civil society in contemporary Africa does not often have ‘formal 
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power’ but it is not without power.
50
 This thesis agrees with Chabal to the extent that he 
argues that ‘whether individually, collectively, by avoidance, stealth or confrontation, civil 
society in post-colonial Africa has been responding to the state’.
51
 It would appear in my view 
and therefore much in agreement with Bratton that civil society ‘need not be of necessity 
antistatist’, associational life is likely to thrive in the presence of an effective state and weak 
states can sometimes become stronger and more legitimate by permitting a measure of 
pluralism in associational life.
52
 
In this thesis it is contended that there is a contested ‘space’ between the ‘family and the 
state’.  This space, which in my view commands a number of actors who are outside the direct 
control of the state have interests that they seek to safeguard, among them ‘freedom’.  It is 
these actors who in their constant effort to expand this ‘freedom’ constitute ‘civil society’.  
Gramcsi agrees. He views civil society as ‘autonomous organisations outside the direct 
control of the state’ who provide a safeguard against totalitarian statism thereby turning 
necessity into freedom, buttressing society against tyranny and working to build a foundation 
for a more decent and tolerant existence.
53
 Consistent with this thinking Cohen has likewise 
argued that ‘the desire to expand degrees of freedom, irrespective of how free or coercive a 
regime could be, breeds an irreducible quantity of freely negotiable interactions’.
54
 It is this 
urge for interaction that justifies the existence of civil society in my view. 
Azarya has, in his ‘statist theory’ argued that ‘incorporation or disengagement from the state 
draws attention to various groups and sectors in the civil society as they respond to state 
actions or anticipated state actions which lead to a perceived change in the field of 
opportunities of given groups or individuals’.
55
 According to Fatton, this ‘statist theory’ is 
based on two principal processes; the ‘shrinking realm of the state obligations and expanding 
sphere of the market or in contrast the authoritarian reach of the state and its regiment 
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network of control, that of necessity makes subordinate classes retreat into their own spaces 
for survival and engage in all sorts of self-help activities’.
56
  
In the case of incorporation, large sections of the population associate with the state and take 
part in its activities in order to share its resources; such activities might be initiated by 
individuals or groups solicited by the state.
57
 
 Disengagement, by contrast, is the ‘tendency to withdraw from the state’, a response often in 
protest against unpopular government policies.
58
 Such activities of disengagement include 
‘parallel markets, brain drain, and non-compliance with laws’.
59
 Traditional structures take 
centre stage as the ordinary population seeks protection from instability and arbitrariness of 
state channels.  This thesis however contends that Azarya’s postulation of incorporation or 
disengagement falls short of encouraging ‘participation’, a much more desirable approach to 
state-society relations.  Participation in this sense is understood according to Ndegwa, with 
whom I agree, to ‘strengthen the checks on abuses of power and influence’.
60
 
Much as the focus is on engagement of the state, a much more focussed view of civil society 
consisting of ‘organizations that are autonomous, voluntary and protected by the rule of law, 
organized to influence policy makers, mobilise public opinion and hold governments 
accountable at all levels’ is preferred.
61
 In its broad sense civil society would include the 
‘civic community of neighbourhood associations, political parties, grass-roots support 
organisations and social movements which complement state and market and form the 
informal sector of the polity’.
62
 
Whether viewed from a narrow or broad sense, civil society is conditioned by three qualities: 
human rights practices of the state, a concern for the public or common good (education, 
healthcare, social security, etc) and the welfare of others.
63
 These qualities are underpinned by 
three elements; the relationship between the state and the citizenry, is it fair to the majority to 
guarantee emergence of an environment in which human rights safeguards emerge; the degree 
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to which the norms and values of society propagate a concern for the public or common good, 




 The pursuit of these values evokes a response from individuals or a group of individuals in 
association with others who constitute civil society.  This view is also supported by Tandon 
and Mohanty who argue that ‘conceptualisation of civil society is rooted in two traditions; the 
revolutionary imagery of civil society where people counter pose themselves against state 
power and in the process either replace it or reform it or the Tocquevillean interpretation of 
civic associations performing the role of watchdogs in a democracy’.
65
 
In this thesis civil society is to be viewed more as a ‘watchdog’ that curbs any authoritarian 
tendencies of the democratic state.  This thesis narrows the definition of civil society to a civil 
society organisation which can be defined as an NGO whose primary purpose is to influence 
public policy.  That public policy objective would include, as Kasfir puts it, ‘making the 
African state more democratic, more transparent and more accountable’.
66
 The civil society 
organisation in this sense enjoys autonomy from the state, has an important goal of supporting 
democracy by ‘deepening policy accountability and widening participation’.
67
 
 Deepening policy accountability and widening participation would necessitate such NGO to 
‘monitor the exercise of state power, stimulate political participation, educate people in 
democracy, represent interests, and hold rulers accountable to their citizens’.
68
 Such civil 
society organisations according to Gyimah would include; ‘human rights advocacy groups, 
independent press, civil liberties organisations, middle class professional bodies (bar 
associations/law societies)’ who would monitor and keep governments under check.
69
 Indeed 
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it is within civil society that public opinion is formed and it is through ‘independent 
associations’ that individuals can have some influence on government decision-making.
70
 
In conclusion, despite varying viewpoints on civil society, civil society organisations seek to 
influence public policy, promote democracy and broaden space for citizen participation. 
Within this broad context of civil society, one finds NGOs.  What are NGOs? 
2. 1. 2.  Defining NGOs 
 
There is no universally agreed definition of the term ‘NGO’.  Depending on who uses the 
term and the purpose for which it is put, it could have different meanings.  The Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC) defines an NGO as ‘any organisation that is not established by a 
governmental entity or intergovernmental agreement’.
71
Meanwhile, the World Bank defines 
NGOs as ‘groups and institutions that are entirely or largely independent of government and 
characterised primarily by humanitarian or co-operative rather than commercial 
objectives’.
72
Read strictly, both intergovernmental agencies define NGOs in terms of the 
functions that they perform.  
Another approach has been to define NGOs in terms of what they are not.  For example, 
Edwards and Hulme identify four defining characteristics to distinguish NGOs from other 
organs in civil society: there are voluntary, dependent, not-for-profit and not self-serving.
73
 
Kamminga has a similar view.  He defines NGOs by what they are not.  Four elements 
constitute his criteria of an NGO: that NGOs are private structures, since they are not 
established or controlled by states, that NGOs do not contest political power, as such they are 
not opposition parties, armed groups or liberation movements, that NGOs do not seek 
financial profit, they are therefore non-profit making and despite occasional engagement in 
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The Commonwealth Foundation also distinguishes NGOs using four criteria: ‘voluntary, 
managed and controlled independently, non-profit making and not self- serving’.
75
 For the 
International Council of Human Rights Policy (ICHRP), NGOs are defined in terms of human 
rights protection and promotion.  The ICHRP on its part defines NGOs as groups working on 




In Africa, as Nassali observes, NGOs are defined in legalistic terms.
77
 For example, in 
Malawi, an NGO is defined as ‘Non-Governmental Organisation constituted for a public 
benefit purpose to which the provisions of the NGO Act apply’.
78
 In Uganda, an NGO is 
defined broadly as an ‘organisation established to provide voluntary services including 
religious, educational, literacy, scientific, social or charitable services to the community’. 
79
 In 
Kenya, an NGO is defined as a ‘private voluntary grouping of individuals or associations, not 
operated for profit or for other commercial purposes but which have organized themselves 
nationally or internationally for the promotion of social welfare, development, charity or 
research through mobilization of resources’.
80
 Meanwhile South Africa defines a non-profit 
organisation as a ‘trust, company or other association of persons, established for a public 
purpose; and the income and property of which are not distributable to its members or office-
bearers except as reasonable compensation for services rendered’. 
81
  
Whatever the definition of the term ‘NGO’, this thesis focuses on ‘NGOs’ as a part of civil 
society.  It could be a foundation, national organisation, trust, professional association, 
informal association or community- based group. 
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In the next section is an examination of the historical evolution of NGOs in Africa, and in 
particular, the nature of state-NGO relations at different periods of Africa’s political 
development.   
2. 2.  THE PRE-COLONIAL PERIOD 
 
Pre-colonial Africa is known to have harboured many forms of socio-political organisation 
ranging from centralised kingdoms such as Buganda, Bunyoro-Kitara, in East Africa; the 
Ashanti, Benin, Yoruba and Igbo of West Africa, Bemba and Kuba of Central Africa, the 
Swazi and Zulu of South Africa to stateless societies in many parts of Africa.  Pre-colonial 
Africa was, according to Fernyhough, ‘pre-capitalist, predominantly agrarian, relatively 
decentralised politically and characterised by communal social relations’.
82
 In centralised 
kingdoms such as Ashanti and Benin of West Africa and Buganda in East Africa, ‘the 
kingdoms were built around centralised bureaucracies; most Africans lived in rural areas and 
stateless societies were organised around the ‘family, kinship group and clan’, and often 
migrated from one area to another in the face of war, disease, drought and economic need’.
83
 
African society is known to have been built around ‘traditions and myths’.  Owusu, writing 
about African society has also argued that the daily lives of Africans were among others 
informed by a ‘legacy of pre-colonial traditions and institutions’.
84
 At the centre of these 
traditions were well defined ‘myths of origin’ that defined the societal political cultures. 
These myths according to Chazan highlighted the ‘centrality of human beings in the social 
order projected an essentially pragmatic view of political life, delineated principles of social 
differentiation, division of labour and access to valued resources’.
85
   
 Did these African traditions value human rights of the individual and were they permissive of 
the rights of expression and association essential for civil society growth? Did they permit 
independent views to flourish? The views on the human rights tradition of pre-colonial Africa 
are rather divided.  Like many non-western pre-industrial societies, traditional African 
institutions tended to highlight the importance of the community above the individual, often 
emphasising duties and obligations to the community.  Mojekwu who takes a rather positive 
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view of pre-colonial Africa has posited that the ‘concepts of human rights have been basic to 
Africa since antiquity, emphasising a communitarian ideology’.
86
 He presupposes that rights 
of expression and association existed in pre-colonial Africa.  It could be argued that in some 
societies individuals in pre-colonial Africa enjoyed rights of free speech, conscience and 
religion although in varying degrees.  In Igbo land for example, adult males and elder women 
could attend and express their views at meetings of their lineage.  In Benin, members of 
palace associations, and hereditary chiefs could speak openly before the Oba (king). 
Wai portrays an even brighter picture of pre-colonial Africa when he asserts that ‘individuals 
in pre-colonial Africa may have enjoyed greater freedom’.
87
 Wai claims that human rights are 
not founded in western values of ‘individualism’ alone but are equally a product of distinctive 
African cultural milieus.
88
 Nyerere and Kaunda express a strong view of support of both 
Mojekwu and Wai when they claim that the ‘communitarian tradition’ is known to have 
affirmed collective rights and the reciprocal commitments Africans had to their communities 
in return for the protection of their human dignity.
89
 
It naturally follows that human dignity by extension was affirmed within the ‘extended family 
and community’ context.
90
 Although Mojekwu, Nyerere and Kaunda ‘applaud the 
communitarian approach to human rights in pre-colonial Africa’ this thesis views the lack of 
‘individual liberty’ as highly restrictive of the freedom of expression and association at the 
time and argue that pre-colonial Africa had ‘little concern for human rights’, much in 
agreement with Eze.
91
 In the circumstances, ‘space’ for civil society action would be difficult 
to come by. 
 Mojekwu, in yet another rather persuasive approach has argued that human rights in Africa 
were founded on ‘communal principle and practice’ and therefore ‘human dignity and justice’ 
rested on membership within the community (the clan, lineage, age grade, generation, village 
or family) which validated an individual’s claim to human rights.
92
 What then, were the rights 
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of the individual within this society? What happens to those who felt oppressed and left out of 
the decision making or seen as outcasts, did they have the space to check the excesses of those 
in authority? Nyerere, in what could be viewed as a defensive view argues that the 
‘communitarian perspective’ rendered the pre-colonial African society to be more 
‘egalitarian’, and therefore perceived to have an absence of exploitative classes’.
93
  
Nothing could be further from the truth in my view as Bayart has noted:  
traditional African politics assumed a highly personal aura; power was vested in 
particular authority figures who even when carefully supervised developed 
paternalistic and even highly authoritarian styles.  Examples include Zulu of Southern 




Whereas it is on record that pre-colonial Africa had a great commitment to their clans and 
extended families and community, it is presumptuous to conclude that personal freedom was 
valued or that space could be yielded to those who sought to dissent.  As Donnelly has put it: 
It appears that the community permits the individual to enjoy human rights but has the 
prior right to deny that enjoyment.  The community can always amend individual 
duties required for its own well being, though this may detract from human rights....in 




What is described as an ‘egalitarian society’ by Nyerere was indeed very prescriptive.  
African society cherished the principle of ‘deference and fear’.  The unfettered obedience to 
elders, clan heads, and village chiefs was widespread.  Although Marasinghe has argued that 
‘village democracy existed’, this thesis contends that this was a ‘preserve of the hereditary 
chiefs and royalty’.
96
 For example, even though the Yoruba regarded the freedom to speak 
and express an opinion as a common right, it was highly restricted to a ‘hierarchy of respect 
for parents, heads of households and elders’.
97
 In Buganda it was only the kabaka’s (king) 
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most senior and trusted officials who could ‘remonstrate with the king openly without 
reprisal’.
98
 In Swaziland only the king’s mother, his kinsmen and his council could criticise 
the king openly.
99
 There was clearly no room for organised civil society to emerge or even 
grow. 
The lack of ‘civic space’ for formal opposition can easily be inferred from the view held by 
Nyerere when he argues that: 
Although African tribes did not have modern form of political parties or non –
governmental organisations, they had their own ways of democratic governance. 
Traditional African societies had powerful chiefs but were not dictatorships.  Elders 
would sit under a tree, talk until they agree. 
100
 
It is evident from Nyerere’s admission that ‘citizen participation’ was not central to the 
decision making process, consultations were restricted to the high and mighty, often those 
who held authority; there was hardly room for the citizen to dissent.   
Chabal echoes Nyerere’s view when he notes that: 
 pre-colonial African societies operated according to certain sets of moral, religious 
and philosophical principles.  There were rights, duties and obligations.  The notion of 
the ‘individual’ was not pronounced as the ‘community’.
101
 
There were instances when ‘authority figures’ who deviated would be subject to ‘curbs or 
checks’. Many pre-colonial societies had a machinery to oversee rulers, monitor their actions 
and call them to account when they failed to fulfil their obligations.  Such sanctions against 
abuse of power included ‘gossip, ridicule, and spread of rumour or imposition of 
sanctions’.
102
 But even then this power to check on ‘errant’ leaders could only be exercised by 
the royalty or council of elders or chiefs.  The subject or citizen could hardly express formal 
opposition, to do so, attracted very severe punishment that would include such a person being 
excommunicated, being given away as a slave or sacrificed.  For example, among the Swazi, 
the responsibility of preventing abuses of royal power lay with the liqoqo (council chiefs), in 
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Lesotho reducing rights abuses by Moshoeshoe’s state lay with the pitso,  chiefs  and in 
Buganda it was the Lukiiko (King’s council).
103
 
The lack of room for popular dissent or space to express dissatisfaction with the authority by 
the subordinate class accounts for the diverse forms of protest and resistance that ranged from 
‘overt’ to ‘hidden’ resistance in many parts of pre-colonial Africa.  There were ‘passive’ 
voices and ‘active’ voices.  There were ‘defiant, radical, differential as well as conformist 
voices’.
104
 Like in many other pre-industrial societies where space for civil society action was 
constrained and where social contradictions were prevalent, there were instances when 
subordinate classes protested or rebellions became rife.  While some societies like Yoruba, 
Asante, and Benin were permissive of rights, others were autocratic like Swazi, Baganda and 
Zulu as noted above.  
As Chazan observes, ‘formal opposition was either circumscribed or considered subversive’, 
and this accounts for internal conflicts, which led to factionalism in some societies and 
disintegration in others.
105
 It would appear therefore that at the time of colonisation, pre-
colonial Africa presented a mixture of both limited democratic and autocratic precepts and 
structures.  Whereas in some societies there was room for consultation and participation 
within existing authority structures, others were highly autocratic and no form of dissent was 
allowed.  It was not uncommon in different areas of pre-colonial Africa for democratic 
traditions and principles to run parallel to authoritarian norms.  Without any political opening, 
it would be foolhardy to expect independent associations to be established to check arbitrary 
action and broaden citizen participation. The ‘authority structures’ dominated every aspect of 
society, civic space was constrained and civil society hardly existed.  
In conclusion, pre-colonial Africa was a diverse society, ranging from highly centralised 
kingdoms to clans and stateless societies.  Daily life revolved around traditions, customs and 
myths.  Politics was highly personalised with authority figures who lived authoritarian 
lifestyles.  The concept of ‘deference’ was strong as elders, chiefs, clan heads and royalty 
were to be respected and revered.  Although some societies allowed freedom of speech and 
expression, this had to be exercised within the ‘community’ as membership constituted the 
basis for rights.  There was hardly a ‘rights discourse’ that could be professed in public.  
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Because the emphasis was ‘rule over people’, with so much emphasis on ‘wisdom and justice’ 
of rulers, and limited regard to ‘laws and procedures’, there was hardly any freedom for 
individuals to organise independently and monitor those in authority.
106
 With a ‘patrimonial’ 
form of governance, and without a ‘rights discourse’, there was hardly any meaningful civil 
society that existed at the advent of colonialism.  A ‘public realm’ that could form a seedbed 
for the emergence of civil society in Africa was yet to evolve.  Did the spaces widen under 
colonial rule? 
2. 3.  THE COLONIAL PERIOD 
 
As noted above, pre-colonial Africa had a ‘patrimonial’ governance system, and with highly 
‘paternalistic and authoritarian styles,’ there was hardly any space available to exercise rights 
of association and expression in public, with the exception of a few societies in which such 
exercise had to consider communal social relations.  Did the situation get any better during 
colonialism? 
 European contact with East Africa is traced back to the early 15th Century when Europeans 
began trade along the West coast and thereafter spread into the interior, establishing the 
Trans-Sahara route linking the West with the Maghreb.
107
 Europe had just undergone an 
industrial revolution while pre-colonial Africa was still a pre-capitalist, pre-industrial, 
predominantly agrarian society, decentralised politically with communal social relations.
108
  
The Europeans were mainly in search of raw materials for their industries and protected 
markets for their manufactured goods.  For easy access to raw materials, the colonialists 
established an infrastructure comprising of railways, roads, and harbours within their 
colonies.  For example, in East Africa, the Imperial British East Africa Company built the 
East African railway linking Mombasa, Kampala to Dar es Salaam in Tanzania.  Side by side 
with this economic infrastructure, colonialists built schools, hospitals, and churches to provide 
education, control disease and spread their faith. 
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Unlike the pre-colonial, pre-capitalist mode of production, colonization introduced a 
‘capitalist system of production’.
109
 Alongside this capitalist mode of production, the 
colonisers introduced a different system of governance that was ‘rule oriented’.
110
 This system 
of governance based on British colonial policy stressed ‘indirect rule’, that is between the 
European and the African population, a system of chiefs was introduced who served as their 
agents.  According to Chazan, ‘the colonial structures were grafted upon and did not displace 
pre-existing institutions’.
111
 The newly introduced system of chiefs run the colonial 
administration, in effect de-linking the African population from the traditional institutions of 
authority that existed among some societies like the Baganda, Yoruba, Asante, and Benin.  As 
a result, communal divisions grew between the chiefs and their people. 
 This system of governance bred a lot of resentment among the African population.  It had no 
regard for ‘traditional values’.  Carnmack, Pool and Tordoff have noted that ‘until the Second 
World War, colonial rule was authoritarian, bureaucratic, and paternalistic and 
psychologically instilled in the Africans the concept of European superiority’.
112
 Unlike the 
pre-colonial period, the contact between the population and their colonial masters was 
‘indirect’; contact was through an agent, the chief.  This bureaucracy based on ‘rules and 
procedures created a vertical relationship between the governors and the governed.  Indeed 
Bayart has argued that ‘without regard to existing structures, the colonial state stressed 
functional utility, law and order but not participation and reciprocity’. 
113
 
Like the pre-colonial state, the colonial state was a very ‘dominant state’.  Chabal argues that 
it sought to ‘modernise’ traditional society by decreeing a distinction between the ‘individual 
and the community’ thereby creating a ‘civil society’ along European lines.
114
 Unlike in 
Europe where ‘civil society’ grew organically, this separation of the ‘individual and the 
community, religious and temporal, civic and political’ was bound to raise tension in a society 
that was hitherto very ‘paternalistic’.  In this sense as Makau observes: 
the colonial state sought to replicate civil society in Europe in the eighteenth century 
which was co-terminous with the state; in this case a citizen devoted complete 
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obedience, dependence, and fealty to the state, such citizen would act in accordance 
with the laws and would not engage in acts harmful to other citizens.
115
 
In doing this, the colonial state wanted ‘total obedience’ to its ‘rules’ and sought to pre-empt 
any opposition from its subjects, thereby undermining the prospect of developing a civil 
society.  Beyond the ‘dominant character’, the colonial state was also a ‘bureaucratic’ state.
116
 
Laws were made by the colonial state, passed on to its ‘agents’ to implement and to pass 
sentence on those who did not comply.  In this respect the colonial state was not only 
‘centralised but coercive’.  The local structures were only accountable to the colonial state 
which in turn was only accountable to the imperial government.
117
  
The African reaction to the colonial state was confrontation, resulting in a form of resistance 
among Africans.  The notion that Europeans were forcing a new civilisation onto the Africans 
precipitated a ‘new social and political consciousness’ among the Africans.
118
 This social and 
political consciousness resulted in a self-conscious opposition to the colonial state in what 
eventually grew into a ‘civil society’ that organised itself around the pro-independence 
movement after the Second World War (1939-1945).  
The Second World War marked an important watershed for the African colonial state.  During 
this War Africans were recruited to fight side by side with their colonial masters.  This action 
altered the earlier belief that the colonial state was ‘militarily superior’ and shattered the 
‘myth of invincibility’ upon which the colonial state was built.
119
 Although the ‘allied 
powers’ won the war, they were much weakened.
120
 Secondly, this period marked the ‘second 
wave’ of democratisation that swept the globe.
121
 According to Huntington, the allied powers 
promoted democratic reform among the defeated powers of West Germany, Italy, Austria, 
Japan and Korea after the war and it was a contradiction to continue depriving their colonial 
subjects the enjoyment of similar values.
122
 The Africans who fought side by side with the 
‘allied powers’ soon discovered that  the western system of governance treated citizens with 
‘equal rights’ and began to agitate for equal rights back home.  
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Hyden notes that initially the Africans demanded civil rights (one man one vote, freedom of 
expression and association) but the denial of such rights within the colonies soon became a 
rallying point for a collective expression which culminated in a call for ‘self-determination or 
independence’ as the nationalist movements in Africa began to gather momentum after World 
War II’.
123
 Soon after the war, the demand for self- determination took centre stage. 
124
A new 
‘rights consciousness’ had evolved and was now directed against domination by outsiders. 
This new urge for ‘democratic values’ as well as rising nationalism in overseas colonies  
prompted the imperial states to initiate a process of decolonisation.
125
 
The process of decolonisation was spearheaded by colonially dependent elites who had 
benefitted from the western education, and Christianity introduced by the colonial rulers.  The 
teaching in the colonially founded church missionary schools and churches had imbibed in 
them ‘democratic ideals ‘including ‘participation, accountability, and popular mobilisation’ 
although these had hardly impacted on the colonial system of governance.
126
 When the anti-
colonial struggle began, it was unfortunately limited to the ‘right to choose and change one’s 
own government’ and much less to a broader struggle for democracy.
127
 This thesis contends 
that here lies the broader challenge of promoting democracy in Africa because the opportunity 
to ground the struggle on broader democratic principles was lost as the post- independence 
leaders conceptualised the struggle as a struggle for independence only and therefore a 
conquest of the colonial state.  
The independence struggle symbolised a significant civil society action after World War II as 
‘associational space’ was loosened due to the changing international environment.  The anti-
colonial agitators were ceded ‘space’ to form voluntary associations to defend their interests 
and to articulate grievances of their ethnic constituencies such as racial segregation, punitive 
taxes, land alienation and native registration ordinances.
128
 With respect to civic associations 
Drah notes that: 
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During the colonial period freedom of association in the political sphere was 
restricted.  However, colonial regimes were relatively liberal with regard to the 
formation of non-governmental and labour organisations.  So important were the 
institutions of civil society during this time that it was civic organisations, particularly 
trade unions, which played a key role in the struggle for independence and produced 
many of the first generation of Presidents and Ministers in Africa.
129
 
Mamdani holds a contrary view.  He argues that the colonial period marked the third moment 
in the history of civil society when the state held a firm grip on civil society, thereby 
restricting the space for civic action.
130
  
Given the capitalist mode of production, the colonial state depended on these trade unions and 
the labour movement to rally farmers and to promote collective bargaining on pricing of raw 
materials.  When it became clear that the colonial state had to be self-sufficient after the 
Second World War, formation of these civic associations was encouraged to the advantage of 
their leaders who led the independence movement.  These leaders later turned these civic 
associations into political parties that pioneered the march to independence.  In British East 
Africa, for example, the Tanganyika African Union (TANU) in Tanzania, Kenya African 
Union (KANU) in Kenya and Uganda People’s Congress /Kabaka Yekka (UPC/KY) in 
Uganda were founded around the 1950’s, a few years after the Second World War. 
The architects of the anti-colonial struggle notably Julius Nyerere in Tanzania, Kenneth 
Kaunda of Zambia, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Namdi 
Azikiwe of Nigeria conducted the campaign on two fronts;  a campaign against the injustice 
of foreign domination and the right of the governed to shape their destiny.
131
 Through rallies, 
petitions, demonstrations, strikes, they seized the available space to engage the colonial state. 
Although the struggle promoted the right to self-determination, it was lacking in so far as 
promoting self expression, individual rights and political democracy among Africans was 
concerned.  Scholars such as Mazrui have criticized the independence struggle to have been 
                                                          
129
 FK Drah ‘The Concept of Civil Society in Africa: A View Point’ in Drah, F.K and M Oquaye (eds) Civil 
Society in Ghana (Accra: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 1996) 1-29. 
130
 M Mamdani   Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism  (Kampala: 
Fountain Publishers, 1996) 21. 
131
 Chazan op cit note 102 at 74-75. 
32 |  
 
short on democracy and instead embedded a ‘power cult, and a culture of elite groups that 
continue to inhibit democracy in Africa’.
132
  
As independence drew closer, the space for civil society grew wider.  The colonial state 
sought to improve its relations between the individual and the state.  On state-civil society 
relations at independence Chabal notes that: 
 
 All legal, economic, racial and political restrictions on colonial subjects were 
removed.  State power to arbitrarily discriminate against certain individuals or groups 
was abolished. The post-colonial state was a state for all citizens regardless of their 
position in the colonial order. 
133
 
The colonial state also undertook political liberalisation by expanding the public realm.  
Principles of political accountability to increase legitimacy of the state were embraced.  At 
independence particularly in ‘British Africa’, the colonial powers created political institutions 
modelled around the ‘Westminster system type of government’, with structures that 
emphasised accountability to citizens.
134
 Among these were independence constitutions that 
entrenched a ‘bill of rights’, recognising individual rights and obligations; defined the powers 
of the executive, legislature and judiciary; espousing limited government built on values of 
pluralism, tolerance and state obligations.
135
  
Regrettably the new ‘political elite’ did not respect this public realm created by the colonial 
powers arguably on the following grounds; that it was ‘too little, too late’, given that the arena 
for public policy making had been a preserve of the Europeans with a few of their trusted 
elites.
136
 Secondly, the public realm was too closely associated with exploitation and 
repression among the African population for it to enjoy respect for such institutions.
137
 
Thirdly, at the time of independence, the political leadership, culture or tradition that would 
be committed or defend such institutions was lacking.
138
 Although these institutions were 
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handed over at independence, save for a few countries like Benin, Botswana, Senegal and the 
Gambia, they were short-lived to make an impact on the struggle for democracy in Africa. 
At the beginning of the 1960’s in most of sub-Saharan Africa, the Union Jack was lowered 
and power was handed over to the newly independent African States by the British colonial 
governors.  
 
In conclusion, prior to the Second World War colonial rule like its predecessor, pre-colonial 
Africa was authoritarian but unlike pre-colonial Africa which was ‘patrimonial’, colonial rule 
was ‘rule oriented’ and therefore ‘bureaucratic’.
139
 This type of rule was highly resented by 
the Africans who always preferred ‘direct contact’ with their leaders often leading to open 
confrontation and rebellion.  The public realm was dominated by Europeans and a few of their 
trusted political elites, thereby restricting public policy making to a few.  Following the 
Second World War, the process of decolonisation began due to the ‘wind of change’ that blew 
across the globe necessitating institutional changes to bring about democratic reform.  The 
colonial state ‘opened up’ and ‘space’ was created for civic associations that formed the 
seedbed for the independence movement across Africa.  At the time of independence ‘civil 
society’ was very vibrant in Africa and a new sense of ‘rights-consciousness’ swept across the 
continent.  Did this new found freedom last past independence?  
2. 4. THE POST-COLONIAL PERIOD 
 
Despite the progress registered at the time of independence, what followed was a narrowing 
of the civic space and the erosion of the newly found democratic freedoms.  But why this 
democratic reversal? 
 At independence, post-colonial leaders inherited states that differed in many respects.  While 
some were immense like Sudan, Zaire and Nigeria, others like the Gambia, Lesotho, 
Swaziland, Rwanda and Burundi were so small in both size and population to be 
economically viable as independent states.
140
 Others like Uganda, Ghana and Nigeria had 
within them powerful centralised kingdoms who still preferred their ‘patrimonial’ systems of 
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 Unlike the colonial state which could draw on resources of the imperial state, 
the post- colonial state had limited resources at its disposal to discharge its obligations.
142
 In 
view of this resource constraint Lofchie has noted that: 
The new African leaders had to depend on primary produce.  The manufacturing 
industries that had been established, mostly in towns, were capital intensive and 
depended on importation of costly machinery from Europe; even the jobs created were 
few.  Attempts at diversification with industrialisation as a key strategy made little 
progress.  Urban migration and urban unemployment grew.  The prevailing pattern of 
social inequality was deepened and increased, social conflict was the result.
143
 
Beyond the challenge of economic viability of their states, these leaders also inherited a 
‘Western style of government’ and ‘Westminster type’ constitution that required them to 
promote individual rights and ensure political accountability to their citizens.  Soon these 
post-independence leaders came under pressure from civil society to deliver services and as 
the state reneged on its obligations, disappointment and discontent grew within the 
population. 
The nationalist leaders adopted a strategy to respond to this challenge in what they described 
as the search for a new identity for Africa.
144
 Under this strategy they adopted ‘a 
development’ ideology which prioritised unity above ‘rights’, and in so doing tightened their 
control of citizens.
145
 Part of this ‘development agenda’ was to demand unity, to dismiss 
‘rights talk’ as bourgeois inventions and to stress ‘duty’ rather than rights.
146
The process 
involved dismantling competitive institutions, centralisation of administration and the 
introduction of single party rule.   
Commenting on this process Rothschild and Chazan have observed thus: 
Using populist politics African leaders concentrated upon securing, extending and 
transforming the institutions of rule that they had inherited.  They impeded certain 
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institutions that placed checks on their power while facilitating others that they 
thought would increase their control.
147
 
The first casuality of these draconian measures are the civic associations and competitive 
institutions which these African leaders saw as their immediate threat.  Among these were 
rival political parties and groups which were silenced, opposition leaders who were harassed, 
co-opted or exiled.
148
 Republican constitutions were introduced to replace the independence 
constitutions that the post-colonial state had inherited on grounds that these independence 
constitutions were ‘cumbersome to implement and that they took little account of ethnic and 
regional cleavages’.
149
 Instead these republican constitutions centralised decision making, 




This personal rule phenomenon effectively introduced ‘patronage politics’, which undermined 
the growth of institutions.  And as a form of governance it relied heavily on individual 
personal qualities.
151
 This explains why in Africa, regimes are credited to individuals such as 
the Obote regime, Amin regime, Kenyatta regime, Moi regime and why democratic 
institutions are weak. 
Unlike the independence constitutions that had an elaborate bill of rights, these republican  
constitutions introduced the ‘public interest’ provisions under which the post-independence 
state curtailed personal liberties on grounds such as the ‘the public good’.
152
 Within ten years 
of independence, many African countries, with the exception of Botswana and the Gambia, 
had amended their independence constitutions to introduce ‘one- party rule’.
153
 
 For example, in Uganda, Milton Obote suspended the 1966 Constitution and replaced it with 
the republican Constitution of 1967 under which kingdoms were abolished.  Uganda became a 
one-party state and UPC the only political party; in Kenya, Jommo Kenyatta amended 
Kenya’s Constitution making Kenya a one-party state and KANU the only recognised 
                                                          
147
 Donald Rothschild and Naomi Chazan ‘The Precarious Balance: State and Society in Africa (Boulder, 
Colorado: West view Press, 1988) ix. 
148
 Nelson Kasfir ‘Introduction: Relating class to state in Africa’ (1983) 21 3 Journal of Commonwealth and 
Comparative Politics 4.  
149
 Don Ronen ‘The Challenges of Democracy in Africa: Some Introductory Observations’ in Dov Ronen (ed) 




 Hyden op cit note 103 at 272. 
152
 Ali A Mazrui ‘Political Engineering in Africa’ (1983) 35 2 International Social Science Journal 4. 
153
 Ibid. 
36 |  
 
political party.  Nyerere introduced Ujamaa in Tanzania, making Tanzania a one-party state 
and CCM the only political party.  In Malawi Banda ruled under a one-party dictatorship.
154
 
The effect of these authoritarian measures on civil society in Africa in my view was far 
reaching.  The state grew stronger and civil society was weakened.  Constructive criticism 
was discouraged, active involvement in politics was not tolerated, and risk-taking was 
discouraged.
155
 In sharp contrast, ruler privilege and abuse of office was perceived as a 
necessary evil and bureaucratic corruption was condoned.
156
 Bayart summarises the civil 
society situation at the time so well: 
 That as the arena of legitimate political action shrank, larger sections of civil society 
were disenfranchised, and the space grew less.  The politics of civil society became 
increasingly illegal, civil society voices were muffled, if not silenced altogether. 
Where access to the state was increasingly shut out and civil society silenced, for 
example, in Chad, Uganda, Guinea, and Kenya, opposition to the state grew.  
Legitimacy of the state was eroded, absolute rule was instituted and coercion became 




The weakening of civil society in Africa at this time can be attributed to three major factors; 
the ‘single party’ ideology that these post-independence states adopted, the nature of state-
civil society relations at the time and the doctrine of state sovereignty. 
First, the single-party ideology was opposed to competitive politics as well as civil and 
political rights.  The architects of this ideology namely Kwame Nkrumah, Sekou Toure and 
Julius Nyerere had argued that African society was ‘classless’ and ‘communitarian’ in nature 
and therefore opposed to ‘individualism’ which the pluralist ideology espoused.
158
 The single 
party ideology advocated for a ‘state-centred’ approach to development and therefore the 
nationalist leaders demonised ‘active citizen’ engagement.
159
Given this emphasis of a 
‘communalist approach’, civil society was disempowered because ‘interest group pluralism’ 
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was seen to be detrimental to the single- party ideology.
160
 In advancing this ideology, the 
post-colonial state behaved much like its predecessor and in many ways the post-colonial state 
was a replica of the colonial state before decolonisation took place. 
Second, state-civil society relations were impeded by these authoritarian measures which 
were adopted at a time when the ‘rights discourse’ was just taking shape.  At the time of 
independence, ‘civic space’ had just been opened by the colonial state having been restricted 
during the pre-colonial period and the larger part of colonialism.  Civic associations (political 
parties, trade unions) had hardly taken root.  In fact the independence elections had been 
based on ethnic, social and religious considerations.  Moreover, democratic institutions take 
time to grow and without a democratic culture within the local population such institutions 
could not be expected to have developed the necessary structures to resist.  As Pinkney 
observes, ‘the deep colonial penetration in Africa had left no opportunity for society to 
develop and nurture its own political institutions’.
161
 Coincidentally, these nationalistic 
leaders had been at the helm of these civic associations before coming to power and knew 
how best to emasculate them. 
Unlike in Europe or Asia, the post-colonial state is seen more as an imposition of the colonial 
state, in that it did not grow organically from and against civil society, is structurally deficient 
without deep legitimacy and is without any putative power over civil society.
162
 Given this 
legitimacy crisis, the state and civil society have been involved in a protracted struggle in 
which the state has sought to capture and manage civil society and in reaction, civil society 
has been preoccupied with the ‘politics of counter-hegemony’.
163
 In view of this struggle 
Chabal has noted that: 
at independence, civil society in Africa possessed formal power through the system of 
representation established by decolonisation but soon that representation was lost 
almost everywhere in Africa and civil society became devoid of formal power.
164
 
It is therefore argued in this thesis that the process of resisting this forcible capture against 
these post- colonial leaders who overnight wielded so much power and wealth in order to re-
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appropriate some power weakened civil society so much.  It is also argued that the forcible 
control of civil society could be a useful indication of the ‘power’ that civil society had 
accumulated at independence. 
Third, at independence the post-colonial state was very protective of its ‘sovereignty’ to the 
extent that this principle of state sovereignty was entrenched in the Organisation of African 
Unity Charter pre-empting any act by any African government to meddle in the affairs of 
another.
165
 Under the cover of state sovereignty these post-colonial leaders committed human 
rights violations without any close scrutiny of member states or any colonial power, who 
regrettably chose to keep a distance to avoid being accused of neo-colonialism.  In countries 
like Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, Liberia, Somalia and Sudan, human rights abuses took place 
without such states being held accountable.
166
 It is for this reason that Babu questions the 
‘moral responsibility’ of these post- independence African leaders who he asserts ‘by default 
held power only by denying the democratic rights of their opponents’.
167
 It was not until much 
later in the 1970s that external human rights organisations like Amnesty International, Africa 
Watch and some donor countries like Canada began to express concern about these violations 
in some African states.  
The 1960’s to 1970s were marked by domination of ‘one party’ states in most of Africa with 
the exception of a few countries like Botswana, Gambia and Mauritius.  Many of these 
countries adopted ‘marxist or communist ideologies’ such as the ‘Move to the Left’ in 
Uganda’, and ‘Ujamaa’ in Tanzania.  Ruling parties institutionalised themselves in power and 
alienated other civil society organisations from the political process.  The post-colonial state 
was characterised by ‘high levels of bureaucracy and misuse of scarce resources, official 
corruption, and state failure to deliver essential services (social, medical and educational 
services were on decline)’.
168
 Given these ‘democratic haemorrhages,’ one would have 
expected the former colonial powers to intervene.  This was not the case.  Instead the former 
colonial powers were pre-occupied with the protection of markets for their goods at home, 
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and the supply of raw materials for their industries.
169
 It is my contention that the colonial 
powers preferred not to antagonise these African leaders at the time because of the 
‘ideological war’ between the East and West, co-operation was to them a useful strategy to 
continue economic ties with Africa.  
Faced with authoritarian regimes and economic decline, voices of civil society began to re-
emerge to put a limit to state power and misuse of public resources in Africa.  These were 
mainly ‘social, cultural, economic, professional and religious organisations’ that often spoke 
out against the excesses of the state.
170
 For example, the Catholic Commission for Peace and 
Justice (CCPJ) in Zimbabwe became outspoken on human rights, peace and justice in the 
early 1960s.  These associations raised questions of governance, conduct and accountability 
of public institutions.
171
 Unfortunately the situation did not get any better. 
During the 1970s and 1980s many African countries were in a state of collapse.  The state 
could not deliver even the most basic services.  Basic commodities were scarce.  State-civil 
society relations were at their lowest.  The post- colonial phenomenon of ‘single party’ states 
and African socialism had become discredited.  Unlike ‘multi-party states’ like Botswana, the 
Gambia, Mauritius and Namibia, marxist states like Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique were 
severely hit and countries like Uganda, Kenya, and  Tanzania were not much better.
172
 
At the global level, the final phase of European decolonisation was taking place.  According 
to Huntington’s ‘Third Wave of Democratisation’, this wave was attributed to the global 
economic growth as well as the economic crisis of the 1960s.
173
 The economic growth in the 
1960s in some countries such as South Korea had led to improvements in education and high 
standards of living, and expansion of the middle class who embraced democratic values.  In 
the Eastern European countries that had single-party and autocratic rule, the economies were 
in a crisis and were therefore unable to continue support to ‘friendly’ sub-Saharan countries 
which triggered revolts and coups leading to the collapse of states in former communist and 
military dictatorships in East, Central Europe, Latin America and Africa.
174
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Faced with a social, political and economic crisis and loss of support from their allies in 
Eastern Europe, and unable to deliver basic services to the population, the African states had 
one option-to liberalise.  African countries that hitherto were ‘one party’ states began to 
undertake democratic reforms in the 1980s by amending their constitutions to allow ‘political 
reforms’ to take place.
175
  Countries such as Cote d’Ivoire, Cameroon, and later Kenya, 




This ‘new wave of democracy’ led to the rebirth of ‘associational life’, creating ‘autonomous 
spaces’ for ordinary men and women to take collective action as a counter to state power.
177
 
The relationship between the state and society changed, presenting a shift from 
‘authoritarianism to democracy’ and with it a ‘more pluralist model’ led to the rebirth of ‘civil 
society’ in Africa.
178
 Popular forces, some dating back to the pre-colonial and colonial periods 
resurfaced while other ‘new constructs’ proliferated.
179
 Among these new constructs are 
‘domestic human rights NGOs’ which according to Wiseberg play two absolutely 
indispensable functions: keeping the political process open or creating political space for 
democratic forces, and information gathering, evaluation and dissemination.
180
 
 In East Africa, for example, the human rights NGO sector has grown rapidly in the last two 
decades covering a broad spectrum of issues; women’s rights, child rights, environmental 
protection, refugees, transitional justice, media freedom and accountability, and presently 
‘account for the most critical voices against the state’.
181
 NGOs continue to play a lead role in 
the struggle to open up political space, advancing the cause of human rights and holding the 
state accountable for its actions.  Notwithstanding this important contribution to the 
democratisation process in Africa, the NGO– state relationship remains one of mistrust as the 
state in sub-Saharan Africa seeks to ‘closely regulate, monitor, co-opt or muzzle NGOs’.
182
 
In conclusion, the post-colonial state in Africa is a ‘predatory state’, in as far as it muzzled 
other actors to tighten its grip on power.  As it restricted the ‘associational space’, it narrowed 
the space for democratic forces to operate and civil society effectively came under attack.  
                                                          
175
 Chapter 3 (3.2.1) deals with the subject in detail. 
176
 Chazan op cit note 102 at 80 
177
Tandon and Mohanty op cit note 62 at 9. 
178
 Pinkney op cit note 157 at 94. 
179
 Michael Bratton ‘Beyond the State: Civil Society and Associational life in Africa’ (1989) 41 3 World Politics 
407-430. 
180
 Wiseberg op cit note 34. 
181
 Mutua op cit note 10 at 5. 
182
 Ibid. 
41 |  
 
Once civil society was effectively silenced, the state undermined other accountability 
structures such as the independence constitutions which were amended to introduce ‘one- 
party rule’ in most states of Africa. 
 
However, when the economic crisis of the 1960s struck, these single-party states could hardly 
withstand the new economic pressures.  They could hardly deliver even the most basic 
services to the population.  The state was in decline.  With no one to turn to, the post- colonial 
state had one option left- to liberalise.  This democratic reform process reopened the space for 
popular forces and therefore triggered the ‘rebirth of associational life’ in Africa in the 1980s.  
 Among the new forces that have emerged since the 1980s are domestic human rights NGOs 
whose foremost mandate is to keep the political process open, advance the cause of human 
rights and promote respect for the rule of law and democracy in Africa.  These domestic 
human rights NGOs which have proliferated since the 1990s are, not withstanding their 
contribution to democracy in contest with the state for political space.
183
   
2. 5.   CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter set out to provide an historical account of the development of NGOs in sub-
Saharan Africa, and in particular, to examine the nature of state-NGO relations at different 
periods of Africa’s political development.  
NGOs, as the discussion has shown, are part of civil society.  Defining an NGO has its own 
difficulties however, it is argued here that NGOs have four common attributes: voluntary, 
dependent, not-for-profit and not self-serving.  NGOs may be formal or informal.  
State-NGO relations have been adversarial in much of Africa.  Apart from the independence 
period when Africa witnessed a new wave of democracy and the rebirth of associational life, 
civil society has been under threat during most of Africa’s political development.  For 
instance, during the pre-colonial period, the state was highly personalised and any form of 
dissent had to be expressed within the community.  With a ‘patrimonial’ form of governance 
and hierarchical society, associational space was restricted and no meaningful form of civil 
society growth was possible.  
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The colonial period was not any better. Colonial rule was ‘rule oriented’ and bureaucratic.  
Civil society space was restricted and public policy making was a preserve of Europeans and 
a few of their trusted political elites.  It was not until the Second World War that the colonial 
state opened up political space due to the decolonisation process that took place soon 
thereafter.  Once the spaces were opened, the demand for rights to freedom of association, 
expression and assembly were heightened, civil society flourished, and the struggle for 
independence spread across the continent. 
The post-colonial period was however characterised by a reversal process; associational space 
was restricted as the state sought to tighten its grip on power.  Civil society was systematically 
muzzled, as one-party states were instituted across Africa.  Without a strong civil society, 
corruption, abuse of office and a breakdown of democratic structures took centre stage.  Civil 
society only regained prominence when the wind of change blew across Africa in the 1980s 
bringing with it democratic reforms and the rebirth of associational life.  With this rebirth, 
domestic human rights NGOs emerged and have since taken centre-stage to promote 
democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law in Africa. 
But what is democracy and which democracy model is best suited to the free functioning of 
NGOs in Africa?  To this the discussion turns in Chapter Three.  





THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES OF DEMOCRACY IN 
AFRICA 
 
3. 0. INTRODUCTION 
 
In Chapter Two, the discussion of the historical development of NGOs in Africa concluded 
that state-NGO relations have been adversarial in much of Africa.
184
 With the exception of the 
independence period, civil society space has been constrained.
185
 The wind of change that 
swept across Africa in the 1980s called for a shift in political governance, necessitating 
constitutional reforms, construction of democratic institutions and extension of basic 
freedoms.  From one party dictatorships and military rule, most states in sub-Saharan Africa 
had to adopt some form of political pluralism and constitutional order whereby political 
power and its exercise were subject to legal and democratic control.
186
 The constitutional 
change process also meant loosening state restrictions on civic associational life.
187
 It is this 
act of ‘pluralising’ society that opened space for domestic human rights NGOs to emerge and 
since then to promote democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law.  
‘Democracy’ is however a much contested notion.  Different groups conceptualize democracy 
in different ways.  For example, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) in Uganda 
adopted Nyerere’s idea of African democracy and called it popular democracy.
188
 The NRM 
argues that unlike multi-party democracy which is divisive and diminishes participation, 
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popular democracy enables everyone to participate directly in decision-making.
189
 Multi-party 




Notwithstanding the democratic reform process which has been slow and agonising, the key 
challenge for the post-colonial state however remains; how to create democratic societies and 
address the deficit of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa?
191
 How can an enabling environment 
be created for NGOs to operate free from unnecessary restrictions? 
This Chapter therefore seeks to address three interrelated issues: first, what is our theory of 
democracy? Second, what are the pre-conditions necessary for democracy to thrive? And 
third, which model of democracy would allow the free and effective functioning of NGOs in 
Africa?  
The discussion will in no way be exhaustive.  It will be restricted to a review of existing 
theories and models of democracy in order to provide a more nuanced understanding of the 
theory of democracy as it will be applied in this study.   
3. 1.  DEMOCRACY AS A UNIVERSAL VALUE 
 
Despite being contested, the concept of democracy as a ‘universal value’ is not in dispute.  
There are two major theories of democracy that help us to understand democracy as a 
universal value; the ‘democratic theory’ and the ‘competitive theories’ of democracy.  Other 
theories of democracy namely, the ‘economic theory of democracy,’ the ‘contemporary theory 
of democracy’ and the ‘participatory theory of democracy’ either modify or reinforce these 
two principal theories. 
 Under the democratic theory, attributed to Rosseau, Mill and Cole, democracy is defined as 
the ‘rule or power of the people’.
192
 ‘Demos’ is a Greek word meaning ‘the people’.
193
 The 
theory postulates that political power is held by the many rather than the few since 
‘democracy is the power of the people’.
194
 The theory also recognises the ‘majority as 
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 Among the ancient Greeks, democracy ‘is government of the people, for the 
people and by the people’.
196
 The democratic theory in its articulation of democracy raises a 
number of issues: Who controls power? How is power distributed? And what is the 
relationship between those who govern and those they govern?  
The competitive theory of democracy, a brain child of Schumpeter, in contrast to the 
democratic theory views democracy as a ‘political method’ (institutional arrangement) for 
arriving at political, legislative and administrative decisions, in which individuals acquire the 
power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote.
197
 Unlike the 
democratic theory, the competitive theory views democracy as a method whose ‘primary 
purpose is to vest power of deciding political issues in the electorate’.
198
 In both theories, 
there is an underlying emphasis on ‘participation’, whether by the majority in reference to the 
democratic theory or ‘elected representatives’ under the competitive theory.  In retrospect, 
however, both theories do raise similar issues as noted above.  
In addressing the issue of ‘who controls power’, one should consider what the purpose of 
democracy is.  Both theories do agree that the ultimate goal of democracy is to achieve 
‘political equality’, which is defined as ‘the operating principle’ of democracy.
199
  
Bellamy reasserts the same principle when he argues that: 
the primal principle of democracy is the worth and dignity of the individual. That 
dignity, consisting in the equality of human nature, is essentially the same in all 
individuals, and therefore equality is the vital principle of democracy.
200
 
The question to ask is who controls power in a democracy? 
3. 1.1.  Who controls power? 
 
Who controls power then comes down to who makes decisions in the community and how 
those who make the decisions reach them? In the democratic theory, it would imply that those 
who make the decisions must be the majority, since democracy is government in which the 
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will of the majority prevails.
201
 If this were to be so, is there a danger of excluding the 
minority in the decision- making process, and if not, does this undermine ‘political equality’?  
Dahl, in his theory of ‘the rule of minorities’ argues that such a ‘tyranny of the majority’ is an 
illusion because ‘majorities do not decide’.
202
 Dahl’s position may not be entirely correct 
considering that in most African states, there is neglect of the minority and respecting 
minority rights and voices is still a challenge.  In parliamentary democracies, the party in 
power often has the majority in parliament.  The opposition is always in the minority and 
when an issue is to be voted for, it is always the majority who decide.  For example, in 
Uganda, the National Resistance Movement (NRM) has the majority in parliament and is the 
majority party; party decisions are taken in ‘party caucuses’ and party members have to vote 
for party positions.  The majority take the decision, but is this democracy? Democracy can be 
adversely affected by this ‘majoritarian principle’.  For example, using its majority in 
parliament, the NRM tabled an ‘Omnibus’ Constitutional Amendment Bill in February 2005.  
The bill, sought to amend among other provisions, article 105(2) of the 1995 Constitution of 




Dahl had also argued that the tyranny of the majority would be resolved when ‘all the active 
and legitimate groups’ in the population could make themselves heard at some crucial stage in 
the process of decision-making.
204
 This, in my view raises another democracy related 
challenge for African states and this is the issue of ‘responsiveness’.  Responsiveness of 
government to the preferences of its citizens is a key characteristic of a democracy.  Would a 
state that entrenches a bill of rights in its constitution, and denies its citizens the liberty to 
exercise them be regarded as responsive? Would consultations be adequate when the findings 
of special tribunals appointed to probe the conduct of public officials are never implemented 
to construe a regime as responsive? Many African states point to the existence of a bill of 
rights sometimes with ‘draw back’ clauses in their constitution to be an indicator of 
democracy yet citizens are not at liberty to enjoy them.  
Przeworski argues that responsiveness should be construed in terms of liberties or freedoms or 
rights and only when both ‘contestation and participation’ are possible should one hold the 
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 Przeworski is correct in as far as the existence of rights in a 
constitution is in itself a useful beginning, but when the opportunity to exercise such rights is 
denied, an important indicator of democracy is lost.  Indeed many African states face a 
challenge of implementing rights in their policy and programme implementation despite 
having them in the constitution. 
 
 For instance, it was not until the adoption of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action 1993 that states began to think about developing a Human Rights Action Plan inspite 
of having human rights provisions in their constitutions.
206
 Only a few countries like Austria, 
South Africa, Sweden and Netherlands are known to have Human Rights Action Plans.  
Beyond legislating for rights, Huntington holds that democracy should be viewed in terms of 
civil and political rights and when ‘the right to speak, publish, assemble and organise’ exists, 
can one then hold the state to be democratic.
207
 Huntington argues, that ‘the rights to speak, 
publish, assemble and organise are necessary to political debate and the conduct of electoral 
campaigns’.
208
 These rights, in my view, are the most contested rights.  In many sub-Saharan 
African countries, citizens have been denied the right to speak, to assemble or organise.
209
  
The opposition in many of these countries such as Uganda, Ethiopia, Malawi, Zimbabwe and 
Rwanda cannot hold rallies freely or publish.
210
 Press is censored and human rights defenders 
are under attack for expressing their independent views. 
Under the competitive theory, responsiveness is defined in terms of elections.  It is stated 
under this theory, that ‘competition for leadership’ is the distinctive feature of democracy; 
that there is democracy when leaders compete for votes, that elections provide a mechanism 
of control by non-leaders.
211
 Nothing in my view can be further from the truth in sub-Saharan 
Africa.  Elections have proved to be a disaster in many countries in Africa.  The post-
independence elections were held on ethnic, social and religious considerations in many 
countries.  Since the return to multi-party politics in the 1980s, there are few countries that are 
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known to have held free and fair elections in Africa.  The few could include South Africa in 
1994, Malawi in 1994, Botswana, and Zambia in 1994, and Kenya in 2002.  More and more 
countries have held flawed and disputed elections.  For instance, Uganda,  in 1980, 2006, and 
2011; Kenya in 2007, Ethiopia 2010, Rwanda in 2010, and Zimbabwe in 2007.  These 
elections can hardly be used as a measure of control since the will of the people is not 
respected.  The right to vote and to be voted for cannot be held to matter when voters are 
disenfranchised.  It is therefore far-fetched to expect leaders who emerge out of ‘rigged’ 
elections to be responsive to the popular will.  
3. 1. 2   How is power distributed?  
 
The next issue to be addressed is the distribution of power.  The democratic theory makes two 
basic assumptions: that government behaviour is influenced largely by the constitutional 
system through which they emerge and that governments pursue policies in the general 
interest or the common good.
212
 The presumption may be valid for those countries that uphold 
the constitutional framework under which they are elected.  The experience in sub-Saharan 
Africa has been rather different.  At independence, African states inherited a ‘Westminster 
system’ of governance but within ten years, as it was noted in Chapter Two, the majority of 
them had amended their constitutions and adopted ‘one- party, single rule,’ and effectively 
introducing ‘personal rule’.
213
 Under such constititutional framework power is not shared, it is 
a monopoly of the ruling party.  
The constitutions of most sub-Saharan African countries do provide for three branches of 
government: the executive, legislature and judiciary, and power is distributed among the three 
organs.  Whereas Parliament has a tripartite mandate; oversight, representation and 
legislation, with the party in power having a majority in parliament, the two branches are 
often intertwined.  Consider this scenario; where the Speaker of Parliament is also the Vice-
Chairperson of the ruling party as it is in Uganda’s 9th Parliament. Would one expect a fair 
distribution and exercise of power? 
How does one explain distribution of power where the judiciary being the third arm of 
government is filled with appointments of ‘cadre judges’, judges who are loyal to the ruling 
party as it is the case in Uganda?  The appointment of judges is done by the President who 
submits his nominees to the Appointments Committee of Parliament to debate and approve.  
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The Speaker of Parliament chairs the Appointments Committee and yet the Speaker is the 
Vice-chairperson, Eastern region, of the ruling party in power.  How do you expect an 
independent decision from such a committee given its institutional design?   
According to the constitutional design of most African countries, the judiciary is made up of 
Presidential appointees.
214
  When a matter involves an issue of extreme national importance 
such as a referendum or election petition, it is the President who has the discretion to 
nominate the ‘Panel of judges’ to hear the matter.  Can such a Panel of judges so appointed to 
preside over a matter in which the President has an interest exercise judicial independence, 
and show a fair dispersal of power?  
Democratic theory also envisages that decisions made by one arm of government would be 
respected by another but this may not necessarily always be the case.  Where matters of 
human rights have been adjudicated by courts in many African countries, the executive has 
been reluctant to implement the court rulings.  This is often the case when the right to speak, 
organise, associate and assemble has been adjudicated upon.  For example, in Muwanga 
Kivumbi v AG, the applicant sought a constitutional court interpretation of the ‘right to 
associate and assemble’ following persistent arrests of  members of his group, Popular 
Resistance Against Life Presidency, who campaigned for the restoration of presidential term 
limits in Uganda’s constitution.
215
 The court ruled in his favour and decreed that the right to 
associate and assemble did not require police permission.  Notwithstanding this constitutional 
court ruling, the Uganda police continued to disband his rallies and to arrest political 
opposition activists.  In 2011, the Uganda government tabled a bill, ‘The Public Order 
Management Bill, 2010’ which in effect seeks to undermine the court ruling by restoring the 
power of the police to grant permission to citizens who wish to organise and assemble 
contrary to the provisions of the Constitution.
216
   
Distribution of power also entails a deliberate effort through an institutional framework to 
have all legitimate voices heard.  For example, article 78 1 (c) of the 1995 Constitution of 
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Uganda provides for representation of special interest groups in parliament namely the army, 
youth, workers, persons with disabilities and any other groups as parliament may determine.  
This is a good practice that increases the political bargaining power of these under- 
represented groups.  Legislation that is directed at addressing their concerns has since been 
enacted, such as the Disability Act 2005, Employment Act, 2010, however these groups have 
been discredited for becoming an extension of the ruling party and for failing to advocate for 
their members’ interests. 
Distribution of power would also require that those who hold power would seek to make 
decisions for the satisfaction of the ‘common good’.  In a democracy, the overriding goal is to 
‘stimulate civic virtue, action and judgement’ based on a concern for the common good.
217
 
There is therefore an underlying presumption that decisions that are made do not serve 
individual interest.  If this were so, then group competition would be encouraged.  But 
experience has shown that states have interpreted ‘the common good principle’ to deny 
citizens their fundamental rights.  In many African constitutions, rights are abridged ‘in public 
interest’.  For example, article 43 of the 1995 Uganda Constitution provides that ‘these rights 
are subject to ‘public interest’ and public interest may not mean in article 43(a) political 
persecution.  But in practice, the reverse seems to be the case, as opposition political rallies 
are dispersed ‘in public interest’ and political party activists are persecuted.  
3. 1. 3.  What is the relationship between those who govern and the governed? 
 
Democratic theory also raises another fundamental issue; the relationship between the 
governors and those who are governed.  Two concerns are important here: how to safeguard 
liberties and enhance participation.  Democracy unlike dictatorship and monarchy, places a 
high premium on the defence of liberties.  A democratic system would put in place 
constitutional safeguards against arbitrary action of the state thereby ensuring restraint on the 
government.
218
 This defence of liberty in turn creates obligations on the state that would 
include ‘accountability, security of person and property, respect for constitutional safeguards, 
rule of law, freedom of expression and association and popular control over authority’.
219
 
What then are these constitutional safeguards that NGOs should monitor, that this theory of 
democracy envisages? 
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Among these constitutional safeguards is the bill of rights.  Have ‘rights’ been entrenched in 
the constitution under an elaborate bill of rights? These would include civil, political, 
economic, social and cultural rights.  Are they subject to ‘draw back clauses’? African states 
have often sought to undermine these rights with the inclusion of ‘exception clauses’, which 
as it will be noted in Chapter Five, must meet accepted criteria to restrict the enjoyment of 
these rights. 
Beyond entrenchment of these rights in the constitution is a requirement for mechanisms of 
popular control of authority.  Democratic theory envisages that mechanisms are put in place to 
oversee implementation of these ‘rights’ and appropriate safeguards are entrenched to afford 
them sufficient protection and independence within the constitution.  These mechanisms to 
ensure human rights protection would include but are not limited to: the judiciary, Human 
Rights Commissions, Ombudsman, and civil society organisations.  The idea of having strong 
checks and balances is envisaged as an important indicator of democracy.  To ensure that 
there are regular checks on government behaviour, ‘the existence of active groups (NGOs), 
internally democratic who check arbitrary action of leaders and keep them accountable for 
their actions’ is recognised.
220
  
Popular control of authority is achieved when ‘participation’ is made possible.  Participation 
is viewed as a very important ingredient of democracy under the democratic theory.  
Participation confers many benefits to democracy.  First, it upholds the concept of ‘active 
citizenship’ which as Lively argues, ensures that ‘through participation citizens would realize 
their wants and satisfy their needs and in turn improve their lives’.
221
 When individuals 
participate in the decision making process, it helps them to understand the rules better and 
appreciate social norms.  Participation confers a ‘sense of freedom’ on the individual. 
Democratic theorists argue that ‘democratic citizens find self-expression and self-fulfilment 
through participation’.
222
 But participation in my view should be based on voluntary co-
operation to be meaningful and the ‘art of persuasion’ is essential in a democracy.  
Within the framework of this thesis, active involvement of the citizenry, organised in 
voluntary associations would be key to enhancing participation in the formulation of public 
policies.  Democracy remains an abstract notion unless people understand its workings and 
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how it transforms people’s lives.  This conceptual appreciation of democracy is only made 
possible when citizens are informed, go beyond elections and make their demands known to 
government.  To achieve this, Downs observes, ‘government should seek to enhance the 
political influence of intermediaries such as interest groups which in turn keep the 
government informed about what people want’.
223
  
When participation is enhanced, the danger of having a ‘passive society’ which hardly makes 
demands is effectively overcome.  Mill, one of the well known participatory theorists, 
convincingly argues that ‘broadening participation avoids social conformity, allows people to 
have a greater role in shaping public policy and stimulates the active rather than the passive 
character of political life’.
224
 In broad agreement, Pinkney neatly sums up the three key 
functions of participation in a democracy to include; education for the individual to enable 
him/her distinguish between his/her own impulses and desires, to increase the value of 
individual freedom and to promote an individual’s sense of belonging to the community.
225
 It 
can therefore be argued that a participatory process would ensure realisation of individual 
rights, furtherance of the common good and ultimately political equality. 
To complete the cycle, democratic theory vouches for ‘popular rule’.  This is meant to dispel 
the underlying presumption that power could be vested in the ‘hands of the few’ even if those 
issues discussed above are resolved in the affirmative.  Personal rule or rule of the few as 
noted in Chapter Two is a common feature of dictatorships and one-party states.  Neither 
should popular rule be understood to mean that all shall be involved in decision making 
because to do so would breed anarchy.  Democracy is to be understood in the context of the 
totality of all issues considered above: that a democracy is responsive, guarantees liberties, 
encourages participation and ultimately promotes political equality. 
In conclusion, this thesis argues that the two principal theories of democracy discussed above 
underscore the realization of political equality as the ultimate goal of democracy.  To achieve 
political equality, the theories stress the defence of liberties, citizen participation in public 
decision making and respect for minorities.  
The thesis identified key elements of democracy by answering three key questions: who 
controls power, how is power distributed and what is the relationship between the governors 
                                                          
223
 Anthony Downs An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper Collins, 1957) 29. 
224
 John Stuart Mill ‘Representative Government’ in Everyman (ed) Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative 
Government (1944) 193. 
225
 Pateman op cit note 187 at 22-27. 
53 |  
 
and those governed?  These three issues point to the current challenges facing the democratic 
reform process in Africa. 
 
Notwithstanding any contestation of the concept of democracy, our theory of democracy is 
grounded on the pursuit of equality.  Therefore, when NGOs set out to promote democracy, 
respect for human rights and rule of law in Africa, it is all about enhancing equality, civic 
participation and making the state more responsive to the demands of its citizens.  What then 
are the pre-conditions necessary for democracy to thrive? 
3. 2.  DEEPENING DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA 
 
Democracy as a value has to be nurtured.  Both the theory and practice of democracy require 
an enabling environment to thrive.  Democratic theorists single out three major factors that 
influence the deepening of democracy in Africa which are the subject of discussion.  These 
are: the degree of economic development, civic culture and state-NGO relations. 
3. 2. 1.   The Degree of Economic Development  
 
The degree of economic development of a country has a strong bearing on the practice of 
democracy.  Among the economic indicators that determine economic progress is the ‘degree 
of industrialisation, urbanisation, and level of education’.
226
 
 Where a society has a higher average level of economic progress, such society is more 
affluent, it tends to have a larger middle class, is well educated, and has elites who can make 
their views on different issues known to the state.  The state is equally more ‘responsive’. 
Where a society is less well to do, it relies more on the state as the provider; a clientele 
relationship develops, associational spaces are restricted and the state is ‘less responsive’, 
putting democracy at stake. 
Lipset in his hypothesis agrees.  He argues that ‘the more well to do a nation, the greater the 
chances that it will sustain democracy’.
227
 To demonstrate this nexus the thesis undertakes a 
short review of democracy in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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In Chapter Two it was noted that pre-colonial Africa was a ‘pre-capitalist, predominantly 
agrarian, relatively decentralised politically and characterised by communal social 
relations.
228
 Most Africans lived in rural areas and carried out peasant farming and for others 
who were stateless; they migrated frequently from one area to another in the face of war, 
disease, drought and economic need.
229
 For these societies, survival was their highest priority 
and as earlier noted, any exercise of rights to freedom of expression and association were 
restricted to membership to the community. Pre-colonial Africa practiced a ‘patrimonial’ form 
of governance, society was poor and the state was undemocratic. 
When colonial rule was introduced in the early nineteenth century, the prime motivation was 
economic.  The colonial state introduced a capitalist mode of production and the focus was to 
produce raw materials to feed their industries in Europe and to develop protected markets for 
their manufactured goods.
230
 The colonial state was a dominant economic actor, levying taxes, 
developing markets and introducing new crops.
231
 For example, the colonial state introduced 
coffee in Uganda, tea in Kenya, and cocoa in Ghana whose market was in Europe.  The 
colonial state also established an economic infrastructure of roads, railways, and harbours and 
industries which were highly dependent on their home industries in Europe.  This created a 
dependency relationship with the colonial powers.  Under the circumstances the relationship 
was more dependent than responsive.  The colonial state was only accountable to the imperial 
government not subjects of the state.  Colonial rule, until the Second World War was 
authoritarian, bureaucratic, paternalistic and forceful.
232
 
Following the decolonisation process and independence struggles, the post-colonial state that 
emerged in the 1960s was characterised by ‘high concentration of power’ in the hands of the 
state.
233
 The post-colonial state had limited resources at its disposal, and attempts at 
industrialization were not successful either.  The ‘political elite’ at the time appropriated the 
little that was available to their advantage and social inequality deepened.  Under the 
circumstances as Ihonvbere observes, the state was ‘the largest investor, employer, importer 
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 With economic stagnation, there were high levels of unemployment and 
social inequality, a dependency relationship blossomed, associational spaces were restricted 
and democracy at its lowest.   
When the global economic crisis of the 1980s struck, African economies were worst hit.  The 
World Bank responded by imposing ‘a structural adjustment programme’ which linked 
‘economic progress with democracy’.
235
 This new ‘economic reform package’ demystified 
state institutions, opened new spaces, revitalised African economies and with this came a 
renewed interest in democracy.  Ihonvbere could not have put it any better than when he states 
that:  
With structural adjustment, there was the proletarianization of the middle class 
bringing with it intellectuals and professionals into the ranks of workers, peasants and 
unemployed.  The state and its institutions were demystified.  Popular groups were 
encouraged to form new organizations, ask new questions and make demands for 
accountability, participation, social justice and basic human needs on the state.  There 
were renewed interests in democracy, democratization, empowerment and the need to 
mount a fundamental challenge to the dictators on the African landscape.
236
 
Whereas it is argued that economic progress provides much more impetus for democracy, 
does this mean that poorer countries cannot have democracy? It is possible to have democracy 
in poorer countries provided the population is educated and democratic institutions do exist. 
Indeed, there are poor countries that can be held to have democracy such as Ghana, Mauritius 
and Zambia, but sustainability of democracy in these poorer countries then becomes the 
central issue.
237
  Poor countries are more vulnerable to economic shocks and the emergence of 
military dictatorships.  Przerworski has noted, that ‘democracy may survive in poor countries 
given good levels of education of the population and existence of institutions but unlike 
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wealthier countries, poor countries are particularly more vulnerable to military interventions 
and machination of rulers’.
238
 
 A wealthier and more educated population will encourage the spread of democratic 
institutions, and is more inclined to insist on civic obligations and equal participation of 
citizens rendering democracy and ultimately political equality possible.  
3. 2. 2.   Civic Culture 
 
Civic culture is an important determinant of democracy.  But what is civic culture? Civic 
culture refers to a ‘system of values and beliefs’ that defines the ‘context and meaning of 
political actions’.
239
 Is there civic culture in Africa? 
Answering this question poses a significant challenge; first African society is not homogenous 
and had varying experiences during colonial rule under the British and the French.  Whereas 
the British used ‘indirect rule’, the French had more direct contact with the population, 
behavioural patterns therefore vary widely within Africa. 
 Generally, African society is known to have been built around ‘traditions and myths’ which 
varied from community to community.  These ‘myths of origin’ defined societal political 
cultures.  African political culture had a strong sense of ‘deference’ to leadership.  A leader in 
Africa was rarely questioned.  For example, among the Baganda, it was always believed that a 
leader is ‘always right’.  Africans believe leaders are born and power comes from God.  
Leaders demand loyalty from their subjects and seniority is extolled. African society attached 




During colonialism, there was little regard for traditional values.  Leadership was based on 
‘rules and orders’ and much force was used.  There was hardly any ‘participation or 
reciprocity’.
241
 African response took the form of confrontation and rebellion against a feeling 
of domination.  The new sense of social and political consciousness that developed among 
Africans during the pro-independence movement is not known to have lasted beyond the 
independence struggles as the political elites who took charge of the post-colonial state are 
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known to have resorted to patronage politics.
242
 Therefore history does not show us any 
attempt by the African leadership to develop a consensus on democracy. 
A scrutiny of African political systems also reveals that one of its most apparent weaknesses 
is the weakness of the ‘civic public realm’.
243
 Three reasons can be advanced to explain this 
weakness: one, that individual citizens have little or no loyalty to institutions of governance.  
Loyalty tilts towards the home, community or religion.  Africans believe more in their tribes, 
clans or religions.  Second, is political patronage.  Governance is based more on the personal 
attributes of a leader at the expense of institutions.  This ‘personal rule’ phenomenon 
endangers the evolution of institutions.  Third, is the transient nature of social relations among 
people.  Africans, it is argued, tend not to have a strong attachment to their community, and 
easily adopt more rewarding relations as situations change.
244
  
It is further argued that a common feature of African politics is the prevalence of informal 
over formal systems of governance.  African politics is personalised.  African politics, it is 
argued, relies more on ‘power than on exchange, state rather than the market’.
245
 
Developing a civic culture supportive of democracy in Africa has to overcome the challenge 
of leadership.  African leadership does not have a history of positive practices of democracy.  
African leaders have a negative perception of democracy and view it as ‘foreign’.  No one 
portrays this negative attitude towards democracy better than Salim, former Secretary General 
of the then Organisation of African Unity (OAU) who said, ‘democracy is not a revelation, 
how it is expressed, how it is given concrete form, of necessity, varies from society to society. 
One should avoid the temptation of decreeing a so-called perfect model of democracy’. 
246
 
The lack of a civic culture in Africa creates a backlash for NGOs as well.  Without a 
prodemocratic consensus, African states would continue to restrict the space for NGOs 
choking them in the process and continue to view them as ‘alien, subversive, seditious and 
unpatriotic’.
247
 Other factors to consider in promoting a civic culture would be to provide 
civic education to the community in order to develop a politically conscious population, 
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increase information flow using social media, and increase literacy levels to enhance 
participation in decision making. 
3. 2. 3.  State-NGO relations 
 
A discussion of state-NGO relations raises an important issue, whether the state is part of 
society or whether the two are distinct spaces? Two significant viewpoints have been 
advanced.  First, Hegel’s theory of the ‘modern state and civil society’ advances the view that 
the state is different from society and in a democracy, the state is controlled by and serves the 
society.
248
 This Hegelian view sees the state and civil society as distinct spaces, each one 
seeking to influence the other.
249
 This liberal view is hinged on the human desire for freedom 
which is recognised by the state through the grant of rights.
250
 On the other hand, Marx’s 
social theory posits that the state is a product of society and therefore the state and society are 
one and occupy the same space.
251
  
The two theories are of significance to our discourse.  Whereas the liberal theory would be 
favourable to the opening of ‘associational spaces’ to advance democracy, the marxist theory 
has compelling validity to advocates of the ‘communitarian theory’ who prioritise duties and 
obligations against individual rights.  State-society relations are then perceived differently.  
For example, in Tanzania under Ujamaa, the community was considered supreme.  NGOs, 
until the 1980s would not be welcome.  Nyerere, who was the architect of ‘Ujamaa’, is on 
record for having applauded the ‘communitarian approach of collective rights’.
252
  
Notwithstanding the two theoretical perspectives on state-society relations, democratic theory 
considers the relations between the two, a key ingredient of democracy.  The theory raises 
three concerns; how to safeguard liberties, how to exercise restraint on government and how 
to secure a mechanism of popular control of authority. 
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Addressing these three interrelated concerns requires the presence of active pressure groups.  
In a pluralist society, the presence of a ‘complex of independent organizations and social 
groupings’ mediating between the individual and the state is healthy for democracy.
253
 Apart 
from holding the state accountable for its actions, popular groups maintain a delicate balance, 
on one hand keeping the people involved in public policy and decision making and on the 
other making the state aware of people’s demands.  Eckstein reaffirms this in his theory of 
‘stable democracy’ when he argues that, ‘stability depends upon patterns of authority within 
the government system being congruent with those in other social institutions’.
254
 It would be 
in the interest of the state, in my view, and more broadly democracy, if the state encouraged 
the existence of interest groups to mediate between it and society. 
In conclusion, the deepening of democracy in Africa would require economic progress, 
promotion of a civic culture and improvement of state-NGO relations.  Broadening the 
‘space’ would require addressing an additional challenge of leadership in Africa which, as 
noted above, harbours negative attitudes towards democracy.  This enabling environment is 
not only conducive to the growth of democracy but would also improve the spaces available 
for civic participation and NGO sustainability in particular.  If democracy were to be 
deepened, what model of democracy would enhance civic participation and the free and 
effective functioning of NGOs in Africa? 
3.3. MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 
 
There are several modes of governance besides democracy.  Other forms include military rule, 
one-party rule, aristocracy or personal rule, however, democracy is the most preferred form 
because it guarantees political equality as noted above.
255
  
 In discussing existing models of democracy and making a case for the most appropriate 
model that affords the highest levels of civic participation, the discussion is guided by two 
major considerations: the ultimate goal of democracy which is political equality and the core 
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mandate of NGOs being the protection of the individual against arbitrary action of the state, 
and keeping the political space open for other democratic forces to operate.
256
  
There are several models of democracy but for our discussion the study shall confine itself to 
only three which are relevant to Africa namely; liberal democracy, electoral democracy and 
participatory democracy. 
3. 3. 1.  Liberal Democracy 
 
Liberal democracy is what post-colonial Africa inherited at independence.  Under this model 
of democracy the powers of government are limited by law and laid out in the constitution.  
At independence many African states inherited a ‘Westminster style’ of government with a 
‘Westminster type’ constitution.
257
 The Westminster system provided for a parliamentary 
government and a two-party system.
258
 The powers of government were spread out between 
the executive, legislature and the judiciary.
259
 The independence constitution had an elaborate 
‘bill of rights’.  For example, the Constitution of Uganda, 1962 provided for ‘equality before 




Despite the extensive provision of rights in these constitutions, they also contained 
‘drawback’ clauses providing restrictions to these rights.  For example, Article 26(2) of the 
constitution provided for the limitation of the same rights in the interest of defence, public 
safety, public order, public morality or public health; for the purpose of protecting the rights 
of others or to impose restrictions on public officers.
261
 The independence constitutions were 
also weak on protective mechanisms rendering these ‘rights’ more of a myth than a reality. 
There were other positive features of this model, for example, clear separation of the state 
from society, individuals and groups were well represented and protected from other groups 
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Liberal democracy had some negative attributes too.  The system allowed limited citizen 
participation.  Beyond elections, the citizen had limited room for making the state accountable 
for its actions.  As Dryzek noted, liberal democracy provided limited channels for social 
movements and organised interest groups to exercise influence on government and placed 
constitutional restrictions on democratic rights in the interest of security.
263
  
In this sense liberal democracy is inconsistent with the democratic theory.  It champions 
representative democracy in contrast to the idea of popular power, because instead of 
advancing sovereignty of the people it heralds the sovereignty of the law.
264
 Democracy is 
reduced to multi-party electoral competition and little in terms of active civic participation.  
The idea of ‘group competition’ is however positive in the sense that interest groups through 
competition encourage ‘bargaining, consensus-building and inclusiveness’.
265
 However, in the 
negative sense, this group competition neglects accountability and the rights of individuals.  
As a model of democracy, liberal democracy upholds the ‘protectionist view’ of democracy 
under which a citizen is protected against the state.  To critics this is ‘negative freedom’ given 
that the focus is on the individual rather than the collective.
266
 Individual rights override 
community interests, much to the dislike of the community.   
Given its representative character and limited application of popular rule, African leaders 
found it easy to adopt liberal democracy at the time of independence although they abandoned 
it within ten years in preference to one-party rule.  To African leaders this model of 
democracy demanded more in terms of structures and less accountability, little in terms of 
citizen participation, and although it offered some measure of protection against the state, it 
was less responsive to civil society.  The African state found it easier to restrict freedoms, and 
as noted in our earlier discussion, the political elite found it easier to exploit the population.  
Although it provided for competitive elections, it lacked a mechanism to safeguard the 
independence elections from ethnic, social and political bias. 
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As a model of democracy, liberal democracy falls short of guaranteeing democracy, citizen 
participation, and accountable government and ultimately does not guarantee political 
equality.  As Decalo observed and with whom this thesis agrees, ‘liberal democracy satisfies 
political pluralism but not democratic deepening’.
267
 
Liberal democracy, as the discussion has shown, falls short of guaranteeing political equality 
and does not provide the environmental conditions necessary for the growth of democracy in 
Africa.  It is therefore contended in this thesis that liberal democracy would not enhance civic 
participation, as it is not the most suitable model of democracy for NGOs in Africa. 
3. 3. 2.  Electoral Democracy 
 
Electoral democracy mirrors liberal democracy in so far as it champions representative 
government and competitive elections.  Electoral democracy, as a model of democracy, 
affords citizens the right to vote in elections.  It is a model of democracy that African states 
adopted at independence, then abandoned when they introduced one-party rule.  It was also 
re-introduced following the democratic reform process in the 1980s.  When ‘structural 
adjustment’ was imposed on the African states in the 1980s, there was a renewed interest in 
democracy as multi-party competition was re-introduced.
268
 This followed the amendment of 
the one- party state constitution in many countries of Africa that had hitherto provided for 
one-party rule.  For example, Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Malawi, and Zambia all held multi-
party elections in the 1980s or early 1990s. 
As observed in the earlier discussion of the competitive theory of democracy, competition for 
votes is presumed to provide a mechanism of control of the leaders by non-leaders.
269
 This 
presumption raises a number of issues; does the constitutional framework guarantee fairness 
in electoral competition? Are there sufficient safeguards to resolve disputes? Are governments 
once elected responsive to the demands of their people?  
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In most of sub-Saharan Africa, the constitution provides for the right to vote.
270
 The right to 
universal adult suffrage is always entrenched.  An Electoral Commission to conduct elections 
is provided for but several issues arise with respect to the appointment process of the electoral 
body, the rules governing elections, and the participation of civil society in the electoral 
process. Is the electoral body independent? Are the rules fair to all? Is civil society 
participation recognised?  
The independence of the electoral body has been a subject of dispute in most countries in 
Africa.  The electoral body is often appointed by the party in power and its ability to render a 
fair and impartial vote is always in question.
271
 In Kenya, elections held in 2007 were highly 
disputed and resulted in post-election violence.  In Uganda, elections held in 1980 were 
disputed and resulted in a civil war that brought the NRM government to power in 1986.  
Subsequent elections held in Uganda in 2001, 2006 and 2011 have led to similar electoral 
disputes.  In many other countries such as Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Burundi, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, the story is similar.  In each of these countries citizens have disputed the 
outcome of the vote, the independence of the electoral body, the fairness of the election rules, 
and have often contested the disenfranchisement of citizens. 
What about dispute resolution? Are there adequate mechanisms to provide redress? The 
fairness of the courts as well as the electoral body are key determinants.  The independence of 
courts is dictated by the appointment process, the electoral rules and the parties to the dispute.  
Bias may always be imputed where courts are perceived to be less independent, for example, 
in Uganda judges have been accused of bias in deciding election disputes.
272
 
The overriding issue is whether electoral democracy can achieve political equality and 
guarantee active civic participation.  Despite elections being held in many countries in Africa, 
degrees of freedom and fairness vary significantly, and structural problems, mainly poverty, 
inequality, corruption, incompetence and ethnic and religious conflict continue to afflict the 
region.  There is always the danger that as soon as the voters have cast their votes, their 
existence as a group lapses until the time when another election is held.
273
 In many respects 
electoral democracy continues to harbour similar constraints like liberal democracy and as a 
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model of democracy affords limited civic participation beyond elections.  For the reasons 
noted above, this thesis argues that electoral democracy is not the best model of democracy to 
guarantee equality and the free functioning of NGOs in Africa.  
3. 3. 3.  Participatory Democracy 
 
Democratic Theory makes a presumption that to achieve political equality, democracy must 
defend liberties, broaden citizen participation in decision making and respect minorities.  
Each of these interrelated goals carries with it the idea of participation.  The idea of 
representative government that is epitomised in both the liberal and electoral models of 
democracy is limited in its emphasis on the centrality of the individual in the decision making 
process.  As noted earlier, the liberal model of democracy upholds the supremacy of the law.  
The electoral model of democracy, as discussed above, focuses more on competition for 
elections. 
The participatory model of democracy is to be conceptualised as one with an edge above the 
other two; for it combines both representation and participation of the individual in 
governance.  At the core of a participatory political system is the centrality of the individual in 
the decision-making process.  When individuals are enabled to decide, the ‘policy result’ is 
more likely to protect individual rights and interests and further public interest.
274
 This brings 
to the fore the idea of the ‘common good’.  Is it only for the individual to decide? 
Participatory theorists argue that where organised associations are formed, these should be ‘as 
numerous and as equal in political power’.
275
 In this sense this model of democracy advocates 
for the existence of associations which should be ‘free to control their affairs without state 
interference’ as part of a democracy.  But what else does participation offer? 
Participation can lead to fair sharing and removal of existing inequalities.  When individuals 
decide, both their ‘private and public interests’ are protected by the law because the law then 
serves individual actions.  Rousseau argues that participation ‘ensures good government’ 
because its central function is an ‘educative one’.  The individual learns to be a ‘public and 
private citizen’.
276
 This thinking lends support to the argument that ‘it is of no use having 
universal suffrage’ if an individual has not been prepared for his participation at the local 
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level where he learns democracy.  Through education, the individual would acquire civic 
values and leadership qualities.  
 Beyond education perhaps the most significant value of participation is its guarantee of 
‘freedom’.  It is argued in this thesis that when an individual participates, he or she becomes 
socially responsible for his actions and his or her sense of freedom is increased.  The 
individual acquires greater control over his or her course of life and the environment.  What 
remains doubtful is whether such freedom would not easily come under threat from existing 
institutions which seek to impose their authority over the individual’.
277
  
It is also argued that participation increases among individuals a ‘sense of belonging’ to the 
community.  Where individuals participate, they see themselves ‘as one of’, and inequalities 
among them, whether rich or poor, matter less.  
Participatory democracy as a model of democracy brings with it the essential elements of a 
system of governance that would place the individual at the centre of the decision making 
process.  It recognizes and accommodates the idea of the plurality of associations and the 
value of freedom.  For countries that are in a transition to democracy particularly the countries 
of sub-Saharan Africa, this model of democracy would be best placed to address the current 
deficit and accord the highest levels of civic and NGO participation in governance.  Both the 
liberal and the electoral model of democracy fall short of this important principle and have, 
despite being adopted since independence, failed to deliver on this promise.  This thesis 
therefore agrees with Schumpeter, that ‘no system which debars the mass of non-rulers from 
playing a part in the process of decision-making can be deemed democratic and no definition 
of democracy that excludes such a role is tenable’.
278
 Participatory democracy fits our theory 
of democracy as applied to this study.  
3. 4.  CONCLUSION 
 
This Chapter set out to review the current theories of democracy in order to adapt a model of 
democracy that would allow the free and effective functioning of NGOs in Africa.  Besides 
adapting the relevant conceptual framework, the thesis sets out to inquire into the conditions 
necessary for such a model to thrive.  
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Democracy upholds the principle of active civic participation in the decision-making process, 
political equality and state responsiveness to the preferences of its citizens.  Participatory 
democracy speaks to the three core concerns of democracy namely: who controls power, how 
is power distributed and the relationship between those who are governed and those who 
govern.  
With regard to the issue of who controls power, participatory democracy recognises that the 
majority make the decisions while respecting minority views.  All active and legitimate 
groups are heard in the decision-making process.  The state is responsive to the demands of its 
citizens.  Under this model of democracy both contestation and participation are possible.  
Representation is based on majority votes provided the rules of fair play apply.  Competition 
for position of leadership is allowed based on fair rules of the game.  Within this conceptual 
framework, the rights to freedom of speech, association and assembly are respected.  
With respect to the issue of how power is distributed, the model provides that there is a 
constitutional framework that influences the conduct of government.  A separation of powers 
between the executive, legislature and judiciary exists.  All the three organs of government 
respect the institutional mandate of each other.  For example, the executive respects the 
decisions of the courts and the legislative and oversight functions of parliament.  Under this 
model, the institutional framework in place provides for all legitimate voices to be heard: the 
youth, women, disabled, refugees and the minorities.  The decisions made are for the common 
good, and individual interest is secondary.  
The model also addresses itself to the relationship between those who govern and the 
governed.  It provides for a constitutional framework that has safeguards to deter the state 
from taking arbitrary actions against individuals and respects individual liberties.  It provides 
for a bill of rights to promote participation and active citizenship.  Finally, the model 
recognises the value of organised voluntary associations including NGOs in the formulation 
of public policies.  
Participatory democracy would also require an enabling environment to thrive.  Such an 
environment would be dictated by the degree of economic development, civic culture and 
existing state-NGO relations.  The downside to this model is, to the chagrin of many states, it 
calls for a leadership that subscribes to democracy as a universal value.  
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In Chapter Four, the discussion addresses the vexed issue of legitimacy of NGOs in Eastern 
and Southern Africa to understand the underlying state-NGO tensions and challenges to active 












THE LEGITIMACY OF NGOs 
 
4. 0.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In Chapter Three, the discussion on the theoretical perspectives of democracy in Africa 
underscored three important elements of democracy: active civic participation, the protection 
of liberties and state responsiveness to citizen demands.
279
 It was noted that participation 
promotes active citizenship which in turn confers a sense of freedom to the individual.
280
 
Democracy, it was argued, depends on the existence of an enabling environment which is 
often dictated by the degree of economic development, civic culture and the nature of state-
NGO relations in a given state.
281
  
Where an enabling environment exists, pressure groups have sought to involve people in the 
decision- making process and in holding the state accountable for its actions.
282
 Through 
NGOs, individuals enjoy freedom of expression and association, and are able to participate in 




 Notwithstanding the invaluable contribution NGOs make to democracy, NGOs have come 
under strong scrutiny in East and Southern Africa.
284
 NGOs are increasingly being challenged 
about their legitimacy and democratic governance practices.  Difficult questions are being 
asked.  What are their agendas? Are these NGOs accountable and transparent? Are they 
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This Chapter discusses the vexed issue of the legitimacy of NGOs in Eastern and Southern 
Africa.  What are the underlying causes of state-NGO tensions and, what are the challenges to 
the credibility and effectiveness of NGOs? 
4. 1.  THE CONCEPT OF THE LEGITIMACY OF NGOs 
 
Given the varied application of the term ‘legitimacy’, this section begins with a discussion of 
the term and how it applies to NGOs.  ‘Legitimacy’ as applied to NGOs has a broad meaning.  
Brown defines legitimacy to be a right for an organisation to be and to do something in 
society, in this sense such organization being lawful, admissible and justified in its course of 
action.
286
 Legitimacy could also mean that the institution acts with authority that is accepted 
as proper, moral and just.
287
 Relatedly, legitimacy could as well refer to the beliefs and 
attitudes that people have towards NGOs.
288
 The beliefs and attitudes are often dictated by 
several factors: indigenousness, effectiveness, representativeness, institutionalisation, 
responsiveness and sustainability of an organisation.
289
  
For NGOs to be legitimate, they must be accountable.
290
 But what does accountability mean? 
‘Accountability’ means taking responsibility for one’s actions or presenting accounts to 
someone else.
291
 Kakumba and Fourie identify three reasons why accountability is important 
to NGOs: to check abuse of authority by the leaders of NGOs, to provide assurance for the 
proper use of resources, and to promote continuous improvement in the delivery of 
services.
292
 Accountability would therefore go beyond compliance with laws to ensuring 
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Murungi outlines five sources of legitimacy for NGOs that are equally relevant to our 
discussion:  
 First, is the strong moral conviction of an NGO to articulate public concerns on the 
basis of universally recognised rights and freedoms of speech, assembly and 
association;   
 Second, is political legitimacy based on community approval of the voluntary 
association in which the association asserts peoples’ sovereignty;   
 Third, is performance legitimacy based on results arising from the NGO’s 
activities, knowledge, and expertise.   
 Fourth, is legal legitimacy arising from compliance with the statutory 
requirements.  Legal recognition is however a double-edged sword that could 
enhance or undermine the credibility of an organisation since registration could be 
extended to less credible groups and,   




These five sources can be summed up into five factors that affect the legitimacy of NGOs: 
legality, indigenousness, independence, representativeness, and accountability, to which the 
study now turns.  
4. 2.  LEGALITY OF NGOs 
 
The status of NGOs under international law has been a subject of debate.  Do NGOs have any 
rights under international law? If not, what justifies their existence and the right to operate? 
The liberal school of thought holds that states are the primary duty bearers and it is the duty of 
states to protect individuals not just against violations of their rights by the state and its 
agents, but also against acts committed by private actors that violate human rights.
295
 
According to this view, human rights are state-centric and it is the obligation of states to 
ensure that private actors do not violate human rights.
296
 Even though NGOs are associations 
of individuals, this school of thought does not recognise the existence of NGOs as rights 
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holders or duty bearers under human rights and international public law.  Brownlie argues that 
‘to qualify as a legal entity under international law, an entity must have the capacities to make 
claims in respect of breaches of international law, make treaties and agreements valid on the 
international plane and enjoy the privileges and immunities from national jurisdiction’.
297
  
Notwithstanding this view, international law recognises NGOs as a means through which 
individuals can exercise their rights.  These rights have been codified in various international 
instruments to which states are parties.  Beginning with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR), the duty of every individual to promote respect for these rights has been 
recognised.  The UDHR obliges ‘every individual and every organ of society to strive by 
teaching and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms’.
298
 The right of 
individuals to freedom of peaceful assembly and association has also been recognised.
299
 
Though not legally binding, the rights enshrined in the UDHR have been codified in legally 
binding instruments to which states are parties.  
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), mindful of the obligation 
of states to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms, 
provides that the ‘individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to 
which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the 
rights recognised in the Covenant’.
300
 Likewise, the UN Declaration of Human Rights 
Defenders recognizes the right of everyone, individually, or in association with others, to 
promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms. 
301
 
Within the African human rights system, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(African Charter), ratified by African states, provides a more expansive approach to the issue 
of rights and duties.
302
  The African Charter provides that ‘. . . the enjoyment of rights and 
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freedoms also implies the performance of duties on the part of everyone’.
303
 Unlike the 
ICCPR, the African Charter does not place the responsibility for human rights promotion, 
defence, and protection solely on the state but the society as a whole.
304
 The individual 
therefore is not only a bearer of rights but has corresponding duties, either alone or in 
association with others.
305
 In view of this finding, Nassali argues that ‘although the individual 
is the principal and central subject of human rights, NGOs, as a collection of individuals who 




At the national level, states have ratified these international and regional human rights 
instruments, thereby granting citizens the rights to establish NGOs.
307
  All the constitutions of 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa provide for the right to freedom of association.
308
 National 
constitutions bear provisions that confer responsibilities to protect rights on states as well as 
rights to individuals to form associations.  For example, the Constitution of Ethiopia 
recognises the right of every person to freedom of association for any cause or purpose with 
the exception of organisations formed in violation of laws, or illegally to subvert the 
constitutional order, or which promote activities that are prohibited.
309
 The Constitution of 
Uganda recognises the right of every person to freedom of association, which includes the 
freedom to form and join associations, or unions, including trade unions and political and 
other civic organisations.
310
 The Constitution of Zimbabwe recognises the right of every 
person to freedom of assembly and association, and the right not to assemble or associate with 
others.
311
 The Constitution of Namibia, likewise, provides for freedom of association, which 
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Individuals therefore have the right to form NGOs under national and international law.  And 
upon registration such NGOs acquire legal recognition.  NGOs also acquire ‘derivative 
legality’ upon the grant of ‘observer Status’ before regional bodies.
313
  Despite this formal 
recognition, NGOs remain curious phenomena.  Are they an imposition of the West? This has 
attracted considerable debate.  Are they indigenous, foreign or neo-liberal?  
4. 3.  NGOs AS A NEO-LIBERAL CONSTRUCT 
 
‘NGOs’, like democracy, is a contested concept.
314
 NGOs, it has been argued, are a ‘neo-
liberal’ construct.
315
 They arose in the 1980s and proliferated in the 1990s following the 
collapse of the Soviet Union and East European regimes, and the subsequent democratisation 
drive in Africa.
316
 With the collapse of socialism, the post-colonial state, unable to deliver 
services without the support of its benefactors, had to institute democratic reforms.
317
 
As already noted in Chapter Two, the democratic reform process has blossomed into a ‘global 
associational revolution’.
318
Within this revolution are associational groupings, civil society 
organisations (CSOs), and NGOs.
319
  Broadly speaking, CSOs and NGOs are part of ‘civil 
society’, a political expression which serves as a counter-weight to state and corporate 
power.
320
 Unlike civil society in Europe that is a product of the bourgeois revolution, the rise 
of NGOs in sub-Saharan Africa is seen more as a direct response to the dysfunction and 
despotism of the post-colonial state.
321
 NGOs are promoted as new agents of change, 
custodians of ‘good governance’ and a recipe for the better delivery of services.
322
 Makau 
argues, that ‘the whittling away of absolute power due to the end of Cold War politics 
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afforded an opportunity to pro-democracy forces to open the political space necessary for the 
establishment of human rights groups’.
323
  
In the neo-liberal discourse, the existence of a plurality of autonomous associations which 
constitute independent centres of power to check abuses of central authority is crucial to 
securing greater accountability from the regime.
324
 Within this neo-liberal paradigm, NGOs 
would perform several democratic functions which include; empowerment, educative, 
watchdog, and advocacy roles.
325
 Under this neo-liberal framework, NGOs, consistent with 




But herein lies another challenge of the legitimacy of NGOs in the region.  In the neo-liberal 
discourse, the African state is cast as a villain.
327
 The discourse demonises African 
bureaucracies as corrupt, incapable and unable to learn.
328
 According to the World Bank 
report, the state in Africa is described as ‘corrupt, dictatorial, with no capacity to manage 
resources, bloated, and based on nepotism’.
329
 In this discourse, mentors and monitors to 
oversee the state are needed and NGOs are prescribed as such.
330
 NGOs which are conflated 
with civil society are presented as the third sector, the other sectors being the state and the 
private sector.
331
 This dichotomisation of society, however, poses serious political 
implications for NGOs.  
Among these political implications is the perception by African states of NGOs as agents of 
imperialism.
332
 Are NGOs, as Cassese argues, an imposition, used to spread a western 
philosophy of human values on the rest of the world?
333
 Shivji argues that ‘NGOs arose as 
donors became disenchanted with states; they took a fancy to NGOs thus undermining the 
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state and its institutions’.
334
 NGOs are thus perceived as, essentially pressure groups to keep 
those in power, the state and the government on their toes.
335
  
It has been argued, that this exertion of pressure by NGOs undermines governmental authority 
and is unacceptable.
336
 Governments go on the offensive when their propriety and 
respectability is challenged.
337
 The tendency of such states is to deny or, to label human rights 
groups as ‘subversive, alien, seditious or terrorist’.
338
 This condescending attitude of states is 
double-edged.  As noted earlier, states recognise the role that NGOs play in the development 
of human rights standards and in the enforcement of human rights in international and 
domestic settings.
339
 For example, since the end of the Second World War, the Western 
based-NGOs have been instrumental in the creation of the United Nations and its subsidiary 
bodies.
340
 NGOs were active in the discussions that secured human rights in the UN 
Charter.
341
 NGOs with UN Consultative status submit alternative reports to the Office of the 
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) who compiles a report for 
submission to the UN Human Rights Council for consideration during state party 
proceedings.
342
 It is ironic, as Wiseberg notes that states know that the raison d’être of many 




Ideologically, human rights NGOs are viewed by African states as part of the neo-liberal 
tradition, a model built on traditional western liberal values, which, to critics, is bent on 
promoting political democracy.
344
 Are NGOs indigenous or are they truly a creation of 
western capitalism? It is for a fact that NGOs are a phenomenon of the post-independence 
period; however, their origins are rooted in the civil society struggles against imperialism and 
neo-liberalism.  The origin of civil society in Africa, it is argued, is traced to the rise of 
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capitalism, and efforts to challenge the authoritarian colonial state in Africa.
345
 Civic 
organisations played a key role in demanding direct participation in policy making and 
legislation to secure the interests of Africans against the colonial state.
346
 For instance, the 
seeds of the nationalist liberation movement that culminated in the independence of many 
countries in Africa in the 1960s can be traced to civil society, of which NGOs,  are a only a 
recent expression.
347
 Whether in Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, Uganda or any other 
country in East and Southern Africa, civil society organisations were actively involved in the 
struggle for independence.   
It is also argued here that the 1980’s marked a resurgence of civil society, a time when the 
principle of liberal democracy ran counter to benevolent authoritarianism of the post-
independent state.
348
 As the state retreated, civil society organisations became the leading 
development agent and occupied the space that the state had dominated.
349
 This rejuvenation 
of civil society in the post-cold war era was instrumental to the democratization process in the 
1990s.  Characteristic of the democratization process were political reforms that led to the 
repeal of single-party legislation and the holding of multi-party elections in most countries in 
the region.  Kenya, for example, repealed the single-party legislation that opened the country 
to multiparty elections in 1992 and 1997; Tanzania instituted reforms leading to multiparty 
elections in 1993, Uganda instituted reforms, moving from a no-party system in 1996 to 
multi-party rule in 2006.
350
 South Africa witnessed a political revival as the apartheid state 
began to make concessions, repealing legislation that restricted political space necessary for 
NGOs to grow and flourish, and giving way to democracy in 1994.
351
 
Besides their democratising role, NGOs have been central in the development of the 
international human rights system.  For example, NGOs have taken centre stage in promoting 
these human rights norms and processes through the exercise of the duty to consult.
352
 Article 
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71 of the UN Charter establishes the duty to consult NGOs.
353
 States have since consulted 
NGOs and the practice has become widespread within the UN and the African human rights 
system, the latest being the UN Security Council, which as Charnovits observes, appeared to 
be off-limits for NGOs,  and many UN bodies including ECOSOC and the UN Human Rights 
Council.
354
 This duty to consult provides a framework within which the Economic and Social 
Council makes arrangements for consultative status with NGOs.
355
 Indeed, under ECOSOC 
resolution 288B (X), the first NGOs were granted ECOSOC status in 1948.
356
 Since 1948, 
NGOs, at the national, regional, and international level have actively participated in the work 
of the United Nations and its subsidiary bodies.  Since 1945, a range of human rights 
declarations and or, treaties have been adopted and ratified by states with the participation of 
NGOs, the most recent being the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights Defenders.
357
  
NGOs are increasingly becoming important players within civil society, serving as a useful 
intermediary between the family as a primary unit of society and the myriad agencies of the 
state.
358
 For this reason, this thesis argues, that in as much as a democratic state and civil 
society are two sides of the same coin, an NGO and government are complementary, each 
fulfilling different functions but both presumably dedicated to improving society’.
359
 It is 
further argued that the acceptance of the international human rights regime by African states, 
through the domestication of international human rights standards legitimises the existence of 
NGOs.  For this reason and other reasons given above, the claim that NGOs are merely an 
extension of the Western based human rights movement is misplaced as NGOs have justified 
their existence in other ways.
360
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 Unfortunately states that are illiberal and undemocratic hardly share this view.  As it was 
noted in the introductory chapter, the value of ‘rights’, is questioned, and imperatives of 
‘statehood’ are advanced.
361
 A contest over political space arises when NGOs monitor and 
report on governmental human rights abuses.  Bratton captures this underlying tension very 
well when he notes ‘that NGOs that specialize in human rights advocacy have been slow to 
gain access to, and take root in Africa.  This slow approach has more to do with African 
governments that are sensitive to the barest hint of negative international publicity about the 
management of public dissent’.
362
 Yet, the quest for political democracy has always enlisted 
NGO involvement and accounts for this ideological fix.  The idea of political democracy 
entails making the citizen a key factor in the political society.  NGOs, as a key factor in civil 
society inevitably became an important feature of this political landscape.  Notwithstanding 
this ideological myth, the work of NGOs in promoting democracy can no longer be ignored.  
Key issues however arise; how deep, effective and independent are NGOs? 
4. 4.   INDEPENDENCE OF NGOs 
 
The issue of depth and independence of NGOs presents another challenge to the legitimacy of 
NGOs.  Key questions arise.  How do NGOs determine their mandate?  How are they funded? 
This section discusses two inter-related aspects that affect the credibility and reliability of 
NGOs namely; the mandate and the funding of NGOs. 
4. 4. 1.  Mandate of NGOs   
 
Critics argue that NGOs have no ‘grand theory’ to account for the work that they do.
363
 NGO 
activism, it is argued, is based on an ‘act now, think later’ mantra.
364
 Much of NGO work, it is 
argued, is based on ‘activism’ without any attempt to interrogate the underlying theoretical or 
philosophical premises or outlooks.
365
 This school of thought holds the view that most 
advocacy NGOs focus on particular areas of their activity such as human rights, gender, 
development, environment and governance without questioning the theoretical outlook of 
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 Without a theory to explain their actions, NGOs can hardly be successful in 
their mission.  Cabral, who subscribes to the relevance of a theory to every practice, has 
argued that ‘every practice produces a theory and nobody has made a successful revolution 
without a revolutionary theory’.
367
 This lack of a ‘grand theory’ has lent credence to current 
thinking that contrary to NGO belief that their work is for the ‘pro-poor,’ NGO roles and 
actions advance neo-liberalism which does not serve the large majority of the people, but 
instead  advances ‘free enterprise’. 
368
  
The ‘pro-poor’ ideology is premised on the the state as the guarantor of law and order, the 
private sector as the engine of growth, and the voluntary sector being assigned the role of 
social welfare for the less privileged.
369
 Given this thinking, how do NGOs determine their 
vision, mission, objectives, and working methods, and without perpetuating the status quo?
370
 




As it was noted earlier, NGOs derive their legal legitimacy from international human rights 
treaties, which states ratify and domesticate in national constitutions.
372
  National 
constitutions have codified these rights in a bill of rights giving individuals the freedom to 
choose who to represent and what issues to advance.  This creates a presumption that 
individuals enjoy freedoms to expression, association and assembly and the right to 
participate in matters that affect them.  Participation enables individuals to collectively 
determine their priorities and needs in order to protect and, advance their rights and 
interests.
373
 Expanding the space for peoples’ participation in the institutions of the state 
should be a priority for NGOs.  The Declaration on the Right to Development,
374
 also 
recognises development as a process whose objective is the ‘constant improvement of the 
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well–being of all people on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation . . .’
375
 
NGOs are therefore expected to mobilise people, enhance their skills, and empower them to 
question the status quo.
376
 In doing this, NGOs promote critical consciousness and decision 
making upon which active citizenship thrives.
377
 Achieving such transformation requires 
effective participation, which this thesis notes is a missing link in nascent African 
democracies.  
States have a legitimate concern to ask whether NGOs are operating lawfully or not.  To 
dissipate the argument whether ‘NGOs are merely foot soldiers’ of capitalism, which they 
perpetuate, NGOs, need to identify their niche.  NGOs need to define their vision, mission, 
and objectives clearly within the human rights framework.  Having a well defined vision, 
mission, and objectives as well as working methods that are consistent therewith, increases 
the legitimacy and credibility of the NGO.
378
 With a clear set of issues to address, clarity of 
underlying causes and with appropriate capacity, NGOs would become effective players, and 
go beyond understanding the root causes to making their clients into active citizens.
379
 As 
Thaw observes, the success of an NGO is measured by the extent to which it achieves its 
identified mission or programme or mandate.
380
 
But beyond the issue of vision and mission is the broad question of the working methods.  It 
is argued that NGOs as a ‘conscience of the people’ lie at the intersection between power and 
powerlessness.  NGOs seek to promote civil and political rights and have increasingly joined 
the fray to advocate for economic, social and cultural rights.  Promoting human rights is a 
political question.  It involves mobilising, educating, engaging, and conscientizing the 
population, activities which are inherently political.  Does engagement in political activities 
delegitimize NGOs?   As Wiseberg notes:  
One function that NGOs perform in the defence of human rights is to keep the political 
system open to other elements of civil society.  In working for freedom of association, 
freedom of opinion, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly, human rights 
                                                          
375
 Ibid. Article 1.  See paragraph 10 of the African Charter on Popular Participation (1990). 
376
 C McCrudden ‘Mainstreaming Human Rights’ in Harvey (ed) Human Rights in the Community: Rights as 
Agents for Change (oxford: Hart, 2005) 7-27. 
377
 Darrow and Tomas   op cit   note 276 at 506. 
378
 P F Drucker Managing the Non-profit organizations: Practices and Principles (London, Oxford: Butterworth 
Heinemann) 39.  
379
 L Diamond Civil Society and the Development of Democracy Working Paper 1997/101 9 (Madrid: Juan 
March Institute, 1997) 29-42.  
380
 D Thaw ‘Stepping into the river of change’ in Edwards and Fowler (eds) The Earth scan Reader on NGO 
Management (London: Earth scan, 2002) 146-163. 
81 |  
 
NGOs make it possible for civil society to function; they create political space for 
democratic forces and therefore for democracy.
381
  
Democratizing society of necessity draws NGOs into policy and legislative advocacy.  Policy 
making, it is argued, is inherently a ‘sovereign activity’ that states undertake on behalf of the 
people.  It involves a lot of political activism and entails a terrain of intense conflicts of 
interest.
382
 Should states restrict NGOs from participating in political activities? I argue to the 
contrary.   
Demanding change implicitly makes NGOs defend interests, whether of workers, women, 
children or the political society.  NGOs work for ‘participation rights’ for the people.  Being 
non-political limits the political space within which NGOs can influence change.  As Shivji 
observes, ‘NGOs cannot be pro-people and pro-change without being anti-status quo.   NGOs 




NGOs should not have any political party affiliation as this threatens their autonomy and 
objectivity, and may subject them to political patronage.  Being independent of the state and 
being non-partisan, however, should not preclude an NGO from collaborating with or 
supporting a political group or governmental agency.  Experiences among states however 
differ.  For example, Malawi does not register NGOs engaged in partisan politics including 
electioneering and politicking.
384
 Unlike Malawi, Kenya, allows NGOs to express views on 
any issue or policy that is or may be debated or discussed in the course of a political campaign 
or election.
385
   
 
4.4.2. Funding of NGOs 
 
The next issue is the funding of NGOs which raises an additional issue of legitimacy.  How 
should NGOs be funded?  Should NGOs accept donor funding or, in the alternative, 
government funding?  One school of thought believes that NGOs working on political and 
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democratic reform would be compromised if they receive fiscal support from government.
386
 
A divergent view holds that foreign funding is a threat to the independence of NGOs since ‘he 
who pays the piper calls the tune’.
387
 In practice, the majority of NGOs in the sub-region 
depend on either donor funding or governments to support their activities.  Oloka-Onyango 
observes that many NGOs would not survive without donor aid.
388
 For example, about 75% of 
NGOs in East Africa depended on foreign grants in 2004.
389
 Like the NGOs in East Africa, 
donor funding to NGOs in South Africa, is estimated at 45%.
390
 Hearn argues that the push 
for human rights in Uganda owes its origins to donor funding.
391
 Donors, it is argued, exert a 
lot of influence on policies, strategies and agendas of NGOs.
392
 Donor funding raises the issue 
of state sovereignty.  There is an underlying fear that donor funding raises the prospect of 
foreign powers interfering with the internal affairs of African states thereby undermining state 
authority.  The donor shift that views NGOs as alternatives for donor support is also feared to 
undermine state authority.  African states are reminded of the experiences of colonialism.  
Donor funding allegedly contributes to unhealthy competition among NGOs, erodes 




 Away from donor influence, donors have also been criticised for stifling NGO activism by 
encouraging a less critical engagement with states.
394
 Is it plausible to discredit the source of 
funding or is the ability of the NGOs to execute the mandate that one should be weary of? 
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This thesis argues that it is not government or donor funding to NGOs that should be the 
primary concern.  Accepting government funding should not pose a major challenge since as 
it was noted; NGOs and government are two sides of the same coin.
395
 Bazaara argues that 
where the state and the non-profit sector cooperate, the state earmarks a role for the non-profit 
sector and subsidizes it.
396
 The primary issue should be that of disclosure of funding sources.  
Does the NGO disclose its funding sources in order to ‘safeguard its autonomy’ and, be held 
accountable to its constituency?
397
 Is the duty to disclose the source of funding open- ended? 
What about funding sources that prefer to remain anonymous? Should the NGO be compelled 
to reveal the source? 
This thesis argues that although disclosure of funding sources should be encouraged, the NGO 
should also be free to exercise the freedom from non-disclosure to protect funding sources 
that may prefer anonymity.  Beyond disclosure of funding sources, the NGO should be able to 
strike a balance between maintaining its autonomy and having external funding.  The answer 
lies in having ‘strategic partnerships’.
398
 Foreign donors have increasingly adopted the 
‘partnership’ approach.  For example, the Ford Foundation, Open Society, HIVOS, and the 
European Union hold annual reflection meetings with their partners.  Although a novel idea, 
in a region where most states depend on donor funding and treat human rights as an 
‘anathema’, would they be in support of this approach? Moreover, most African states are 
neither democratic nor pro-people.
399
 Experiences vary.  For example, Ethiopia restricts 
foreign funding towards human rights and advocacy activities to not more than 10%.
400
 Kenya 
requires NGOs to receive not more than 15% of their funding from external donors.
401
 
 On the side of government funding, this thesis is of the view that having a funding 
mechanism set up by government that is transparently and independently managed would 
address the threat of state interference in NGO activities.  NGOs ought to ‘explore the 
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possibility of an NGO-controlled fund that the state would finance’.
402
 It would appear 
therefore, that where an NGO accepts government funding, or for example, where an NGO 
provides services to a government agency (humanitarian, consulting or otherwise), it should 
not bow to undue outside influence, otherwise it risks being a ‘fake or rogue’ NGO.
403
  
Donor dependency affects the legitimacy of NGOs in as far as it is a threat to their autonomy.  
In view of this challenge, widening the local revenue base for NGOs is seen as a progressive 
approach.  Fundraising from the private sector, investing in purchase of bonds, as well as 
generating income from membership subscriptions and donations are possible avenues that 
could be explored.  Local fundraising would improve current credibility ratings of NGOs and 
contribute substantially to improving accountability of NGOs as well.  Good as the options 
may be, NGOs may have to overcome potential challenges.  Among these is poor 
philanthropy.  The private sector, besides the possibility of dictating the agenda, is under 




Despite the obstacles stated above, widening the local resource base would contribute 
significantly to narrowing the credibility gap, would address the ‘conceptual and physical 
distance’ between most NGOs and the ordinary poor and consequently promote active 
participation of communities.  
But who elects NGOs to assume the moral high ground? How democratic are they? Who 
holds the NGOs accountable? In the next section the focus is on the challenge of the 
democratic legitimacy for NGOs.   
4.5.   DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY 
 
Unlike the popular organizations like trade unions, the church, farmers’ associations, which as 
Barkan argues, ‘are grassroots, member-oriented, democratically-run and (mostly) locally-
funded’, NGOs cannot claim serious democratic roots in the community.
405
 NGOs, save for a 
few community-based groups are located in urban areas, composed largely of the educated 
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elite who are often disconnected to the social reality of the poor rural majority whom they 
claim to represent.
406
 Even the few NGOs that have a membership, is not significant to 
guarantee them legitimacy.  Without a strong membership how does an NGO set its agenda, 
make decisions and make its advocacy people-driven? Can an organization advocate on 
behalf of the general public or specific groups or individuals without being representative?  
Legitimacy, as noted earlier, has many elements; moral, legal, political, performance and 
democratic.  NGOs can acquire legitimacy in the way they operate, the issues they address 
and the rights they promote in a democratic society.  The international human rights law 
regime and the constitutional framework create choices for individuals who form associations.  
Among these is the legal obligation to register under the law.  All the constitutions of Eastern 
and Southern Africa provide for the right to freedom of association.
407
 The question is 
whether the requirement to register is mandatory? Where an NGO is allowed to operate, what 
matters is its ability to deliver on its mandate.  Where an organisation has a clear and concise 
mission and is able to achieve results, its legitimacy and credibility will be enhanced.
408
 
Anderson puts it even more bluntly, that ‘the glory of organizations of civil society is not 
democratic legitimacy, but the ability to be a pressure group’.
409
 Being a membership 
organisation does not necessarily make an NGO accountable.
410
  
To some what matters is the fidelity of an NGO to its core mandate.  Unlike states, NGOs do 
not have coercive power, financial power or even authority that derives from 
representation’.
411
 What matters is the impact of their work which is dependent on the 
execution of their core mandate.
412
 An NGO can have legitimacy if it is able to execute its 
core mandate.  Execution of its mandate makes the NGO effective but as a ‘voice of the 
voiceless’, does this make it democratic if it is alienated from the people it claims to 
represent?  
 
                                                          
406
 Moore and Stewart op cit note 278 at 30.  
407
 Op cit note 301-305. 
408
P F Drucker Managing the Non-Profit Organization: Practices and Principles (London, Oxford: Butterworth, 
Heinemann, 1990) 39.  
409
 Anderson op cit note 280 at 92.  
410
 A  Bebbington and R Riddell ‘Heavy Hands,  Holding Hands? Donors, Intermediary NGOs and Civil Society 
Organizations’ in Hulmes and Edwards (eds) NGOs, State and Donors: Too Close for Comfort (New York, 
London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1997)   107-127 at 111. 
411
 Lisa Jordan Mechanisms for NGO Accountability (Global Public Policy Institute, 2005) Research Paper 
Series No 3, 13. 
412
 Ibid. 
86 |  
 
Effectiveness in my view does not offer an NGO democratic legitimacy.  Edwards holds a 
similar view.  He argues that NGOs pledge to be democratic consistent with the human right 
to representation.
413
 Gutto asks, is it not the involvement of the people in rights struggles that 
has given these struggles the appropriate content?
414
 Lister, like Edwards, argues that NGOs 
do not have to be membership- based to be legitimate but they should be accountable for what 
they do.
415
 Lehr-Lehnardt, unlike Gutto, argues that NGOs do not need full democracy in their 
internal processes provided they adhere to the theory of rights.
416
      
 Addressing the NGO deficit to achieve democratic legitimacy requires NGOs to take 
deliberate steps in four key areas:  First, is the need for accountability to a broad spectrum of 
stakeholders; members, donors, peers, partner institutions both governmental and non-
governmental.
417
 This could be achieved through carrying out membership meetings, joint 
projects and issuance of regular reports.  Other accountability measures would include needs 
assessment surveys, programme reviews (mid- and end-of term) and, strategic assessment 
meetings.
418
 Second, is the over-riding need to adopt democratic structures that encourage 
participatory decision- making.  The demand to popularise the human rights struggle is 
overwhelming.
419
 NGOs need to deepen their roots among the communities and adopt a ‘mass 
social movement model’ (grassroots-based, member-oriented, locally funded and activist in 
nature).
420
 Third, NGOs should be focussed on their primary agenda and resist the temptation 
to do what is in ‘vogue’.
421
 The idea of active citizenship obligates NGOs to expand spaces 
for peoples’ participation in the institutions of the state.  As Ihonvbere has argued, this 
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requires a systematic and sustained mass mobilisation as a basic activist strategy.
422
 And 
finally, NGOs should ensure fiscal accountability that goes side by side with effective 
reporting.
423
 So, to whom do they account?  
4. 6.  ACCOUNTABILITY  
 
The question is, ‘To whom and in what ways are NGOs accountable’? The principle of 
accountability requires an NGO not only to adhere to its vision and mission, it should fulfil 
reporting requirements, be ethical in the conduct of its business and involve a wide range of 
stakeholders in carrying out activities.
424
 NGOs have an obligation to provide accurate 
financial and progress reports to their constituency- Government, members, donors, and the 
people they serve.
425
 Wyatt describes an NGO which is accountable as one whose activities 
are driven by its mission, whose internal systems safeguard the public trust and one which 
uses its resources in accordance with its purposes.
426
 
4. 6. 1.  Accountability to Government  
 
Accountability to Government requires associations to register under the law in order to 
pursue legitimate associational life.  In a democratic society, the state is obliged to provide the 
legal and regulatory framework within which NGOs operate.
427
 Does this require Government 
to establish special oversight mechanisms? The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights 
(LCHR) argues that ordinary criminal and civil laws are adequate to protect against fraud and 
abuse of the public trust.
428
 The duty to operate within the law establishes a corresponding 
obligation on the part of government to establish a body that provides the oversight.   As it 
will be noted in Chapter 6, the countries in East and Southern Africa have adopted regulatory 
laws that establish National Boards for the registration and monitoring of NGOs.  But would 
this require NGOs to undertake mandatory registration with such a body?  Does Government 
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have a duty in exercise of its regulatory function not to interfere with legitimate associational 
life? In Christopher Mitkila v AG, the High Court in Tanzania addressed itself to the issue and 
held that a law which limits or derogates from the basic rights of the individual must be lawful 
and be free from arbitrary abuse by those in authority and be reasonably necessary to achieve 
the intended objective.
429
   
 As it will be noted in Chapter 5, NGOs are required to register in order to be accountable and 
transparent, and to fulfil reporting requirements to Government.
430
 And in case of mandatory 
registration, what registration procedures are required? Registration procedures must be 
quick, straightforward, inexpensive, and where denial of registration takes place, such a 
decision must be subject to judicial review.
431
 Indeed, as it was noted in Chapter 6, most NGO 
laws require NGOs to declare their objectives, promoters, Boards of Directors, activities and 
sources of funding.
432
 Difficulties have been encountered where associations formed to carry 
out activities dubbed ‘prohibited activities’ have shied away from having themselves 
registered.  For example, the Citizens Coalition for Constitutional Change in Kenya (4Cs), the 
Citizens Coalition for Electoral Democracy in Uganda (CCEDU), Kenya Women Political 
Caucus (KWPC); each of these groups have had to operate under host organisations.  Would 
the inability to register make them less accountable?  This thesis argues that provided they 
operate transparently within the host organisation, they should be able to assert their right to 
freedom of association which is enshrined in the constitutions of most states in Eastern and 
Southern Africa.
433
 Where the NGO law requires periodic reporting to the regulatory body, a 
default by the NGO may not only amount to a breach but could render the NGO less 
accountable.  For example, Nassali reports that an Impact study of Non Profit Organisations 
(NPOs) recorded two thousand one hundred organisations to have been de-registered in South 
Africa for non-reporting in 2004.
434
 There are also efforts at self-regulation.  For example, 
NGOs in Uganda launched a self-regulating instrument, the NGO Quality Assurance 
Mechanism (QuAM) in September 2006.  QuAM is designed to promote adherence by Civil 
Society Organizations to accept ethical standards and operational norms.  Among these 
                                                          
429
 Christopher Mtikila v AG, High Court of Dodoma, Civil Case No. 5 of 1993. 
430
 Welch op cit note 349 at 44. 
431
 Lawyers Committee for Human Rights op cit note 419 at 22. 
432
 Uganda NGO Act, 2006; PBO Act, 2013, Tanzania NGO Act, 2002, Malawi NGO Act, 2000; South Africa, 
NPO Act, 1997, Zimbabwe PVO Act, 1995. 
433
 Article 29(1) Uganda Constitution, Article 52 Kenya Constitution, Clause 18, South African Constitution, and 
Article 20, Tanzania Constitution.  
434
 Nassali op cit note 74 at 110. An Impact Assessment Study of Non-Profit Organizations in South Africa 
conducted in 2004 showed a poor record of legal reporting by NPOs. 
89 |  
 
minimum standards is ethical governance, effective management of resources, a clear work 
plan, mission and vision including policies and procedures to ensure transparency and 
accountability.435 
  
4. 6. 2.   Accountability to Members    
 
Membership organisations have an obligation to account to their membership (the General 
Assembly) which is often the highest decision-making body.
436
 Being a membership 
organisation may not be mandatory but where such membership exists, NGO actions and 
policies should be controlled by the membership for the NGO to be legitimate.
437
 However, 
critics argue that being membership-based does not guarantee democratic governance nor 
being accountable.
438
 In support of this view, Nassali reports, that in a comparative study of 
Uganda, Ghana and South Africa conducted by the Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, 




Even if a large membership does not guarantee democratic governance of an NGO, the 
payment of membership contributions and holding regular elections for the Board of Directors 
of NGOs is an important accountability mechanism to the membership.  Where members 
contribute financially to the activities of the NGO, however nominal, it places them in a 
position to hold the NGO accountable.  For example, the Foundation for Human Rights 
Initiative (FHRI) derives much of its funding from donors, but with a membership of over 
1000 members, each paying Uganda shillings 250,000 (USD 250), this entitles them to a right 
to elect the leadership of the organisation and to participate in its activities.
440
  
Not all NGOs are membership-based.  Some NGOs have nominated or appointed Boards of 
Directors.  For example, the Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) in South Africa amended its 
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constitution to remove the membership from the decision-making body, arguing that 
managing people was expensive.
441
 Barr, Fafchamps, and Owen report that in Uganda, only a 
half of NGOs elect their Boards while a third appoint or nominate them.
442
 Would such 
nominated Boards be accountable? I argue in the affirmative.  Winston, likewise argues, that 
NGOs with self-perpetuating Boards can be democratically governed and accountable.
443
 
Notwithstanding any differences in opinion, NGOs ought to apply democratic principles in 
the conduct of their business, and in doing so, be accountable to their members. 
 
 4. 6. 3.  Accountability to the People   
  
The key issue to consider is how do the beneficiaries participate in the activities of the NGO? 
Are they central to the design and implementation of the programmes of the NGO? 
Accountability to beneficiaries can take several forms: baseline surveys to determine the 
priority needs of the community, review of strategic plans, evaluation of programmes, and 
fiscal accountability.  What is questioned is the quality of the consultations, are beneficiaries 
central to the decision-making process? Do beneficiaries hold NGOs accountable to their 
actions? NGOs have come under scrutiny for using communities to endorse pre-conceived 
ideas.  Dicklitch, for example, questions the top-down approach of the consultations, and 




Being accountable to the people would mean engaging the victims in identifying the root 
causes of the inequality.  An NGO needs to be accountable: Does it speak for the poor, about 
the poor or as the poor?
445
 Being accountable to the beneficiaries requires NGOs to monitor 
the impact of their work on the intended beneficiaries.  Is it making a difference in the lives of 
the people they seek to improve? Understanding the shortfalls and lessons learnt enhances the 
accountability and transparency of the organisation.
446
 This thesis agrees with Orlin that 
NGOs need to publicise their mission, objectives, methods of work, achievements, challenges, 
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areas of work, governance structures, funding and activity reports among the communities 
they serve to increase accountability.
447
  
4. 6. 4.  Accountability to Donors 
 
Donor funding comes with obligations: to account for the funds received and to show results 
for the money spent.  Nassali reports that until the 1990s, donors were more concerned with 
financial accountability, and little attention was paid to good governance practices.
448
 
Accountability to donors should in my view, include monitoring the impact of the work done 
by the NGO and ensuring that reports about expenditures made are available to the target 
groups.  Evaluations that promote organisational learning are necessary in promoting good 
practices and cost effectiveness.
449
 What sort of reporting would therefore satisfy accounting 
obligations to the donor?  
 It is the argument of this thesis that such reporting would require an NGO to provide Audited 
Accounts by a Certified Management Accountant accompanied with a Management Letter 
explaining weaknesses in the organisation annually to members, donors and government.  In 
practice, few NGOs adhere to this requirement.  For example, Barr, Fafchamps and Owen 
reported that only one-third of NGOs in Uganda provide information about their income and 
not all accounts were accurate.
450
 Improving fiscal accountability may require NGOs to 
establish links with the private sector to tap new management practices.  Using social media 
such as website face book, twitter, NGOs would keep the donors and the public informed 
about their activities; and any ‘breaking news’, energising the sector and thus deepen 
democratic accountability.  
At the sector-wide level, mechanisms are necessary to check unscrupulous NGOs to enforce 
standards as donors have often limited themselves to withdrawing funding instead of 
prosecuting dubious NGOs.  The adoption of Codes of Conduct that promote self-regulation 
is an important measure of checking errant behaviour of NGOs.  For example, in Uganda, the 
adoption of the Quality Assurance Mechanism (QUAM) by the Development Network of 
Indigenous Voluntary Associations (DENIVA) and the NGO Forum is an attempt at self-
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 In Kenya, the NGO Council is mandated to prepare the Code of Conduct for 
self-regulation of NGOs.
452
 The major downside to the enforcement of these Codes of 
Conduct is the ineffective policing structures, but if well enforced, the ability of the sector to 
police itself would promote accountability and ultimately enhance the legitimacy of NGOs.   
4.7. CONCLUSION  
 
This Chapter set out to discuss the challenges to the legitimacy of NGOs.  These challenges 
include; the legality, indigenousness, representativeness, independence, and accountability of 
NGOs.   
The legality of NGOs has been a subject of debate.  Do NGOs have any legal status in 
international law and how does this impact on their acceptability? The study has established 
that the right of every one, individually or in association with others, to promote and protect 
human rights is recognised under international and regional human rights treaties to which 
African states are parties.  The right to freedom of association including the right to form 
associations has been domesticated under African constitutions which individuals have 
invoked to form NGOs.  Under national legal frameworks, NGOs have been established, and 
through registration are able to acquire legal recognition.   
The acceptability of NGOs has been affected by the wide belief that NGOs are an imposition 
of the West.  Are NGOs indigenous to Africa or are they a creation of capitalism? Though 
NGOs are a phenomenon of the associational revolution that marked the post- 1980 period, 
they have been instrumental in the development of international human rights standards.  
Though a more recent creation, NGOs have their origins in the civil society struggles against 
imperialism and colonialism in Africa.  The nationalist liberation movements that led to 
independence in most African countries such as Namibia, Kenya, Uganda, and Malawi have 
their origins in civil society.  NGOs have been key to the democratisation process in Africa as 
single party states such as Kenya, Malawi, and Uganda opened up to multi-party democracy.  
For these reasons, NGOs have justified their existence in Africa, and it is no longer plausible 
to perceive them as foreign whose only motivation is to contain the African state and its 
excesses.   
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Aside from being seen as a neo-liberal construct, NGOs have been criticised for not being 
representative.  Are NGOs democratic and representative? The issue casts doubts about the 
credibility of NGOs for not being ‘mass movements’.  The study argues that where an NGO is 
membership-based, it should adopt democratic structures that encourage participatory 
decision-making.  Membership, however, is not a panacea to democratic legitimacy; having a 
clear mission and ability to deliver results can enhance the legitimacy of NGOs.  
Beyond democratic legitimacy, is the broader issue of public accountability.  To whom and in 
what ways are NGOs accountable? NGOs have been accused of being unaccountable to 
various stakeholders.  NGOs have accountability obligations to Government, members, 
communities, donors and the sector at large.  Whether NGO laws are enabling or not, 
registration and fulfilment of reporting obligations helps the NGO to pursue legitimate 
associational life.  The issue for further discussion is whether such registration should be 
mandatory.  
Where the NGO is membership-based, the study argues that NGO actions and policies should 
be controlled by members.  This can be achieved through the payment of membership fees 
and the holding of regular elections for the NGO leadership.  However, NGOs should avoid 
top-down methods of consultation and decision-making.  
Accountability to donors has taken the form of financial reporting without any attention to 
monitoring results among the target group.  NGOs should do more to promote organizational 
learning as this would have the effect of improving efficiency and cost effectiveness of 
programmes implemented by the NGOs.  
At the sector-wide level, NGOs should adopt self-regulatory mechanisms to improve on self-
policing and ultimately strengthen accountability to the broad spectrum of stakeholders.  
Having discussed these challenges to the legitimacy of NGOs, the question to ask, does 
international law envision an appropriate regulatory framework for NGOs?  To this the 
discussion turns in Chapter 5.  
 
 
                                               




THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK GOVERNING NGOs 
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
5. 0.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Despite their contribution to democracy and respect for human rights, NGOs in Eastern and 
Southern Africa face several challenges to their legitimacy.  Chapter Four identified these 
constraints to include, the legality, indigenousness, independence, representativeness and 
accountability of NGOs.
453
 These challenges affect the credibility and effectiveness of NGOs 
and contribute to state-NGO tensions.   
In a democratic society, the state is obliged to provide the legal and regulatory framework 
within which NGOs operate.
454
  The duty to operate within the law establishes a 
corresponding obligation on the part of government to appoint a body that provides the 
oversight on NGOs.
455
 At the national level states have adopted national constitutions that 
grant citizens the rights to establish NGOs.
456
 NGO laws have been enacted to provide for the 
regulation of NGOs, and National Boards on NGOs have been appointed.  These Boards are 
regulatory mechanisms within which Government monitors and registers NGOs.  NGOs have 
to register in order to be accountable and transparent, and to fulfil reporting requirements to 
Government.  Is such registration of NGOs mandatory? In case of registration, what sort of 
registration procedures should be envisaged? Are NGOs restricted in carrying out certain 
activities? 
On the broader issue of public accountability and transparency, NGOs have to fulfil reporting 
obligations to multiple stakeholders: Government, members, communities and donors.
457
  The 
NGO regulatory bodies have powers over NGOs.  Should these powers be controlling, 
restrictive or enabling? Does the exercise of such powers permit interference in the 
management of NGOs? 
This Chapter seeks to answer two fundamental questions: Does international law envision an 
appropriate regulatory framework that permits NGOs to operate without undue restrictions? If 
                                                          
453
 Chapter 4 (see section 4.1). 
454
 Chapter 4 (see section 4.6.1). 
455
 Chapter 4 (see section 4.6.1). 
456
 Chapter 4 (section 4.2). 
457
 Chapter 4 (see section 4.6). 
95 |  
 
some form of regulation is essential, what would be the salient features of such a regulatory 
model? 
Answers to these questions would advance this thesis in so far as they provide the standards 
necessary for an enabling regulatory regime which promotes active public participation and 
the free functioning of NGOs.   
5. 1. THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 
 
The right of individuals to form associations is integral to the right to freedom of association.  
States have however made laws regulating the right of individuals to form and operate NGOs.  
Does the regulation of the freedom of association meet the internationally accepted 
requirements of this right? To understand this right and its application to NGOs, this section 
discusses three inter-related issues: the right to form and join associations, the requirement 
that they pursue a lawful purpose and the right to register NGOs.   
5. 1. 1.   The Right to Form and Join Associations (NGOs) 
 
 The right to freedom of association is not expressly defined by the UN Human Rights 
Committee.  However, the right to freedom of association, including the rights of individuals 
to form, join and participate in associations, and through such associations, to promote human 
rights causes, is recognised in international and regional treaties and declarations.
458
 These 
treaties and declarations  include; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),
459
the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
460
and the United Nations 
Declaration on Human Rights Defenders (Defenders Declaration).
461
  At the regional level, 
the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR),
462
 the European Convention on 
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Human Rights (ECHR), 
463
and the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights (IACHR) 
provide for this right.
464
  
Within the African human rights system, African states with the exception of South Sudan 
have ratified both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, and have made specific provisions for the right to 
freedom of association in their Constitutions, thereby making the right to association 
enforceable within their jurisdiction.
465
  But what does the right to association mean?   
At a minimum, every individual has the right to freedom of association.  The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) recognises the right of individuals to peaceful 
assembly or association.
466
 It states that ‘everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly and association’.
467
 No qualification of the right to association is implied or 
expressly stated, indicating a universal recognition of the freedom of individuals to come 
together for a common purpose.   However, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) recognises not only the right of individuals to associate with others but also 
the right to form associations.
468
 The ICCPR provides that ‘everyone shall have the right to 
freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests’.
469
 
 The ICCPR limits the enjoyment of the right to freedom of association only to such 
restrictions that are acceptable in a democratic society.
470
 Though not legally binding, the 
Defenders Declaration does not restrict the right of individuals to form associations or NGOs 
on particular grounds.  It states that ‘for the purpose of promoting and protecting human rights 
and fundamental freedoms, everyone has the right, individually and in association with others, 
at the national and international levels, to form, join and participate in non-governmental 
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organizations, associations or groups.
471
 The Defenders Declaration expressly recognises the 
formation of both domestic and international NGOs.
472
  
These treaties and declarations recognise the right to freedom of association as cognisant of 
the right of individuals to organise themselves in associations to pursue common interests.  In 
its General Comment, the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UN HRC), the body that 
interprets the ICCPR, notes that the right to freedom of association imposes an obligation on 
the state to respect and protect the enjoyment of the right.
473
 The obligation to respect requires 
states parties to the Covenant not to take any measures that result in denying or limiting 
access to the enjoyment of the right.  Such actions or policies that contravene the obligation to 
respect include the adoption of laws or policies or repeal of pre-existing domestic law that is 
incompatible with standards set by the Covenant.
474
 NGO laws that interfere with the right of 
individuals to form NGOs would be in breach of this right.  The right to freedom of 
association also imposes an obligation on the state to protect the enjoyment of the right by 
taking all necessary measures to ensure that individuals under their jurisdiction are protected 
from breaches of this right by third parties, be they individuals, groups or corporations.
475
 The 
state therefore has a duty to regulate the actions of third parties from denying or limiting the 
enjoyment of the right.
476
 The state would be acting lawfully to monitor NGO activities to 
ensure that they are accountable to its stakeholders, including government, members, 
communities and donors within the meaning of this right.  
The UN HRC observes that in a democracy, the state should provide the space and the legal 
framework for individuals to organize in the form of associations in order to express their 
political opinions and to hold leaders accountable.
477
 The obligation to respect this right, 
without unnecessary restrictions, is also upheld by Sekaggya, the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Human Rights Defenders, who in her report, argues that individuals have rights to form 
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 Sekaggya contends that the right to freedom of association has a collective 
dimension, entitling individuals who have formed an association (NGO) to perform activities 
within its declared objectives’.
479
 Nowak argues likewise, and contends that the right to 
freedom of association obligates states not to prohibit the formation of an NGO provided its 
objectives are lawful.
480
 Within the meaning of this right to association, unwarranted 
interference in the affairs of an NGO is proscribed.  
Within the African human rights system, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
also recognizes the ‘right of every individual to free association provided that he abides by the 
law’.
481
 Unlike the ICCPR, the ACHPR makes the enjoyment of the right to associate 
contingent on the provisions of the law.
482
 Are restrictive laws permissible? This may not be 
the case.  Like the UN HRC, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR), in its interpretation of article 10(1) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples 
Rights (ACHPR), recognises the right of individuals to form associations.  The ACHPR holds 
that ‘citizens are free to join associations, in order to attain various ends’.
483
 The African 
Charter, like the ICCPR, recognises the collective dimension of the right to associate and does 
not permit unnecessary restrictions.  
Within the European human rights system, the right of individuals to form associations, as an 
integral component of the right to associate, is recognised much like the ICCPR.  Under the 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR), it is provided that ‘everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to 
freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the 
protection of his interests’.
484
 The right of individuals to form associations including NGOs is 
respected, and reaffirmed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) which held that 
‘freedom of association broadly embraces the right of individuals to form associations, 
political parties, religious organisations, trade unions... and various other forms of 
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 The ECHR notes in the Sidiropoulos case that the right to form an association 
is an inherent part of the right set forth in article 11 of the European Convention of Human 
Rights.
486
 The ECHR, like the ICCPR and the ACHPR, does not permit unwarranted 
restrictions on the enjoyment of the right to association.   
The American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), like the ICCPR, recognises the right of 
every one to freedom of association.
487
 The ACHR provides that ‘everyone has the right to 
associate freely for ideological, religious, political, economic, labour, social, cultural, sports, 
or other purposes’.
488
 Unlike the other treaties, the ACHR defines the purposes for which 
persons can associate including political purposes and, by implication, human rights.
489
  
The treaties without exception recognise the right to freedom of association as a right that 
enables individuals to interact for a common purpose.  Jilani, former UN Special Rapporteur 
on Human Rights Defenders, argues that the right to freedom of association enables 
individuals to interact and organize among themselves collectively to express, promote, 
pursue and defend common interests.
490
 The right to form associations including NGOs, 
within the law is asserted.  According to the Privy Council decision in Collymore v Attorney 
General, freedom of association was defined to mean the ‘freedom to enter into consensual 
arrangements to promote the common interests or objects of the associating group, However, 
the freedom to associate confers neither right nor licence for a course of conduct or for the 
commission of acts which in the view of parliament are inimical to the peace, order, and good 
governance of the country’.
491
  
From the above discussion, it is concluded that the right to freedom of association means that 
individuals are permitted to form associations, including NGOs, for the promotion of human 
rights as a common purpose.  State regulation is permitted, provided it does not interfere with 
the enjoyment of the right.  Would such associations and NGOs be free to pursue objectives 
that are declared unlawful? 
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5.  1. 2.  Lawful Purpose 
 
International law recognises the right of individuals to form associations provided the purpose 
for which they are formed is ‘lawful’.  But what does lawful purpose mean? Lawful purpose 
is not expressly defined.  ‘Lawful purpose’ would imply that the objective for which the 
association is formed is not ‘against the law’ or ‘legitimate government aim’ necessary in a 
‘democratic society’.
492
 Objectives that are pursued by an NGO that contravene these 
requirements would be prohibited.  For example, the ICCPR limits the right of association to 
such restrictions ‘prescribed by law in the interests of national security or public safety, public 
order, public health or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others’.
493
 Edwards defines 
lawful purpose to mean that which is consistent with human rights norms.
494
 What amounts to 
‘unlawful purpose’ should be prescribed by law.  For such a law to be accepted it must meet 
the standard of ‘legality and proportionality’.  
 ‘Legality’ presupposes that the law specifying the restriction is introduced through proper 
government procedures such as an Act of Parliament, not government decrees or 
administrative orders.
495
 The restriction imposed by the law must also be precise, not 
arbitrary, and made accessible to the public to enable the NGO regulate her conduct 
accordingly.
496
 The restriction must also be proportionate.  What is ‘proportionate’ was 
defined by the UN HRC to refer to ‘the nature of the right, the importance of the limitation, 
nature and extent of the limitation, relation between the limitation and its purpose and, 
whether any less restrictive measure would achieve the purpose’.
497
 In Velichkin v Belarus, 
the UNHRC held that ‘for the restriction to be prescribed by law, it must conform to the strict 
tests of necessity and proportionality’.
498
 What amounts to being necessary and proportionate 
is determined by the UNHRC to be ‘such  restrictions that  must be applied only for those 
purposes for which they were prescribed, and must directly relate to the specific need on 
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which they were predicated’.
499
 Unnecessary restrictions in the affairs of NGOs are not 
permitted.  For example, the UN HRC observes that the free functioning of NGOs is essential 
for the protection of human rights.
500
 According to La Rue, the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Freedom of Expression, the burden of demonstrating the necessity of the limitation lies with 
the state.
501
   
Activities of NGOs could be prohibited in pursuance of a ‘legitimate government aim’ 
particularly state sovereignty, public safety or the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others.
502
 For example, regulatory laws that deny the formation or carrying out of certain 
NGO activities could be justified on grounds of national security or protection of state 
sovereignty.  This thesis argues that in view of this restriction, activities that promote 
terrorism, hate speech, unfair discrimination or genocide would merit this prohibition.  
According to the UN HRC, such a law that imposes the restriction on the freedom of 
association should not put in jeopardy the right itself.
503
 Laws that grant power to authorities 
to prohibit activities on grounds of disturbance to public order or state security without 
detailing how such activities impact on state security may not meet this test.
504
 For example, 
in Egypt, the law on NGOs prohibits participation in political, extremist or terrorist activity 
without defining what these terms mean.
505
 In Malawi, the NGO Board of Malawi may cancel 
or suspend registration of an NGO, if it is satisfied that the NGO is engaged in partisan 
politics, including electioneering and politicking.
506
 What constitutes ‘electioneering and 
politicking’ is not defined.  In Uganda, an organisation may not be registered if the objectives 
of the organisation as specified in its constitution are in ‘contravention of the law’.
507
 What 
amounts to ‘contravention of the law’ is not defined.  
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Even where the law prohibits an activity of an NGO or restricts its operations, such law ‘must 
be necessary in a democratic society’ to declare such activity as unlawful.
508
 What constitutes 
‘necessary in a democratic society’ has been interpreted by the UN HRC as an obligation on 
states to impose such measures only when they are proportionate to the legitimate aim, and 
under no circumstance should a restriction be invoked to impair the essence of the Covenant 
right.
509
 In his report to the UN General Assembly,  the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom 
of Association has defined the ‘necessary’ test to imply that any measures taken must not only 
be ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued, but must meet a pressing social need for such 
restriction to be accepted’.
510
 The UN HRC does not define what a ‘democratic society’ is.  
To appreciate what such a society is recourse is made to the Siracusa Principles which defines 
such a democratic society as one ‘where the existence and functioning of a plurality  of 
associations,  including those which promote ideas not favourable to government or the 
majority of the population, are permitted to operate’.
511
 
 Unlike the ICCPR, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights subjects the right to 
free association to restrictions such as being ‘law abiding,
512
state security, defence of national 
independence and territorial integrity, preservation of positive African values and the 
promotion of the moral well-being of society’.
513
 The ACHPR permits restrictions on NGO 
activities provided such restrictions are provided by law.
514
 However, for such a law to be 
permissible, it must be proportionate and necessary.  Not only should the law be valid, it 
should be precise and accessible.  What amounts to ‘proportionate and necessary’ was an 
issue in Constitutional Rights Project and Others v Nigeria, where the Nigerian Government 
issued a decree proscribing specific newspapers.  The ACHPR, referring to article 9(2) ruled 
that: 
The justification of limitations must be strictly proportionate with and absolutely 
necessary, a limitation may not erode a right such that the right itself becomes illusory.  
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For the government to proscribe a particular publication by name is thus 
disproportionate and not necessary.
515
 
With regard to the preciseness of the law, the Johannesburg Principles provide useful 
guidance; the law must be valid, accessible, unambiguous, drawn narrowly and with 
precision, so as to enable individuals to foresee whether a particular action is unlawful.
516
 
Regulatory laws that encourage arbitrary decision-making against NGOs do not meet this 
requirement.   
The ACHPR like the ICCPR does not permit unnecessary state interference in the affairs of 
associations once they are formed.  For example, in Civil Liberties Organisation (in respect of 
Bar Association) v Nigeria, the Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO), a Nigerian NGO 
protested against the Legal Practitioners [Amendment] Decree which established a new 
governing body of the Nigerian Bar Association, namely the Body of Benchers, replacing the 
one elected by the attorneys themselves, with functions to prescribe practising fees and to 
discipline legal practitioners.
517
 The ACHPR held that the right to freedom of association 
provided in Article 10(1) of the ACHPR, requires the state to abstain from interfering with the 
free formation of associations, that citizens must have the capacity to join, without state 
interference, in associations in order to attain various ends, and that the right to freedom of 
association imposes a duty on states not to enact laws that would override constitutional 
provisions that guarantee the enjoyment of the right.  Consequently, a violation of Nigerian 
lawyers’ right to freedom of association had occurred.
518
   
Like the ICCPR, the ECHR prohibits activities that are a threat to national security or public 
safety, promote disorder or crime, or threaten public health or morals or infringe on the rights 
of others.
519
 However, the restriction to the right to freedom of association provided in Article 
11(2) of the ECHR must be justifiable.
520
 The state may not prohibit the formation of an 
association merely because it could be a threat to national security.  For example, in the 
Freedom and Democracy Party Case, the Turkish government argued before the European 
Court of Human Rights that some organisations that do not pursue Turkish interests 
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threatened national security and the territorial integrity of the country.
521
 The ECHR held that 
in such cases it is the agendas or activities of the organisations in question that could be 
regarded as a threat, rather than the fact that such organisations may be established.
522
 The 
Council of Europe has adopted a similar approach.  States may not restrict the range of 
objectives an NGO may pursue provided such objectives are consistent with the requirements 
of a democratic state.
523
  
Like the ECHR, the ACHR prohibits activities that are threat to national security, public order 
or the rights and freedoms of others.
524
 It does not prohibit the formation of associations per 
se but requires their activities to be lawful.  In its interpretation of the ACHR, the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights (IACHR) observes that the ACHR permits 
individuals to join others for the achievement of a legal goal, a requirement similar to the 
‘lawful purpose’ under the ICCPR.
525
  
The ‘lawful purpose’ requirement for associations including NGOs is a principle that is 
recognised in international law.  It applies to the objectives, activities or agenda of NGOs and 
does not prohibit their formation.  For any restriction to be permitted on grounds of unlawful 
purpose it must be prescribed by law and, such a law must be consistent with human rights 
principles of equality, equity and non-discrimination.  The requirement of lawful purpose 
does not permit unwarranted state interference in the management of the internal affairs of the 
NGOs.  Given that the right to freedom of association imposes an obligation on states to 
regulate NGOs, is registration of NGOs mandatory? 
5. 1. 3.  The Right to Register NGOs 
 
As it was noted above, international law recognises the right of individuals to form, join, and 
participate in associations to pursue common interests provided the purpose for which they 
are formed is legal or lawful.  But does the right to associate require associations so formed to 
be registered in order to operate? And in case of registration, how onerous is the registration 
process? The right to freedom of association does not make registration compulsory.  Both the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights do not make this a requirement.  By implication however, the right to freedom of 
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association includes the right to associate formally or informally.  An individual who forms an 
association has an option: whether to operate without legal entity status or to seek and obtain 
legal entity status.  
But where individuals associate to act collectively to achieve a common objective, such as the 
pursuit of human rights, international law encourages them to acquire a legal status.  The UN 
HRC, in its interpretation of Article 22(1) of the ICCPR observes that ‘citizens should acquire 
a legal entity status in order to act collectively in a field of mutual interest’.
526
 Acquiring a 
legal entity status would of necessity require the association to register with a recognised 
body that gives it legal status, making registration necessary but not compulsory. 
Neither do the regional treaties require NGOs to register before they can operate.  The 
existing body of legal opinion suggests that registration should be voluntary.  Jilani, UN 
Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders, argues strongly in favour of voluntary 
registration.  She argues that ‘the right to freedom of association exempts NGOs from 
registration if they so wish.  NGOs should be allowed to exist and carry out their activities 
without having to register’.
527
 Edwards, however, argues strongly in favour of registration for 
NGOs to avoid operating illegally.  He contends that ‘non-registration of an NGO may render 
the NGO illegal under its national law, making it difficult to raise funds openly and, recruit 
new members, which would severely diminish its capacity’.
528
 McBride argues likewise when 




But where NGOs once formed, require legal benefits such as capacity to enter into contracts, 
open bank accounts, hire staff, and so on, it is the argument of this thesis that they need to 
register in order to obtain legal personality.  Notwithstanding the voluntary requirement for 
registration, NGOs in many countries must register in order to operate.  In some countries 
governments impose conditions that compromise the independence of NGOs, and make it 
difficult for NGOs to register and to function.  For example, NGOs in oppressive countries are 
subjected to burdensome registration regulations, government harassment, reprisal, 
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discrimination, threats or intimidation.
530
 Where registration of NGOs is required, 




Where NGOs seek registration, it is an accepted principle that the process shall be speedy, 
apolitical, accessible, objective and inexpensive.  However, unnecessary delays occasioned by 
state officials have been experienced while entering NGOs in national registers in many 
countries.  Regulatory bodies often impose burdensome registration requirements.  Decision 
making may be slow and arbitrary.  In some cases the regulatory body may reject an 
application to register without giving reasons.  In some cases, the law may not stipulate the 
time frame within which a decision on an application should be made.  
 In other cases the criteria for approving or rejecting an application may be so vague so as to 
give a broad discretion to the authorities to make arbitrary decisions.  To this the UN HRC 
has called upon states to ensure that citizens should be able to acquire a legal entity status 
without undue delay.
531
 Undue delay would mean that the process is objective, transparent 
and, in accordance with the law, provided the law does not encourage arbitrary decision-
making.  The ACHPR holds a similar view.  The ACHPR has held that states have the 
responsibility to ensure that the procedure for entering human rights organisations in the 
public registries will not impede their work and that it will have a declaratory and not a 
constitutive effect.  
Within the European human rights system, the Council of Europe has addressed itself to the 
process of registering NGOs.  The Council of Europe has called on states to ensure that the 
rules governing the acquisition of legal personality of an NGO, where this is not automatic, be 
objectively framed and not be left to the discretion of the relevant authority. 
532
   
The Americas take a similar approach.  States are discouraged from adopting laws and 
policies that delay or deny registration of NGOs.  The IACHR has called on states to refrain 
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from using laws and policies regarding registration of NGOs that use vague, imprecise and 
broad definitions and whose motive is to restrict their establishment and operation. 
533
  
Although registration of NGOs is not compulsory, international law recognises the global 
practice of registering NGOs in order to operate smoothly and within the law.  The regulatory 
regime should be free from arbitrary decision-making.  Delays in registration are not 
permitted neither is unwarranted state interference allowed once an NGO has been registered.  
Mindful of the state obligation to regulate the operation of NGOs, what form of regulatory 
model does international law envisage? Are there useful features that meet these 
requirements? 
5. 2.  REGULATION OF NGOs UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW  
 
As noted above, the right to freedom of association imposes an obligation on states to take 
measures to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are protected from possible 
breaches by individuals or third parties.  States are therefore permitted to regulate the 
operation of NGOs through regulatory laws provided such laws do not impede their 
operations.
534
  It is also an accepted international law principle that the registration process of 
NGOs shall be speedy, apolitical, accessible, objective and inexpensive.
535
  This section 
therefore takes a deeper look at the United Nations, African and European regulatory models 
to draw possible lessons for an appropriate regulatory framework for Uganda.   
5. 2. 1.  The United Nations NGO Consultative Process 
 
The United Nations regulatory regime is a state-led regulatory model.  It takes the form of a 
Consultative Process, a procedure similar to the registration of NGOs in many countries.  It is 
a mechanism by which states vet NGOs to ensure that they are credible enough for them to 
gain access and participate actively in the work of the United Nations.  Under this 
Consultative Status arrangement, states use accreditation to determine NGOs that are 
legitimate to participate in the work of the United Nations bodies.  Having a ‘consultative 
status’ means that an NGO has obtained the right to take part in a process of consultation,  
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that is expressing its views on issues discussed in meetings or to place items on the agenda.
536
  
Unlike states that have a right to participation (either as voting members or observers), 
ECOSOC consultative status only allows an NGO an opportunity to accredit its representative 
to the meeting and to have a say in such meeting.  
The UN Consultative Process provides for a regulatory body for NGOs as the UN Committee 
on Non-Governmental Organisations (the NGO Committee), an intergovernmental body 
comprising of state representatives of 19 UN Member States.
537
  The NGO Committee does 
not have NGO representation.  For example, in 2011, the Committee was dominated with 
countries which have questionable human rights records.  The Committee was composed of 
five countries (Russia, Sudan, China, Kyrgyzstan, and Cuba) which are ‘not free,’ eight 
countries (Turkey, Burundi, Mozambique, Senegal, Pakistan, Morocco, Nicaragua and 
Venezuela) which are ‘partly free’ and only six states (Belgium, Israel, United States, 
Bulgaria, India and Peru) which are ‘free’.
538
 
 The NGO Committee is set up within the framework of Article 71 of the United Nations 
Charter (UN Charter) which provides the legal framework for NGO participation in the work 
of the United Nations.
539
 Under Article 71 of the UN Charter, the Economic and Social 
Council is mandated to make arrangements for consultation with NGOs whether international 
or national with a priority on international groups.  Under ECOSOC resolution 1296 of 1968, 
a criteria was established for NGO Participation at the United Nations.  Before ECOSOC 
resolution 1296 of 1968, accreditation of NGOs was handled by NGO Liaison officers.  The 
system was found to be inadequate due to the growing numbers of NGOs as well as the 
increasing concerns of accountability and transparency of NGOs that were being admitted to 
participate in UN Bodies.  
To promote NGO participation in the UN System, and to ensure accountability and 
transparency of NGOs, UN Member states reviewed ECOSOC resolution 1296 and replaced it 
with ECOSOC resolution 1996/31 providing for the regulation and registration of NGOs 
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working in the field of human rights.
540
 The review process provided little participation of 
NGOs, driven mainly by the Assembly of States.  
The accreditation process is compulsory.  The NGO Committee has wide discretionary 
powers.  It can accept or defer an application for accreditation on political grounds. The 
process of accrediting an NGO has four stages and is lengthy.  Registration requirements are 
burdensome.  The accreditation process begins with the registration of an organization profile 
submitted on line to the NGO Branch in New York where an officer reviews the profile and 
confirms acceptance of the registration by e-mail.
541
  The organization has to wait for a 
notification of acceptance of the registration to proceed with the submission of documents.  
No time limit is given for this notification.  Once notification of acceptance of registration is 
received, the organization can then submit a formal application supported by a range of 
supporting documentation (which includes an online questionnaire and summary duly filled-
in, a copy of the constitution/charter and statutes, a copy of the registration certificate with 
proof that the organization has been in existence for at least two years, and its most recent 
financial statement and annual report).
542
  Prior registration in the home country is mandatory 
for an NGO to submit its application.
543
  
The application has to be received by 1 June of the year before the NGO wishes to be 
considered for recommendation by the NGO Committee.  Before the application is received 
by the NGO Committee, it is screened by the NGO Branch.
544
  The screening process takes 
place between 1 June and the date the NGO Committee meets to review applications.
545
  An 
officer at the NGO Branch has discretion to reject an application if he is not satisfied with the 
application.  He has no time limit within which he must make a decision whether to return the 
application or to forward it to the NGO Committee for consideration.  
If the NGO Branch is satisfied with the application, the file is forwarded to the NGO 
Committee for consideration.  Upon receipt of the application, the NGO Committee makes 
such an application an agenda item for the next sitting of the Committee.  The Committee 
then sends a letter to the NGO informing it of the upcoming session, and may invite no more 
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than two NGO representatives to be present during the session, making the review process 
participatory.  The NGO Committee sits only twice year, in January and May or June to 
consider applications for consultative status.
546
  The Committee has power to demand 
additional information and, without any warning and clear guidelines, may ask questions of 
the NGO.  It is a requirement that the NGO replies fast or else a decision is made to defer the 
application to a future session.  Through the exercise of such arbitrary power, the NGO 
Committee makes unnecessary demands for additional information, which may happen 
several times, making the accreditation process often lengthy and costly.  Where the 
Committee defers an application, it gives reasons, obtainable from the Secretariat of the 
Committee.  ECOSOC resolution 1996/31 does not provide for a right of appeal against the 
decision of the Committee.  In practice, applications can take between 1 to 3 years for a grant 
of consultative status, signalling undue delay in considering of applications.  
If the NGO Committee decides to grant consultative status, it notifies the applicant 
organisation accordingly.
547
  However, the final decision is made by ECOSOC comprised of 
54 member states upon consideration of the NGO Committee report.  There are instances 
where the NGO Committee has rejected an application only to be accepted by ECOSOC. For 
example, using a ‘no action’ motion that can put on hold indefinitely an application, a U.S 
based NGO, the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC) 
survived rejection by a narrow vote of the Council.
548
 In such cases, the applicant has had to 
lobby ECOSOC member states through their diplomatic missions which makes the process 
highly political, lengthy and expensive.
549
  
The NGO Committee has power to suspend or revoke consultative status on four main 
grounds.  These according to the UN ECOSOC res.1996/31 are; first, consultative status must 
be suspended for up to three years or withdrawn if an NGO abuses the status by engaging in a 
pattern of acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter.  These acts include 
unsubstantiated or politically motivated acts against Member states of the United Nations 
incompatible with those purposes and principles, in particular the breach of peace and 








 In an interview with the East and Horn of Africa Human Rights Defender Project (EAHRDP), I was informed 
that the NGO made its first application for UN Consultative status in 2008. In May 2010 it resubmitted its 
application to the NGO Branch. In December 2011 the NGO Branch requested for additional information. The 
NGO Branch forwarded its application to the NGO Committee at its January –February session 2012. The 
ECOSOC Council approved its application in July 2012 after intense political lobbying, four years after its initial 
application. (Interview with Hassan Shire, August 2012). 
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security, and abuse of fundamental human rights.  Second, if substantiated evidence exists 
that the NGO engages in internationally recognised criminal acts such as illicit drugs or arms 
trade or money laundering, then its consultative status could be withdrawn.  Third, the failure 
of the NGO in consultative status to make a positive contribution to the work of the United 
Nations for a period of three years is a ground for suspension.  Fourth, the NGO Committee 
can also suspend consultative status of NGOs for any administrative errors such as failure to 
submit UN quadrennial reports by a set deadline under UN ECOSOC Resolution 2008/4.  
Where the Committee exercises its power to suspend consultative status, there is no right of 
appeal against its decision.  
In practice, the NGO Committee has abused its powers to suspend consultative status for 
alleged acts such as distributing ‘aggressive publications’, being perceived as a ‘political 




The UN NGO Consultative Process, as the discussion has shown, is a state–led regulatory 
model.  Although state- controlled, it offers five useful elements that could be adopted for an 
appropriate regulatory framework of NGOs.  First; is the representation of NGOs at the 
Committee session when an application is being reviewed.  This makes the process of 
considering the application more participatory.  Second, deferring an application with reasons 
gives the NGO an opportunity to provide additional information necessary to complete the 
process.  Third, having ECOSOC, another layer of authority with a larger majority to make 
the final decision on an application affords an NGO the opportunity to present its case and 
have a more objective decision in the absence of a right of appeal.  Fourth, the requirement to 
report every four years limits the burden of regular reporting and its associated state 
interference.  And finally, the grounds upon which the Committee can suspend or revoke the 
consultative status are laid out, and consistent with Article 22(2) of the ICCPR.  
Mindful of the powers of the NGO Committee and the UN Accreditation process, what 
lessons does the African human rights Observer Status Procedure offer?   
5. 2. 2.  The African Human Rights NGO Observer Status Procedure 
 
Like the United Nations NGO Consultative Procedure, the African human rights NGO 
Observer Status Procedure is a state-led regulatory model.  NGOs seeking to participate in the 
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work of the African Commission on Human Rights have to apply to the African Commission 
on Human Rights for a grant of ‘Observer Status’.
551
  The grant of Observer status allows 
representatives of NGOs to participate directly in the Commission’s activities.  Under Rules 
75 and 76 of the Rules of Procedure, NGOs with observer status are informed of the days and 
agenda of the Commission Sessions, attend public Sessions of the Commission, receive all 
documents and final communiqués of the Session, submit ‘shadow’ reports about the situation 
of human rights in their home countries, and present their activity reports to the Commission 
once every two years.
552
   
Unlike the UN Accreditation procedure, which is a three-tier process, slow and lengthy, 
(NGO Branch, NGO Committee and ECOSOC), the African Observer status procedure is 
shorter and less arduous.  The Criteria for the grant of Observer status are spelt out under a 
resolution of the ACHPR adopted within the framework of Article 45(1) of the ACHPR and 
the Rules of Procedure.
553
 Under these Rules of Procedure, an organization seeking observer 
status with the ACHPR should demonstrate that its objectives and activities are in consonance 
with the fundamental principles of the African Union Charter and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights.
554
 
Under these Rules of Procedure, the regulatory body for the grant of observer status is the 
ACHPR comprising of state representatives.
555
 The ACHPR does not have NGO 
representation.  The ACHPR has wide discretionary powers.  It can accept or reject an 
application for grant of observer status with or without reasons.  Registration requirements are 
onerous.  An organization seeking for the grant of observer status has to submit a written 
application addressed to the Secretariat of the Commission at least three months prior to the 
ordinary session of the Commission at which a decision on the application is to be made.
556
  
The organisation has to submit its statutes as proof of its legal existence, a list of its members, 
its constituent organs, sources of funding including its last financial statement, a statement of 
its activities covering past and present activities, a plan of action and all relevant information 
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of Human and Peoples’ Rights, Resolution ACHPR/ Res. 33 (XX) 99.  
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 Ibid. Chapter I, paragraph 3. 
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that would be helpful in determining the identity of the organization, its purpose and 
objectives as well as its field of activities.
557
 
The registration process is mandatory.  Unlike the UN Consultative procedure, it is less 
onerous. The application for observer status is subject to a two-tier screening process; first it 
is processed by the African Commission Secretariat which must ensure that the applicant 
meets the eligibility criteria.  The review of the application is undertaken by a rapporteur 
designated by the African Commission Bureau and thereafter the application is forwarded to 
the Commissioners for a decision.  Following the review of the Criteria for the Grant of 
Observer status, it is now a requirement for the representatives of NGOs that have applied for 
observer status to be present and to be interviewed during the consideration of their 
application, which to some extent allows minimal participation.
558
 Once the African 
Commission makes a decision, the applicant is notified without delay.
559
 
Like the UN Accreditation procedure, prior registration in the home country is mandatory for 
an organisation seeking for a grant of observer status.  Grounds upon which an application 
can be denied can be broad and arbitrary.  There are instances when NGO applications for 
observer status have been denied mainly due to inadequate documentation or where the 
Commission deems the NGO objectives to be ‘unlawful’.  For example, the Commission 
rejected an application by the Coalition of African Lesbians (CAL) in 2010  giving reason that 
the activities of the said organisation do not promote and protect any of the rights enshrined in 
the African Charter, a decision interpreted to be discriminatory and at best a  confirmation of 
its earlier ruling in Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v Zimbabwe, in which the African 
Commission held that discrimination based on sexual orientation would not be a prohibited 
ground under Article 2 of the African Charter.
560
 The decision also contrasts with an earlier 
Commission resolution which guarantees the right to freedom of association and states that 
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the regulation of the exercise of the right to freedom of association should be consistent with 
the state’s obligations under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.
561
 
 Grounds for the revocation of observer status are not defined either.  With the exception of a 
persistent failure of an NGO to submit its activity report every two years to the Commission, 
no other specific ground is laid out.
562
 It could however be argued that the Commission is 
guided by such considerations as the possible threat to the security of the state and the 
preservation of African positive values in reaching a decision on an application as provided 
under Article 29 of the ACHPR.  No time limit is provided for the Commission to make its 
decision and neither does a right of appeal exist where the Commission revokes the grant of 
observer status.  
Like the UN model, the African regulatory model is state-driven and provides for compulsory 
registration.  The African NGO Observer status procedure, similar to the UN model, permits 
minimal NGO participation in the determination of an application.  Both the United Nations 
and African regulatory framework have broad discretionary powers.  No appeal mechanism 
exists under both arrangements.  The UN system, contrary to the African procedure, is less 
prone to arbitrary-decision making.  Although less stringent in comparison to the UN 
procedure, the African procedure imposes strict conditions, and does not meet a regulatory 
model that is inclusive, participatory and more enabling.  Given these shortcomings, does the 
European model offer a better experience? To this the discussion turns in the next section.  
5. 2. 3.  The European INGO Participatory Status Procedure  
 
The Council of Europe (CoE) provides a more inclusive, accountable and participatory 
regulatory model.  Unlike the previous models discussed above, the European participatory 
status procedure is a state-NGO led regulatory model, where a state regulatory body works 
alongside an independent, democratically-elected body of international non-governmental 
organisations with participatory status known as the INGO Liaison Committee to accredit 
NGOs with participatory status.  Unlike the UN ‘consultative status’ that allows NGOs to 
attend meetings, express their views on the agenda of the meeting without full rights of 
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participation, the participatory status of the CoE provides for full co-operation of NGOs in the 
work of the Council of Europe (CoE) including; contributing to specific projects and the work 
of intergovernmental Committees, making statements both oral or written to the 
Parliamentary Assembly and the Congress of Local and Regional Authorities as well as 
addressing seminars and meetings convened by the CoE.
563
 The participatory nature of the 
European model is noted by the Committee of Ministers who, in their resolution, stress the 
importance of an active and constructive role of NGOs in promoting democracy.
564
    
The regulator is the Secretary General whose powers are deliberately freed from arbitrary 
decision-making, considering that his or her decision is subject to the decision of the 
Committee of Ministers of CoE, the Members of the Parliamentary Assembly and the 
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, as well as the opinion of the INGO Liaison 
Committee.  
 Registration requirements are burdensome.  An INGO seeking to apply for participatory 
status has to fulfil certain conditions.  Among these is the requirement of being representative 
in the field of its competence, being representative at the European level in most member 
states, and being able to contribute to the work of the CoE.
565
 This, as noted before, is to 
ensure that the organisation is credible and accountable.  Having satisfied the above 
requirements, an INGO applicant has to submit to the Secretary General of the CoE three 
copies of the application, containing the INGO’s statute, list of its member organisations 
including an estimate of the number of members in each organisation, a report of its activities 
for the previous two years, a declaration that it accepts the principles of the CoE, reasons for 
applying, how it will contribute and participate in the activities of the CoE, practical 
cooperation already in place with the CoE and how it plans to publicise the work of the CoE.  
In practice, these requirements may be too burdensome to groups in their formative stage.  
Although registration is compulsory, the Rules of Procedure allow the Secretariat of the CoE 
to co-operate with the INGO on an adhoc basis pending the final determination of the 
application unlike the UN procedure that allows participation in UN work only on grant of the 
status.  
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Unlike the NGO Committee or NGO Branch of the United Nations which do not have a time- 
limit within which to respond to an application, the Secretary General of the CoE must make a 
decision with reasons and commit the list of NGOs to which he or she intends to grant 
participatory status to the INGO Liaison Committee, and receive their opinion within two 
months of receiving the communication.  At the end of the two months’ period, the Secretary 
General must submit his decision with reasons, as well as any comments from the Liaison 
Committee for approval to the Committee of Ministers, the Parliamentary Assembly and the 
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities to avoid arbitrariness in the decision-making 
process.  In the absence of any objections, the applicant NGOs would be added to the list 
three months later.  Should there be any objection to the decision of the Secretary General, the 
decision of the Committee of Ministers would be deferred until a recommendation of the 
competent committees of the Parliamentary Assembly or the Congress of Local and Regional 
Authorities is received.  
Powers to withdraw participatory status are not arbitrary either.  Grounds for revocation of 
participatory status are defined.  They include the failure of the INGO to comply with the 
obligations and rules as set out, and a continuous inability to carry out its activities.
566
 The 
Secretary General must inform the INGO in question of an intention to withdraw the 
participatory status and give the INGO two months within which to respond.  A decision of 
the Secretary General to withdraw the participatory status is subject to the same procedure, as 
described for the grant of the status.  A time limit of three months is provided for the removal 
of the NGO from the list, demonstrating a reasonable degree of consistency.  Even where an 
application is rejected or the participatory status is revoked, an INGO may submit a fresh 
application after a period of two years after the date of the decision.  The UN provides for a 
suspension of three years, however, the African model is silent on a possible action of an 
NGO whose application has been denied or whose status has been revoked.  
 
In what appears to be good practice, both the UN model and the European model require 
NGOs to submit a report of their activity every four years.  This, in my view, is a reasonable 
period that ensures minimum state interference once an organisation has been registered. 
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5. 3. CONCLUSION  
 
As noted above, the right to freedom of association entitles individuals to the right to form 
associations, including NGOs.  Individuals have, within these associations, the rights to 
perform activities within their declared objectives, subject to permissible restrictions.  These 
restrictions do not permit unwarranted state interference in the activities of the organisation.  
The right to freedom of association also imposes a duty on the state to regulate the activities 
of the organisation to avoid breaches by third parties, promote transparency and 
accountability, provided such regulatory laws do not encourage arbitrary decision-making.  
NGOs are permitted to perform activities within their declared objectives, provided such 
objectives are lawful.  The formation of an organisation may not be prohibited per se but its 
activities, agenda or objectives that may be a threat to national security, territorial integrity, 
public order and good governance may be restricted.  Where the law restricts the performance 
of certain activities, it must be precise and consistent with the human rights principles of 
equity, equality and non-discrimination.  
Registration is not compulsory for anyone to enjoy the right to associate although it is 
encouraged in order for NGOs to operate freely and in accordance with the law.  Where 
registration is required for an NGO to operate, it must be speedy, apolitical, accessible, 
objective and inexpensive.  States are encouraged to avoid adopting laws and policies that 
delay or deny the registration of NGOs.  Mindful of these requirements, a review of the UN, 
African and European regulatory models has identified important lessons for our study. 
  First, an enabling regulatory model should go beyond ‘consultation’ to encouraging the 
‘active public participation’ of NGOs.  The active and constructive role of NGOs in 
promoting democratic pluralism should be recognised.  The European model that grants 
‘participatory status’ to INGOs presents an important innovation where registration is 
designed to foster cooperation, unlike the UN and the African models where registration is 
meant only to offer permission to NGOs to attend and express their views in meetings by 
virtue of their ‘consultative’ or ‘observer status’.  
Second, it seems that the involvement of NGOs in the determination of applications for 
registration reduces arbitrary decision-making.  For example, although participation of NGOs 
is minimal, both the UN and African models permit representatives of NGOs to participate in 
sessions where individual applications are being considered.  The UN Committee on NGOs 
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and the African Commission invites representatives of NGOs to answer questions about 
individual applications during sessions at which such individual applications are being 
considered.  The European model provides even a better example.  The Secretary General of 
the Council of Europe is required to present his decision together with the file of the applicant 
to the INGO Liaison Committee for an opinion before he or she submits the decision as well 
as the opinion to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe for a final approval.  
Third, specifying the criteria for registration provides a measure of certainty to the registration 
process.  The three models have onerous registration requirements.  The UN Committee on 
NGOs often asks for additional information which may cause undue delay.  Unlike the UN 
and African models, the European model provides a time-limit within which a decision on an 
application must be made.  On average, an application for participatory status takes five 
months from the date of application, while it takes between 1-3 years in the UN system.  
Fourth, the ‘Tier approach’ in the decision-making process limits the broad and discretionary 
powers of the regulatory body.  For example, the UN model subjects the decision of the UN 
Committee on NGOs comprising of 19 state representatives to ECOSOC composed of 54 
state representatives.  Under the European participatory status procedure, the decision of the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe has to be ratified by the Committee of Ministers, 
and in case of an objection, by the Permanent Assembly and the Congress of Local and 
Regional Authorities of Europe.  Unlike these two models, the African Commission on 
Human Rights has broad powers considering that their decision to deny or revoke an 
application is not subject to review.  
Fifth, is the reporting period for an organisation once it has been registered.  The UN and the 
Council of Europe require NGOs to submit every four years a report on their activity 
compared to two years which the African Commission provides for.  A period of four years is 
considered reasonable to avoid unnecessary state interference.  
Sixth, grounds on which a registration or ‘status’ can be revoked should be clearly laid out.  
The UN has laid down four grounds (criminal acts such as illicit drugs, arms trade, money 
laundering, failure to perform, failure to report and politically motivated acts against member 
states); the Council of Europe prioritizes acts contrary to the purposes of the Council of 
Europe, and acts prejudicial to the participatory status including the failure of the NGO to 
perform its activities), while the African Commission has revoked observer status for NGOs 
that have neglected to submit activity reports every two years.  
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Finally, notice should be given where the regulator intends to revoke the registration or 
‘status’, and a ‘cooling period’ be indicated as a measure of respect to the right to freedom of 
association.  For example, the Council of Europe gives two months to an NGO to respond to 
its intention to withdraw participatory status, and a fresh application can be received after a 
period of two years following the date of the decision.   Neither the UN Committee on NGOs 
or the African Commission on Human Rights has a time- limit within which to notify an NGO 
of a suspension or revocation of its status.  The UN has a time frame of three years for a 
suspension.  
Alongside these elements, is a growing interest in self-regulation of NGOs to promote 
transparency and public accountability.  The first attempt at exploring alternative models of 
regulation was the appointment of a Panel of Eminent Persons on UN Relations with Civil 
Society (the Cardoso   Panel).
567
  According to the Cardoso Panel, NGOs should adopt Codes 
of Conduct and self-policing mechanisms to enable them to adopt responsible, ethical and 
efficient conduct.  For example, the big NGOs (such as Amnesty International, Oxfam 
International, Greenpeace International and World Vision International) have adopted an 
‘NGO Accountability Charter’ to which they commit themselves to good governance, 
transparency, non-discrimination, financial, accounting and reporting requirements; minimum 
organisational structure, decision-making requirements as well as stakeholder participation.
568
   
In conclusion, this thesis argues therefore, that the six elements identified above, taken 
together with the recommendation for self-regulation are key to securing an NGO regulatory 
framework that is enabling and respects the right to freedom of association.  
 
Aware of these standards, does the NGO regulatory regime in East and Southern Africa 
guarantee the associational space necessary for active public participation and the free 
functioning of NGOs in the region? To this I turn in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 6  
A  COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF THE EXISTING NGO 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK IN EAST AND SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
 
6. 0.  INTRODUCTION 
 
In an earlier discussion of the regulatory framework of NGOs under international law it was 
established that individuals have the rights to association, expression, and peaceful 
assembly.
569
  These procedural rights are subject to permissible restrictions provided such 
restrictions are prescribed by law, are in the interest of a legitimate government aim, and are 
necessary in a democratic society.
570
 
It can also be argued that government has an obligation to regulate the operations of NGOs in 
order to promote transparency, accountability, and the realisation of the common good.
571
  
But this it must do fully aware of the need to strike  a delicate  balance  between providing the 
necessary oversight to protect the public interest in NGOs and the freedom of NGOs to 
operate without undue interference by the government.  Indeed, it is argued here that in a 
democratic society, the state is obliged to provide the legal and regulatory framework for civil 
society to function independently.
572
 
A discussion of the existing NGO regulatory framework in selected countries of Eastern and 
Southern Africa would have to answer the polemical question: How and why do states 
regulate NGOs? And if they have to, what are the shortcomings of the existing models? 
Using case studies of the legal framework governing NGOs in six countries: Ethiopia, Kenya, 
Malawi, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, this chapter examines the existing regulatory 
models and questions whether there is a link between democracy, associational space and the  
regulatory regime for NGOs in the region.  
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6. 1.  WHY ETHIOPIA, KENYA, MALAWI, NAMIBIA, ZIMBABWE, 
AND SOUTH AFRICA? 
 
As was observed in the Introductory Chapter, the state in much of Eastern and Southern 
Africa has had an uneasy relationship with advocacy NGOs.
573
 The reaction of the state to 
NGO actions varies from suppression, co-option to partial independence.
574
  This relationship 
is determined largely by the nature of the regulatory framework in place.  To understand the 
nature of existing regulation in this region, the study profiles six countries which apply one of 
the three regulatory models; state regulation, state/self-regulation, and self-regulation.  These 
countries are Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. 
First, each of these countries presents a rich history of the democratic struggle, and 
demonstrates how differences in political systems and behavioural patterns contribute to the 
narrowing or broadening of associational space.  
Second, the choice of countries has also been dictated by current global democracy rankings.  
For example, Freedom House in its report: Freedom in the World classifies them as follows: 
Kenya (Partly Free), South Africa (Free) and Zimbabwe (Not Free).
575
    Ethiopia, (Not Free), 
Malawi (Partly Free), and Namibia (Free).
576
  
Third, each of these countries has adopted one of the two dominant regulatory models; state 
regulation in Zimbabwe and Ethiopia, state/self-regulation in Kenya and Malawi while a 
strong debate on self-regulation rages on in South Africa and Namibia. 
Using historical, legal, and political analysis, this Chapter takes a critical look at the mutation 
of state-civil society relations in these countries and the extent to which prevalent models of 
NGO regulation uphold civic participation and associational rights. 
 
 
                                                          
573




 International Center for-Not-For-Profit Law ‘NGO Laws in Sub-Saharan Africa: Global Trends in NGO Law’ 
(2012) 3 International Journal of Not-for-Profit Laws 1 at 2, http: // www.icnl.org/research/trends/trends3-
3.html.  Freedom House: Freedom in the World ranks countries on a scale of 1-7 on political and civil liberties as 
free, partly free, and not free. 
576
 Ibid. 
122 |  
 
6. 2. THE HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CONTEXT 
 
Any mention of the term NGO regulation in Africa evokes negative feelings within the civil 
society sector and tends to portray a sense of denial and democratic decline in many countries 
on the continent.  But is civil society regulation bad or does it in any way mean strangulation 
of the sector? The fact is that state regulation of NGOs is necessary and is an international 
practice.  As already noted in Chapter 5, three arguments are given to justify NGO regulation: 
first, it is invoked to defend state sovereignty.
577
  Through regulation the state argues that it is 
able to  check ‘prohibited activities’ such as terrorist financing that NGOs could be engaged 
in.
578
 Second, it is argued that state regulation provides an accountability tool through which 
the ‘common good’ is protected.
579
 This, it is argued, ensures that unscrupulous NGOs do not 
exploit the public.  Third, it is a mechanism for promoting good governance within the sector; 
and for promoting accountability, transparency and respect for diversity.
580
 What is at stake is 
the amount of associational space afforded to NGOs when a state exercises its power to 
regulate, should it be enabling or controlling? 
As Lindblom observes ‘NGOs are neither good nor bad’.
581
 Neither do NGOs have an 
unequivocal claim to the high moral ground. What is at stake is the right to free political 
expression and the space for civil society to enjoy this right.  Franck describes this right to 
free political expression as inclusive of the rights to freedom of thought, freedom of 
association, and freedom of expression as provided in the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.
582
 According to the Markus Principle of ‘democratic inclusion,’ the right to 
free political expression entitles every individual, alone or in association with others, a right 
to a say in decision–making that affects them.
583
 This right to full participation was declared 
by the UN Commission on Human Rights when it affirmed that the rights to democratic 
governance include such rights as the rights to freedom of opinion and expression, of thought, 
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conscience and religion, and of peaceful association and assembly.
584
 It is this right to 
democratic governance which civil society exercises by creating new social spaces.  
In what could be seen as a major democratisation drive, Africa has seen a proliferation of 
NGOs since the 1980s.
585
 This growth is indicative of the associational space that opened up 
following the fall of the Berlin Wall, as Africa made major strides in embracing multi-party 
politics, pluralism, democratic governance and political stability.  Citizens became major 
players in their own governance and through civil society formations they pushed openly for 
political inclusiveness and wider social space for more voices for political participation.  
Beyond ‘gap filling’ through the provision of welfare services, civil society groups sought to 
reform the state and politics generally in society through raising awareness, and mobilising 
the ordinary people to hold their governments accountable. 
Walters argues that ‘the relationship between the state and the NGOs then became more of a 
political question that impinged on the legitimacy of the various types of organisations to 
exercise power’.
586
 In dictatorships and one party states that dominated much of Africa during 
the post-colonial period all NGO work was seen to be outside the framework of any legitimate 
social order or governance and  was  perceived more as part of oppositional political forces.
587
 
The state under such regimes saw civil society as a threat to their power, and through the use 
of legal and extra-judicial means, it began to constrain activism and the vibrancy within civil 
society.  The relationship was mediated most directly through a range of legislation under 
which the state determined who had the right to assert leadership, organise people and allocate 
resources.
588
 Underlying this state response too, was a belief by the one-party state that it was 
the ‘authentic voice of the people’ and as such represented the aspirations, concerns, and 
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For example, from the 1920s until 1963, when Kenya was under colonial rule, civil society 
organisations were actively involved in the struggle for independence.
590
 Harambee (self-
help) formed the foundation for non-profit initiatives which were galvanised around relief and 
development.  After independence these self-help initiatives became politicised as the ruling 
party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) began to monitor and control their 
activities.  Through the Societies Act of 1968 the state controlled the registration and 
activities of associational organisations and invoked the Trade Dispute Act of 1965 to ban 
industrial action, and in so doing restricted associational rights.
591
  
NGOs in Kenya became more active between the 1980s and 1990s, when the demand for 
constitutional reform and good governance was renewed.  The end of Cold War politics 
heralded a new era of political revival as NGOs and pro-democracy groups in Kenya 
contested the exclusion of citizens from participation and competitive politics.  The growth of 
civic organisations around the 1990s, as Kameri-Mbote observes, was due to the growing 
need to protect associational rights.
592
 With the growth of civil society at this time and the 
return of political pluralism under which the rights to freedom of association, expression, and 
assembly became more pronounced, state regulation of civic organisations became inevitable. 
It is within this political context of renewed optimism, suspicion, and fear that the previous 
law on NGOs in Kenya, the NGO Coordination Act No 19 of 1990 was enacted.
593
 
Like Kenya, civil society in Zimbabwe has had an uneasy relationship with the state.  The 
colonial Rhodesian government did not view civic organisations as entities with unlimited 
rights to define their own agenda.  The state saw civic organisations as an appendage of the 
state to be monitored and controlled.
594
 For this reason the colonial government enacted the 
Private and Voluntary Organisations (PVO) Act No 63 of 1966 to control and monitor groups 
which the state believed were linked to the liberation movement, and disseminated 
information about the human rights situation in Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe.  As long as the 
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Private and Voluntary Organizations Act was in force, civil society organisations 
concentrated more on humanitarian activities to avoid the wrath of the colonial state.
595
  
Under this Act, civic organisations were prohibited from certain activities such as political 
education among Africans and advocacy for democratic rights for Africans.
596
 To the 
Rhodesian state such ‘prohibited activities’ amounted to political incitement and the 
promotion of terrorism against which the state was justified to defend itself.
597
 
 Aware of the need to control activities of groups like the Catholic Commission for Peace and 
Justice (CCPJZ) that investigated and documented human rights abuses of the Rhodesian 
Security Forces, the colonial government enacted the Unlawful Organizations Act of 1959, 
which was used to ban African political groups and any other colonial resistance movements 
and any groups perceived as such.
598
 Throughout the colonial period the state applied the law 
strictly, invoked other repressive laws such as the Law and Order Maintenance (LOMA) Act 
of 1962, which empowered the police to detain and restrict citizens without trial.  The 
Unlawful Organizations Act of 1959 was also invoked to ban all organisations suspected of 
undermining the colonial state and to detain and deport critics of the Rhodesian colonial 
administration.
599
 Civil society groups found it increasingly difficult to operate in an 
environment characterised by fear, threats, intimidation, harassment and unjustified state 
control. 
In what appears to be common practice of post-colonial governments in Africa that restricted 
associational rights, the post-independence government of Zimbabwe retained the Private and 
Voluntary Organizations Act of 1966 which it renamed the Private Voluntary Organisations 
Act of 1995 (PVO Act) with minor amendments and modifications to govern the registration 
and operations of NGOs and civil society groups in Zimbabwe.  The preamble of the PVO 
Act makes it clear what the intention of government is in the introductory paragraph, which 
states that its purpose is ‘to provide for the registration of private voluntary organisations, the 
control of the collection of contributions for the objects of such organisations and of certain 
institutions, and for matters incidental thereto’.
600
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The amendment came in the wake of a major shift of the work of civil society organisations in 
Zimbabwe from relief and welfare to campaigning for democratic space and reforms in the 
1990s.  And regardless of the right to public participation the amendment was carried out 
without consultation with stakeholders.
601
 The proposed amendments are reported to have 
come to the knowledge of NGOs at the second reading stage in parliament.
602
 What followed 
thereafter were reports of state harassment and intimidation of civil society organisations and 
allegations of being an extension of the political opposition.
603
  
In South Africa, state-civil society relations are best described by White, who in his treatise 
on ‘Constructing a Democratic Developmental State’, argues that civil society in South Africa 
functioned as an ‘idealised counter-image, an embodiment of social virtue confronting 
political vice; the realm of freedom versus the realm of coercion, of participation versus 




In many ways this observation holds value for the developments that characterised the 
struggle against apartheid and the democratic movement of the post apartheid era in South 
Africa.  Unlike many countries in the region, where civil society was suppressed, the 
transition from authoritarianism under apartheid to democracy in South Africa enlisted full 
civil society involvement.  Walters observes that ‘since the mid-1970s there has been a 
proliferation of NGOs in South Africa with the growth of the sector reaching an all time high 
during the latter part of the 1980s despite severe repressive action by the state’.
605
 Relations 
between the state and civil society during the apartheid era were adversarial, similar to the 
experiences of other countries under colonial rule.  
But unlike other civil societies elsewhere in Africa, the South African civil society has a 
strong tradition of resistance and has jealously guarded its autonomy.  Civil society was 
strongly instrumental in challenging the injustices of the apartheid regime.  The apartheid 
state imposed a range of legislation to control the operations of civic groups.  Among these 
was the Fundraising Act No 107 of 1978 (Fundraising Act of South Africa), Group Areas Act 
                                                          
601
 N Mashumba and C Maroleng Tightening the Noose: Narrowing the Democratic Space for NGOs in 
Zimbabwe (ISS Situation Report, 24 September 2004) 2. 
602
 The Herald 8 February 1995, 182 ‘State to introduce Bill to monitor activities of NGOs’.  The bill came up for 
the Second Reading in Parliament on 7 February 1995. 
603
 Muzondidya and Nyati Ndlovu op cit note 569 at 32. 
604
 G White ‘Constructing a Democratic Developmental State’ in G White and M Robinson (ed) The Democratic 
Developmental State: Political and Institutional Design (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 77. 
605
 Walters op cit note 561 at 6, 1.  
127 |  
 
No 41 of 1950, and the Movement of Black Persons Act No 45 of 1959, through which the 
state regulated and intimidated NGOs.  For example, under the Fundraising Act of South 
Africa, any group or civil society organisation that wished to raise funds had to register with 
the Department of Welfare.  The Fundraising Act of South Africa gave broad discretion to the 
state officials to decide whether such civil society group or NGO should be allowed to 
register, raise funds or exist at all.
606
 The apartheid state believed that political power was the 
monopoly of the state and regarded the work of NGOs as an inappropriate challenge to this 
monopoly, considering that civil society groups had worked closely with pro-democracy 
forces to open up the closed system.
607
 
The 1980’s was in many ways a period of political revival in South Africa.  Due to 
international pressure, the apartheid state had begun to make more concessions.  This created 
more political space for organisations to grow and flourish.
608
 Not only was there numerical 
growth in civil society, civil society groups adopted and emphasised participatory democratic 
practices.
609
  A strong democratic culture was beginning to revive.  When apartheid gave way 
to democracy in 1994, NGOs were treading a democratic path and in search of their autonomy 
they were keen to counter authoritarian practices by the state.  The post-apartheid state had to 
be mindful of the role of civil society in promoting development, democracy, and good 
governance, and it is against that background that the Non-Profit Organisations Act No 71 of 
1997 which repealed the Fundraising Act of South Africa was enacted. 
In other countries like Ethiopia, Malawi, and Namibia which were under colonial or military 
rule, state-civil society relations were not better.  Moyo argues, whose views are accepted in 
this thesis, that in much of colonial Africa, civil society was the bedrock for the struggle 
against colonialism and other forms of oppression; associational  life, whether overtly or 
covertly, was instrumental in the fight for political and civil rights.
610
 State-civil society 
relations were therefore to a large extent adversarial in much of post-colonial Africa. 
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In Malawi, pressure groups akin to civil society existed during colonial rule.  These groups, 
characteristic of civil society during the colonial period were mainly pre-occupied with the 
struggle for freedom and independence.  With restrictions of rights to association and 
assembly, such groups could only operate outside the legally accepted spaces.  But on 
attaining independence, Banda ruled under a one-party dictatorship.
611
 Under Banda, even 
these constricted spaces could hardly exist.  Civic associations were restricted when Banda 
removed the Bill of Rights from the Constitution of 1964 in 1966.  The regime that was 
characterised by oppression and abuse of human rights created a culture of silence.  Policy- 




The end of Banda’s rule in 1994 ushered in a new beginning for Malawi.  The advent of 
political pluralism and multi-party democracy brought with it new opportunities.  A bill of 
rights was entrenched in the new Malawian Constitution adopted in 1994 creating more space 
for NGOs to operate.
613
  Like elsewhere in Africa, Malawi registered an impressive growth of 
NGOs.
614
  But this new found freedom did not last long as some NGOs were perceived to be 
exceeding their operational criteria.
615
 New laws and a regulatory framework targeting the 
operations of NGOs were deemed necessary.  Later, the opposition to the campaign for the 
removal of presidential term limits (third term campaign) brought the state into further 
conflict with NGOs who were seen to be engaged in politics and electioneering.
616
 As the 
Malawian state became less democratic and less open it became more intolerant of NGOs.  
And within this climate of distrust, and the urge to control and limit public space, the Non-
Governmental Organisations Act of 2000 (Malawi NGO Act) was formulated.  
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In Ethiopia, civil society was slow to take root.  During the rule of the Derg (a military junta) 
civil society was severely restricted.
617
 Autonomous associations typical of civil society 
hardly existed.  The concept of human rights was derived from a soviet model, emphasising 
economic development through highly centralised control.
618
 To the regime, procedural rights 
like freedom of expression, association, and assembly were marginal to what they described 
as ‘greater tasks of mobilisation around economic development’.
619
  
It was not until the fall of the Derg regime in 1991 that domestic advocacy organisations 
emerged.  The Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) adopted the 
EPRD Charter which proclaimed democratic values, and Article 2 of the Charter recognised 
participation, freedom, fair and proper representation as the basis of government.
620
 With this 
pronouncement political space expanded giving room for human rights groups to emerge, 
such as the Ethiopian Human Rights Council, the Ethiopian Congress for Democracy and the 
Inter-Africa Group.
621
 But this honeymoon was short-lived as the Revolutionary Government 
of Ethiopia was soon to demonstrate its reluctance to embrace independent civic groups.  In 
2009 the axe fell.  The Government of Ethiopia adopted the Proclamation for the Registration 
and Regulation of Charities and Societies (CSP), one of the most controversial and restrictive 
NGO laws to date.
622
 
Namibia, on the other hand, has a lot in common with South Africa.  The struggle for 
independence in Namibia gained much support from civil society groups. Before 
independence, civil society organisations, mainly the church, trade unions, students, women 
and human rights groups were supportive of social protection issues whilst being highly 
critical of the colonial regime.
623
 After Namibia gained independence in 1990, the space was 
liberalised for civic action as the first democratically elected government recognised the 
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importance of non-governmental organisations despite occasional tensions that arose.
624
 
Freedom of association is guaranteed under the Namibian Constitution
625
and Namibia 
reportedly has one of the most liberal legislative frameworks for the existence of civil society 
in Southern Africa.
626
 The Government of Namibia adopted the Civic Organisations 
Partnership Policy in 2005 to govern the relationship between the state and civil society in an 
open and participatory process.
627
  Efforts to draft an NGO Law, the Registration of 
Partnership Law, stalled when NGOs opposed it on grounds that the exercise was being 
carried out in a climate of suspicion.
628
   
This survey of the historical and political context of the six countries (Kenya, Zimbabwe, 
South Africa, Malawi, Ethiopia and Namibia) shows a rather uniform pattern of state–civil 
society relations during the colonial period and military dictatorships.  Generally, state-civil 
society relations were adversarial, based on suspicion of civil society, a desire by the state to 
control civic groups and little regard for civic participation and associational rights.  The 
1980s to 1990s, however, marked a new beginning in most of these countries as the fall of the 
Berlin Wall brought new pressures on African states to open up the space for democracy.  In 
many of these countries, states quickly enacted new laws to pre-emptively counter any 
potential threat to their power and to control the public space.  Muzondidya and Nyathi-
Ndlovu observe that at the heart of such laws was a ‘broader political strategy to decapitate 
any opposition, and that even countries with friendly NGO legislation showed a tendency to 
control and repress civic expression and agency’.
629
   
The survey above also shows, as is substantiated by the discussion to follow, that there is a 
clear divide between states which are working towards establishing enabling laws and 
regulations to support NGOs (e.g. Namibia, South Africa); states which have less enabling 
laws for NGOs (e.g. Kenya, Malawi) and those that, being suspicious of NGOs, are enacting 
laws and adopting regulations to restrict and narrow the space for NGOs (e.g. Zimbabwe, 
Ethiopia).  What is not in dispute though is that sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed a 
proliferation of laws that govern the activities of NGOs in recent years, some progressive and 
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others restrictive, bringing the right to civic participation and associational rights into 
question, to which the discussion now turns. 
6. 3. THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF NGOs 
 
Active public participation and associational space are crucial to the defence of liberties.  
Associational space is guaranteed when NGOs have freedom to operate without interference 
and are permitted to exercise rights to freedom of association, expression, and assembly.  In 
examining the legislative and regulatory framework, two principal areas for comparative 
review form the core of this analysis: the legislative process, and existing registration 
practices.  The regulatory models for interrogation are: the state-led regulatory model, the 
combined state-led/self- regulatory model and the self-regulatory model. 
Under a state-led regulatory model, the regulatory framework of NGOs is entirely state-
driven.  The NGO law provides for a National Board (or its equivalent) for the registration, 
monitoring, and regulation of NGOs without any or with little participation of NGOs.  In 
contrast to the state-led model, the state-led/NGO regulatory (hybrid) model provides for a 
National Board for NGOs whose membership includes NGOs, and alongside this statutory 
body is a self-regulating agency for NGOs.  Meanwhile, the self-regulation model entrusts the 
supervision of NGOs to a self-regulatory body of NGOs and the state plays an oversight role.    
There is wide acceptance that there must be some form of regulation of the activities of NGOs 
to promote their transparency and accountability, and to protect citizens against possible 
abuse.  The duty of the state to regulate is also juridical; derived from the juridical social 
contract that rights may be abridged under permissible grounds in return for security, peace 
and order.
630
 States feel the urge to regulate in order to safeguard state legitimacy and the 
undesirable infringing of state sovereignty by NGOs.
631
 This, as noted in chapter 5, is only 
acceptable where the restriction is prescribed by law, is in the interest of a legitimate 
government aim, and is necessary in a democratic state.
632
 Where state sovereignty 
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6. 3. 1.  The Legislative Process 
 
In this section   the question to ask, was the legislative process participatory? And, what were 
the reasons for enacting these laws? To what extent were NGOs involved in formulating the 
NGO laws? And, is there a link between the legislative process and the outcome?  
In the enactment of the NGO laws in the countries under review, the participation of NGOs in 
the legislative process varies according to the state of democracy in each country.  And as 
noted earlier, Zimbabwe and Ethiopia have a state-led model.  
In Zimbabwe, the PVO Act of 1995 is a carry- over from the colonial state.
634
 The PVO Act 
was enacted by the Rhodesian government in 1966 when civil society was increasingly 
critical of government.
635
 The colonial state wanted more control over the sector so that it 
could monitor its activities and intervene whenever it felt such activities threatened the 
existence of the state.
636
 The aim of government in enacting the law is evident from the 
introductory paragraph of the PVO Act which states its purpose as being ‘to provide for the 
registration of private voluntary organisations, the control of the collection of contributions 




It was not until the mid-1990s, when civil society, which had been apolitical since Zimbabwe 
became independent in 1980, became assertive and critical of the Zimbabwean government.
638
  
Rising levels of poverty, unemployment, corruption and abuse of human rights prompted 
NGOs to speak out, engage in policy advocacy, civic education, and election monitoring 
activities.
639
 As a result, state-civil society relations deteriorated and government heightened 
its crackdown on civic activism.  The government responded to this growing activism by 
tightening its control of civic action through partisan constitutional amendments or the 
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adoption of legal and extra-legal instruments.
640
 One such action was the amendment of the 
PVO Act in 1995, and, as noted earlier, it was amended without much public participation.
641
 
To restrict the operating space even further government introduced the Non-Governmental 
Organisations Bill of 2004, (NGO Bill) described by most critics as one of the ‘most 
restrictive laws for civil society in Africa’.
642
  The aim of the Bill had been to curtail NGO 
activities on issues of governance.
643
  NGOs only came to know about the NGO Bill when it 
was on the floor of Parliament during the second reading.
644
  
 The NGO Bill intended to repeal the PVO Act but (did not become law due to lack of 
Presidential assent,) but as Muzondidya and Nyati-Ndlovu argue, ‘its provisions have been 
incorporated into other laws or enforced through de facto means’.
645
 Like the PVO Act, the 
debate on the NGO Bill did not involve NGOs.  When NGOs began a campaign to have it 
repealed, government simply issued a public notice warning that NGOs that would not 
register in accordance with section 6 of the PVO Act risked prosecution.
646
 Apart from the 
PVO Act and the NGO Bill, the governing policy on the Operations of Non-Governmental 
Organisations in Humanitarian and Development Assistance in Zimbabwe was also 




Like Zimbabwe, the adoption of the Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSP) of 2009 in 
Ethiopia was controversial.  The CSP was a product of a fierce debate and contention between 
the Government of Ethiopia and civil society. 
648
The legislation had its roots in the conflict 
between human rights NGOs and the Government in matters related to the May 2005 National 
Elections in Ethiopia.
649
 Civil Society organisations particularly human rights groups were 
                                                          
640
 J Mapuva and L Muyongwa ‘A Critique of the Key Legislative Framework Guiding Civil Liberties in 
Zimbabwe’ (2012) 15 (4) P.E.R 125-231 at 125. 
641
 The PVO Act of 1966 has been amended several times: in 1976, 1981,1995,2000,2002, and 2005. The 
National Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (NANGO) made recommendations calling for a 
wholesome reform of the PVO Act of 1966 but this was ignored. 
642
 Mapuva and Muyongwa op cit note 615 at 134. For example, Section 9 (4) of the NGO Bill of 2004 seeks to 
ban foreign NGOs concerned principally with ‘issues of governance’ and NGOs receiving foreign funding for 
the ‘promotion and protection of human rights and political governance issues’ from being registered. 
643
 The NGO Network Alliance Project, available at http://www.kubatana.net/html/archive/legisl/0905  [accessed 
on 20 October 2013]. 
644
 ‘State to introduce Bill to monitor activities of NGOs’ The Herald 8 February 1995, 182. 
645
 Muzondidya and Nyati-Ndlovu op cit note 569 at 35. 
646
Tamuka H Muzondo ‘The potential impact of the NGO Bill on the Role of NGOs in the Protection and 
Promotion of Human Rights in Zimbabwe’ (Master Thesis) University of Cape Town, 2009) 7. 
647
 Muzondidya and Nyathi-Ndlovu op cit note 569 at 11, 41. 
648
 Debebe Hailegebriel ‘Ethiopia’ (2010) 12 (3) The International Journal for Not- for-Profit Law, available at 
http://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol12.iss.3/special_3.htm [accessed on 19 October 2013]. 
649
 Ibid. 
134 |  
 
active in monitoring and exposing human rights violations during the 2005 Elections.  
Government accused NGOs of being impartial and being pro-opposition.
650
 Since the 2005 
Elections, Government began to see NGOs as a threat to its hold over the political space.  
With a skeptical and hostile attitude towards human rights organisations, Government enacted 
the CSP to reflect the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) policy 
position towards NGOs.
651
 The policy document questions the role of NGOs in the 
development process and describes them as ‘rent seeking, unaccountable, and representing 
foreign interests’.
652
 The underlying motivation of the law was given among others, to ensure 
the citizens’ right to association enshrined in the Constitution of Ethiopia,
653
 to ensure the 
accountability, transparency and consistency of CSOs to the public and, to provide varieties of 
measures to be taken against CSOs in case of fault.
654
  
The draft CSP No 00 of 2008 (the Proclamation) was presented for discussion with CSOs and 
other interested parties.
655
 A number of consultative meetings were held between CSO 
representatives and Government officials.
656
 CSOs met with the Prime Minister and the 
Ministry of Justice officials.
657
  CSOs thereafter established a Task Force to pursue 
continuous dialogue with government officials.  The Taskforce made commentaries on the 
draft law, and organised Round table meetings for discussions.  Although some of the 
provisions in the draft were changed, it is argued that civil society input did not have a 
meaningful impact on the final outcome of the Proclamation.  Hailegebriel argues that 
government officials were resistant to constructive dialogue, and most of the revisions were 
more technical and cosmetic rather than substantive.
658
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 The Ethiopian Constitution of 1995 provides under Article 31 of the Constitution that ‘every person has the 
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 Hailegebriel op cit note 623. Restrictive provisions in the Draft CSP that were toned down include among 
others: (i) the power to refuse registration on ground that a charity is likely to be used for unlawful purpose or 
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Kenya, like Malawi, has a hybrid model.  In Kenya, the process of enacting the NGO law was 
initiated by government that felt the need to have some form of legislation to regulate NGO 
operations.
659
 The President, who reportedly had strained relations with NGOs because of 
their vigorous advocacy for democratic reform, issued a presidential Directive in 1989 
creating a directorate to co-ordinate NGOs under the Office of the President.
660
 The directive 
overshadowed a cabinet paper that had previously been presented by the Ministry of Culture 
and Social Services that co-ordinated them.
661
  The reasons given for this action were three-
fold: first, that some NGOs were unscrupulous; second, that Kenya had to fulfil her 
international commitments under Chapter 27 of Agenda 21, Principle 10 of the 1992 Rio 
Declaration, which required states parties to take concrete measures to facilitate NGO 
coordination for effective environmental management; and third, that NGOs were perceived 
as a potential threat to national sovereignty given that donors showed greater attention to them 
in civil rights matters.
662
 Indeed, the ‘Memorandum of Objects and Reasons’ Clause of the 
NGO Act gives  the reasons for making this law as being to ‘provide for the registration and 
co-ordination of NGOs in Kenya’. 
663
  
Following this directive, the President appointed an inter-ministerial Task-Force on NGOs.
664
 
The study of the inter-ministerial committee recommended the co-ordination of the NGO 
sector.  A draft NGO bill was presented and, during debates on this bill, NGOs lobbied for 
representation on the proposed NGO Co-ordination Board and the insertion of provisions on 
self-regulation.
665
 The NGO Act made provision for this, and established a governmental 
agency, the NGO Co-ordination Board.
666
 The NGO Act also established a self-regulatory 
agency known as the Kenya National Council of NGOs with powers to adopt its own 
structures, rules and proceedings, and to ensure self-regulation of NGOs by adopting a Code 
of Conduct and regulations there under.
667
 Despite the inclusion of NGO demands in the NGO 
Act, due to lack of relevant consultation with NGOs during the legislative process, NGOs 
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found the law to be unsatisfactory and restrictive.  NGOs protested against the restrictive 
law.
668
 NGOs held a series of meetings with relevant government departments, for example, 
the President’s Office and the Attorney General to agree on a compromise position.
669
 After 
lengthy discussions, a process of amending several sections of the Act was undertaken which 
resulted in the adoption of the Miscellaneous (Amendments) Act No 12 of 1991. 
Amendments were effected in three areas.  First, section 13(1) that required NGOs to register 
every three years was amended.  The period was extended to five years.
670
 The three- year 
period was considered restrictive considering that NGOs can be perpetual entities if they so 
desire.
671
 Second, the powers of the Minister were limited in circumstances of disagreement 
between an NGO and the Minister.
672
 Whereas the Minister was the final arbiter, the change 
enabled NGOs to exercise the right to appeal to the High Court in the event of such 
disagreement.
673
 Third, the membership of the NGO Council on the National Board of NGOs 




Malawi, on the other hand, presents a rather interesting experience.  Under colonial rule, the 
state was less permissive of the activities of civil society.  When Malawi became independent 
in 1964, relations entered a new phase under the Banda government.  The relationship was 
characterised by suscipicion and mistrust and more control was exerted on the activities of 
NGOs.
675
  Following the 1994 democratisation process and, the creation of space for NGOs to 
operate, a proliferation of NGOs took place.
676
 Government exerted limited regulation and 
monitoring which resulted into duplication of efforts among NGOs.
677
 NGOs were 
increasingly being perceived as lacking in transparency, accountability and focus.
678
 As 
Government contemplated measures to regulate the sector, NGOs on their own began a 
campaign for a self-regulatory policy to control the operations of NGOs.
679
 The NGOs 
submitted proposals to Cabinet, seeking, among other things, tax exemption benefits and 
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access to government financing.
680
 The government of Malawi set up an NGO/Government 
task force to examine the proposals with a view to developing an NGO law.  Government 
gave three reasons for enacting a law to regulate the activities of NGOs: first, the lack of 
financial accountability and transparency on the part of some NGOs; second, the feeling that 
some NGOs were crossing the boundaries of operation and venturing into politics and that a 
new law would stop that; and third, that there was a need to regulate NGO operations and 
locate them on the basis of need.
681
 
In what could be seen as a perplexing turn of events, an NGO bill was hastily tabled in 
Parliament, passed into law and swiftly assented to by the President amidst protests from 
NGOs.
682
 As noted earlier, a climate of distrust between NGOs and Government and the 
resultant tensions created by human rights advocacy NGOs could have undermined the 
dialogue process.
683
 Nonetheless, the underlying reasons for this law have been stated among 
others, as being the development of a strong independent civil society in Malawi . . . for 
public benefit purposes,
684
 promotion of donor and public confidence in the NGO sector . . . 
and principles of fiduciary integrity, public accountability, and democratic decision- making 
685
. . .  and, to affirm human rights provisions enshrined in the Constitution of Malawi.
686
 
However, two principal areas of disagreement continue to create difficulties; one, being the 
requirement for compulsory registration with the regulatory body and, the other being the 
provision for compulsory membership with the Council for Non-Governmental Organisations 
in Malawi (CONGOMA).
687
   
As noted earlier, South Africa and Namibia are more inclined towards a self-regulatory 
model.  Like other sub-Saharan African countries, South Africa’s Constitution guarantees 
everyone the right to freedom of association.
688
 Within this constitutional framework, there 
are three legal structures for non-profit organisations (NPOs) which are most commonly 
adopted in South Africa.  These are voluntary associations (VAs), trusts and Section 21 
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 VAs require agreements and are governed by common law; a Trust is 
incorporated by lodging a trust deed with the High Court while a Section 21 company is 
governed by the new Companies Act of 2010.
690
  If an organisation chooses to register as an 
NPO, then it would be governed by the Non-Profit Organisations Act No 71 of 1997 (NPO 
Act) which is the subject of this study.  
The process of formulating the NPO Act involved ‘lengthy and rigorous consultations 
negotiated between the state and civil society organisations’.
691
 The participatory approach to 
the formulation of the NPO Act can be seen in the lengthy consultations among various 
stakeholders including government, civil society, and development partners.  For example, in 
a report of an independent study into an enabling environment for NGOs, it is stated that 
provincial NGO sectoral coalitions and umbrella CBO organisations made recommendations 
on all aspects of the NPO Act.
692
 South Africa,  in a more inclusive and consultative approach  
also convened the Non-profit Organisations Summit at which the Policy Framework on Non-
profit Organisations Law (the Policy Document) was circulated for discussion.
693
 Moreover, 
the NPO Act spells out this progressive nature when it states  that the ‘Act is aimed at creating 
an enabling environment which will enable NPOs to flourish, establish a regulatory 
framework within which NPOs can conduct their affairs and, encourage NPOs to maintain 
adequate standards of governance, transparency, and public accountability’.
694
 In what could 
be argued as a positive approach to state-NGO relations, the preamble of the NPO Act 
recognises civil society as a ‘development partner for which the Act is to provide an 
environment in which NPOs can flourish, and conduct their affairs’.
695
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Namibia has a Civic Organisations Partnership Policy (the policy) which, like the NPO Act, 
was adopted in an open and consultative manner.
696
 Namibia does not have an NGO law 
because earlier attempts to draft the Registration of Partnerships Act was opposed by NGOs 
and, given Namibia’s belief in a participatory approach, the process was halted.
697
 Instead the 
Policy proposes the enactment of a Code of Good Practice (the Code of Procedures) to 
provide for partnership with and reporting arrangements to government by civic groups, a 
term that includes NGOs.
698
 
So, was the legislative process in each country above, participatory, and did it reflect the 
outcome? The countries surveyed have different experiences but reflect a common pattern.  
Countries that have a state-led model exhibit the least form of NGO participation.  Even 
where some limited participation was allowed, for instance, in Ethiopia, the views of NGOs 
were largely ignored, and the amendments were largely cosmetic.
699
 In Zimbabwe and 
Ethiopia, the motivation for the law is to control NGOs.
700
 Countries that adopted a state-
NGO-led model allowed more NGO participation, although the degree of involvement varies.  
Amendments were made in some areas of the law, for instance, Kenya effected amendments 
to the NGO Co-ordination Act to accommodate several demands of NGOs.
701
 Malawi was 
less permissive of NGO demands.   Unlike Zimbabwe and Ethiopia who focus on control of 
NGOs, in both Kenya and Malawi, the purpose of the law is to co-ordinate NGOs.
702
 On the 
other hand, South Africa and Namibia demonstrate the highest levels of NGO participation 
and respect for civil society space.  Namibia, for example, halted the legislative process 
because of the discomfort exhibited by NGOs.  The NPO Act, much like the Policy in 
Namibia is designed to create an enabling environment for NGOs to operate.  In all the 
countries surveyed, despite varying levels of NGO participation, there is a common thread in 
the NGO law, which is to provide for the registration of NGOs and, to promote transparency 
and public accountability in the NGO sector.
703
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6. 3. 2.  Registration   
 
As noted before, international law recognises the right of individuals to form, join, and 
participate in an association provided the purpose for which it is formed is legal or lawful.
704
 
The right to freedom of association does not make registration compulsory although many 
countries require NGOs to register in order to operate.
705
 When the right to register is 
exercised in order to operate lawfully, the registration system should be truly accessible, clear, 
speedy, apolitical and inexpensive.
706
 This is necessary to avoid the possibility of government 
manipulating the regulations to interfere with legitimate associational life.  Once registered 
the NGO has a right to operate free from unwarranted state interference.
707
 This section 
examines the registration process in these countries.  How are the regulatory bodies 
established? What are the criteria for their appointment, membership, security of tenure and 
level of independence? 
6. 3. 2. 1.  The NGO Regulatory Mechanism 
 
In South Africa, the national Department responsible for Welfare is the administrative body 
for non-profit organisations (NPOs).
708
 Under the NPO Act, the Directorate for NPOs is the 
body charged with registration of NPOs as legal entities, as well as the coordination and 
implementation of policies in the non-profit sector.
709
 The Director of NPOs is designated by 
the Minister for Welfare and Population Development following a public call for 
nominations.
710
 The list of nominees is published for comments.  Extensive consultations with 
the public are mandatory.
711
 The NPO Directorate is governed by regulations made under the 
NPO Act which require the Directorate to observe the principles of accountability, 
responsibility, transparency, and customer care in all its operations.
712
  
 Although the NPO Act  provides for the NPO Directorate within the Department of Welfare 
as the regulatory body, the policy document proposes to establish a self-regulatory NPO 
Council along the lines of the Charities Commission of England and Wales and a new entity 
to be called ‘The South African Non-profit Organisations Regulatory Authority’ which would 
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deal with the registration of non-profit organisations, investigate complaints, enforce 
compliance, raise awareness and education, and provide public access to information.
713
 If the 
Policy Document is implemented, a new approach to NGO regulation would have been set 
because unlike in other countries where NGO co-ordination boards fall under a parent 
ministry and are subject to state control, the regulatory authority would be autonomous and 
theoretically free from control of or directive from any government body.  This would require 
a repeal of the NPO Act to bring the policy in conformity with the law.  
 In Namibia, the primary regulator of non-profit companies is the Registrar of Companies 
located in the Ministry of Trade and Industry.  There is no specific NGO law at present in 
Namibia and NGOs are registered as non-profit ‘section 21 companies’.
714
 Non-profit 
companies could be trusts, foundations, voluntary organisations or community-based groups.  
The Civic Organisations Partnership Policy proposes that the new bill establish a transparent 
and voluntary registration process.   
 In Kenya, NGOs are required to register with a semi-autonomous governmental agency, the 
NGO Co-ordination Board.
715
 However, Kenya has recently enacted a new law, the Public 
Benefit Organizations Act of 2013 (PBO Act) to repeal the NGO Coordination Act.  Despite 
this new development, the Rules and Regulations to govern the implementation of the PBO 
Act are yet to be adopted for the Act to enter into force.  At the time of writing this thesis, it is 
the NGO Co-ordination Act which is in use.  
 The NGO Coordination Board consists of 21 government appointees, not less than  five  and 
not more than seven of whom are appointed by the Minister on the strength of their 
knowledge or experience in development issues, hold office for three years but are eligible for 
re-appointment.
716
 Five members are appointed by the Minister on the recommendation of a 
self–regulatory agency, the National Council of NGOs, to serve for a period of three years.
717
  
The chairperson is appointed by the President.
718
 Six of the members occupy positions by 
virtue of their offices.
719
 The Executive Director, appointed by the Minister, is an ex-officio 
                                                          
713
 International Center for Not for Profit Law ‘NGO Law Monitor: South Africa’ (Research Center, 2012) 8 
[accessed 20 October 2012]. 
714
Section 21 Companies Act 1973 (No.61of 19973). 
715
 Section 3(1) of the NGO Co-ordination   Act No 19 of 1990. 
716
 Section 4 (1) (b) and 4 (2) of the NGO Coordination Act No 19 of 1990. 
717
 Section 4 (1) (i) and 4 (2) of the NGO Coordination Act No 19 of 1990. 
718
 Section 4 (1) (a) of the NGO Coordination Act 19 of 1990.  
719
 Section 4(1) (b), (c), (d) (e), (h) and (g) of the NGO Coordination Act No 19 of 1990.  These are the Attorney 
General, Permanent Secretary in the Office of the President, Treasury, Economic Planning, Foreign Affairs and, 
Social Service. 
142 |  
 
member and secretary to the Board with no voting rights.
720
 Unlike the Director of NPOs in 
South Africa, who, being an appointee of the Minister but whose appointment attracts public 
nomination, the Executive Director is directly appointed by the Minister to head the NGO 
Coordination Bureau, the organ responsible for the day to day management.
721
 The quorum 
for the transaction of business of the NGO Coordination Board is eleven, including the 
Chairperson and at least seven members appointed by the Minister.
722
 Decisions can be made 
with only one representative of NGOs since all questions are determined by a simple majority 
of the votes of the members present.
723
 Although the NGO Coordination Board is a body 
corporate, it is dominated by state appointees.
724
 Even though members are eligible for 
reappointment, the NGO Coordination Act does not spell out the number of terms one can 
serve nor the criteria to be followed by the Minister when making such appointments.
725
   
In Malawi, the NGO Board of Malawi is a body corporate charged with the duty to register 
and regulate NGOs under the NGO Act of Malawi.
726
 The NGO Board of Malawi is 
composed of ten members, seven of whom are appointed by the Minister in consultation with 
CONGOMA to serve for three years and are eligible for one more term.
727
 Three members are 
there by virtue of their offices.
728
 Although the parent ministry for the management and 
oversight of NGOs is the Ministry of Gender, Children and Women Development, the actual 
registration is in the office of the Registrar of Companies within the Ministry of Justice and 
Constitutional Affairs.
729
 Unlike the Executive Director who is appointed by the Minister in 
Kenya, the NGO Board of Malawi appoints the Registrar who is the Chief Executive and 
Secretary to the Board.
730
 In contrast with the NGO Coordination Board of Kenya which is 
state-controlled, the NGO Board of Malawi is theoretically insulated against any external 
interference.
731
 The members of the NGO Board of Malawi can be removed or substituted at 
any time by the Minister however, consultation of CONGOMA is required.
732
 Appointments 
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or changes in the membership of the Board must be published in the Gazette.
733
 Incapacity or 
any circumstance that would disqualify a member from appointment is given among the 
reasons upon which membership of the Board can be terminated.
734
 
 In Zimbabwe, the Registrar and the PVO Board, a body made up of representatives from 
ministries and five PVO representatives appointed by the Minister of Labour and Social 
Services are in charge of registration and coordination of PVOs.
735
 One representative is 
appointed by the Minister from among persons nominated for that purpose by the PVO or 
Ministry for a period not exceeding three years as the case may be.
736
 However, the Minister 
may decline to appoint a person nominated whether from a PVO or Ministry and appoint a 
person of his own choice to the PVO Board irrespective of whether such person would 
represent the views of the body in question.
737
 Unlike the Director of NPOs in South Africa or 
the Executive Director in Kenya or the Registrar in Malawi, who are either appointed or 
designated by the Minister or the Board, the Registrar of PVOs holds Office of the Director of 
Social Welfare.
738
 No criterion is given for a person to be appointed to the PVO Board.    
The NGO Bill, 2004, which was not assented to and is discussed here to reflect the underlying  
government policy, had provided that the Minister responsible for the implementation of the 
Act would appoint a Registrar and a 14 member NGO Council, five of whom would be  NGO 
representatives, to regulate and supervise NGO operations.
739
 The NGO Bill had specified 
that only public servants at the level of Permanent Secretaries would be eligible for 
nomination and appointment to the NGO Council.
740
  
In Ethiopia, the Charities and Societies Agency (the Agency) established within the Ministry 
of Justice is responsible for licensing and registration of Charities and Societies.
741
 The 
Agency comprises of the Charities and Societies Board (the Board) and the Director 
General.
742
 The Board has seven members who are nominated by the Government.
743
 Two of 
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the board members are nominated from the Charities and Societies.
744
 The Director General 
appointed by the Government is the chief executive of the Agency.
745
 As chief executive, the 
Director General implements the general directions issued by the Ministry.
746
 Whereas the 
Board approves directives issued by the Agency, the Agency is only accountable to the 
Ministry.
747
 Unlike other countries discussed here before, where the regulatory body is 
restricted to matters concerning NGOs, the Agency is also designated as a Sector 
Administrator; which is a Federal Executive Office assigned by the Ministry to among other 
functions to supervise and control the operational activities of charities and societies.
748
 No 
specific criteria is provided for the appointment of the Director General or members of the 
Board.  
The public involvement in the appointment process of the NPO Directorate presents a radical 
departure from other countries discussed here where the appointment of the regulatory body is 
in the exclusive domain of the state.  The degree of independence of the regulatory body also 
varies; the NPO Directorate of South Africa is more independent, the NGO Coordination 
Board of Kenya is state controlled and, the NGO Board of Malawi is equally more 
independent.  The PVO Board of Zimbabwe and, the Agency and Charities and Societies 
Board of Ethiopia, are an appendage of the state.  The appointment process is most 
transparent in South Africa, less transparent in Kenya and Malawi and, least so in Zimbabwe 
and Ethiopia.   
6. 3. 2. 2.  Powers of the Board 
 
This section examines the powers of the regulatory bodies; are they controlling or enabling? 
To what extent do these powers limit the space for NGOs to operate?  
In Zimbabwe, the PVO Board (PVOB) has wide discretionary powers.  The PVOB has power 
to accept or reject an application for registration of an NGO without giving any reasons.
749
 
The PVOB can reject an application if it appears to the Board that it is not bonafide.
750
 What 
is bonafide is not defined, but the NGO Bill gives such prohibition to include a foreign PVO 
                                                          
744
 Section 8 (1) Charities and Societies Proclamation No 621 of 2009. 
745
 Section 7(2) Charities and Societies Proclamation No 621 of 2009. 
746
 Section 11(1) Charities and Societies Proclamation No 621 of 2009. 
747
 Section 4(2) and 9(4) of the Charities and Societies Proclamation No 621 of 2009. 
748
 Section 66(2) and 67 (3) Charities and Societies Proclamation No 621 of 2009. 
749
 Section 4(a) of the PVO Act of 1995. 
750
 Section 9(5) (b) (i) of the PVO Act of 1995. 
145 |  
 
whose work addresses issues of political governance and human rights.
751
 The PVOB may 
also deny an application on mere speculation that the organisation appears unable to comply 
with the PVO Act.
752
 Neither does the PVO Act provide a time-limit within which an 
application should be considered, although the PVO Act criminalises a PVO which operates 
without being registered.
753
 Where the PVOB accepts an application for registration it directs 
the Registrar to issue a certificate of registration on such conditions as it may impose.
754
 
However, the period for the renewal of the certificate is not prescribed, which leaves such 
decision to the discretion of the PVOB.  Where the PVOB rejects an application for 
registration, the Registrar must notify the applicant of its decision and the grounds on which 
the rejection is based.
755
 No time frame is given within which the Registrar must notify the 
applicant of its decision. 
  The PVOB is only accountable to the Minister of Labour and Social Services, who appears 
to have excessive powers.
756
 For example, the Minister is empowered to inspect the internal 
operations and activities of any PVO, including its books of accounts and, any documents as 
he deems it necessary.  The inspection can be done with or without notice.
757
 The PVO Act 
also grants the PVOB powers to deregister NGOs either by amending or cancelling the 
certificate of registration.
758
 The PVO Act requires the Registrar to notify the PVO of its 
intention to cancel or amend the certificate, and gives ninety days within which the PVO must 
show cause why such action should not be taken.
759
 Where the PVOB cancels the certificate, 
such cancellation should be published in the Gazette.
760
  
                                                          
751
 Section 9(4) of the NGO Bill, 2004. 
752
 Section 9(5) (b) of the PVO Act of 1995. 
753
 Section 6 (3) and 3(a) of the PVO Act of 1995.  A person found guilty of managing a PVO which is not 
registered is liable to a fine or imprisonment not exceeding three months or both. 
754
 Section 9 (5) (a) of the PVO Act of 1995. 
755
 Section 9 (6) of the PVO Act of 1995. 
756
 Section 14 (2) of the PVO Act of 1995.  The PVO Act empowers the Minister to confirm the decision of the 
Board or, give such other decision as in his opinion the Board ought to have given, and may instruct the Board to 
do everything necessary to give effect to his decision. 
757
 Section 20(1) (a) of the Private Voluntary Organisations Act of 1995.  See also N Mashumba and C Maroleng 
Tightening the Noose: Narrowing the Democratic Space for NGOs in Zimbabwe (ISS Situational Report, 2004) 
3. 
758
 Section 10 (1) of the Private Voluntary Organisations Act of 1995.  Grounds for deregistration include, (a) 
failure to comply with any condition of registration, (d) if the PVO ceases to function  as a PVO, (e) if the 
objects for which it was registered are merely ancillary to other objects of the organization and,  (i) if the PVO 
has failed to submit any report or return.  See Section 7(c) of the Code of Procedure for the Registration and 
Operations of Non-Governmental Organizations in Zimbabwe, General Notice 99 of 2007. 
759
 Section 10(3) and 10(4) of the Private Voluntary Organizations Act of 1995. 
760
 Section 10(5) of the Private Voluntary Organizations Act of 1995. 
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The PVO Act empowers the Minister to appoint any public officer to inspect and examine any 
NGO accounts including any documents relating to the affairs of the organisation.
761
 In 
practice it is organisations that are deemed political that have been subjected to this scrutiny. 
The Minister also has power to suspend the executive committee of NGOs in case of 
misconduct and even appoint trustees to take over control of an NGO pending further 
investigations.
762
 Appeals against the decision of the PVOB lie to the Minister who is also the 
appointing authority.
763
 The Minister may confirm the decision of the PVOB or decide 
otherwise.
764
 No express provision exists under the PVO Act for a right to judicial review or 
appeal to a tribunal which limits the space for PVOs to challenge the broad powers of the 
PVOB.  
 As noted in the previous chapter, the exercise of broad powers is a threat to freedom of 
association.  For example, freedom of association implies a right, on the part of associations, 
once they are formed, to operate free from government controls.
765
 The arbitrary take- over of 
an association does not only violate the right to form and participate in an organisation but 
would also amount to a denial of the right to continue that association.
766
 The arbitrary take -
over of management or leadership of an NGO would amount to unwarranted interference as 
was held in the AWC case.  In this case the executive committee of a grassroots NGO, the 
Association of Women’s Clubs (AWC) which was formally gazetted was suspended 
indefinitely and stopped from exercising its roles and responsibilities.
767
 The Zimbabwe 
government replaced them with a caretaker committee comprising of ZANU-PF women’s 
league members.  The suspended executive committee challenged the constitutionality of the 
act before the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe on grounds that they were denied the right to be 
heard.  The court ruled in their favour.
768
  
                                                          
761
 Section 20 (1) of the Private Voluntary Organizations Act of 1995. 
762
Section 21(1) and 22(1) of the Private Voluntary Organizations Act of 1995. 
763
 Section 14(1) of the PVO Act of 1995, See Section 6 of the Code of Procedure for the Registration and 
Operations of Non-Governmental Organizations in Zimbabwe, General Notice 99 of 2007. 
764
 Section 14(2) of the Private Voluntary Organizations Act of 1995. 
765
 Stephen Neff Report of Mission to Egypt (Human Rights First, 1995) 1-2. 
766
 An Analysis of the Zimbabwean Non-Governmental Organizations Bill, 2004 (International Bar Association, 
unpublished) 11. 
767





[ Holland &Ors v Minister of the Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, Zimbabwe Law Reports,1977(1) 
186] 
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In Ethiopia, the Charities and Societies Agency (the Agency) has broad and arbitrary powers.  
The Agency has power to licence, register and supervise charities and societies.
769
 Where an 
application for registration is made, the Agency must issue the certificate within 30 days from 
the date of application.
770
 Renewal of registration is required every three years.
771
 Where the 
Agency declines to issue a certificate of registration, the applicant may apply to the Charities 
and Societies Board not later than 15 days from the time prescribed for the grant of the 
certificate, however, no time limit is provided for the Board to make a decision.  No provision 
is made for an appeal against the decision of the Board either to the Minister or court to 
challenge their broad powers.  The CSP grants the Agency excessive discretion in the 
registration process.
772
 For example, the Agency issued the Guidelines on Determining the 
Administrative and Operational Costs of CSOs without consulting with any organization.
773
  
 As a Sector Administrator, the Agency supervises and controls the operational activities of 
charities and Societies.
774
 The Agency can reject an application for registration on mere 
suspicion that the proposed charity or society is likely to be used for unlawful purposes or 
purposes prejudicial to public peace, welfare or good order.
775
 What is ‘unlawful’ is not 
defined.  The Agency has power to institute inquiries of a charity or society from time to time 
either generally or for a particular purpose.
776
 Where a society plans to hold a General 
Assembly, it must notify the Agency in writing of the time and place of the meeting not later 
than seven working days prior to such meeting.
777
 In what appears a threat to freedom of 
association, the Agency may order the removal including suspension of an officer of a charity 




                                                          
769
 Section 6(1) (a) of the Charities and Societies Proclamation No 621 of 2009. 
770
 Section 68(1) of the Charities and Societies Proclamation No 621 of 2009. 
771
 Section 76(1) of the Charities and Societies Proclamation No 621 of 2009. 
772
 See Section 7 (Articles 84-94) of the CSP. The Agency has unlimited authority to exercise control over the 
operations of a charity or society. For example, in 2011, in exercise of this unlimited power, the Agency froze 
the bank accounts of the Ethiopian Women Lawyers Association and the Ethiopian Human Rights Council, 
ordered the closure of seven CSOs and in 2012 warned 476 CSOs because they allegedly breached the 
provisions of the CSP. 
773
 In November 2011, the Agency issued guidelines retroactively requiring all charities and societies to adhere 
to a ‘70/30’ regulation limiting administrative costs to 30% of their budgets. 
774
 Section 67(3) of the Charities and Societies Proclamation No 621 of 2009. 
775
 Section 69(2) of the Charities and Societies Proclamation No 621 of 2009. 
776
 Section 84(1) of the Charities and Societies Proclamation No 621 of 2009. 
777
 Section 86 of the Charities and Societies Proclamation No 621 of 2009. 
778
 Section 91of the Charities and Societies Proclamation No 621 of 2009. 
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The Agency also has power to suspend a licence on several grounds including contravention 
by the charity of its directives or its orders.
779
 The Agency has power to cancel registration on 
a range of grounds including suspicion that the license has been used for unlawful purposes or 
purposes prejudicial to public peace, welfare or security.
780
 Where the Agency exercises 
power to cancel a registration, it is empowered to dissolve the charity or society however the 
decision can only be effected by a decision of the Federal High Court. 
781
 
In Kenya, the NGO Coordination Board has wide discretionary powers.  It can accept or deny 
an application for registration.
782
Before the PBO Act, if the Board accepted an application for 
registration, it would issue a certificate of registration on such terms and conditions as the 
Board could prescribe for a period of five years.
783
 No guidelines were provided for the 
formulation of the terms and conditions attached to a certificate of registration.   
The NGO Act did not specify the length of time for which an application could be considered 
by the Board.  The Board had discretionary power to demand additional information as the 
Board would prescribe.  This was subject to abuse as the Board made unnecessary requests 
making the application process unnecessarily lengthy and costly.
784
 The Board could refuse an 
application if it was satisfied that the applicant’s proposed activities or procedures were not in 
the ‘national interest’ or the applicant gave false information.
785
 National interest was not 
defined.  But Regulation 21(1) of the NGO Coordination Rules, 1992 which prohibits NGOs 
from becoming connected with any groups of a political nature, established outside Kenya, 
without the consent of the Board, provides an important indication of the restriction.  The 
Board could also reject an application if it was satisfied, on the recommendation of the NGO 
Council, that the applicant should not be registered.
786
 Where the Board refused an 
application, it was not bound to give reasons for the refusal.  In practice the period was 
                                                          
779
 Section 92(1) of the Charities and Societies Proclamation No 621 of 2009. Other grounds include failure to 
comply with the Agency’s orders within the time limit set by the Agency, submission of falsified accounts and 
reports or, failure, within the appropriate time to provide the Agency with information required by the Agency. 
780
 Section 92(2) (b) of the Charities and Societies Proclamation No 621 of 2009. Other grounds include fraud, 
failure to renew the licence, or failure to rectify causes for the suspension of the licence within the time limit set 
by the Agency. 
781
 Section 93(1) and (2) of the Charities and Societies Proclamation No 621 of 2009. 
782
 Section 12 and 14 of the NGO Coordination Act No 19 of 1990. 
783
 Section 13 of the NGO Coordination Act No 19 of 1990. 
784
 Kameri-Mbote op cit note 561 at 6-13. 
785
 Section 14 (a) and (b) of the NGO Act No 19 of 1990. 
786
 Section 14(c) of the NGO Coordination Act, 1990 (repealed). Under Section 16 (1) of the PBO Act, the 
Authority may refuse to register any organization on grounds that the application does not comply with the 
requirements of the Act, objectives of the proposed organization contravene any written law, the applicant has 
committed breaches of the Act, other laws or regulations, applicant gives false or misleading information or the 
name of the proposed organization is similar to the name of other organization. 
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prolonged ranging from ninety days to two years.
787
 This slow process represented a barrier to 
the operation of NGOs.  
The Board had power to regulate all NGOs operating in Kenya.
788
 This includes the receipt 
and discussion of NGO reports, approving reports of the NGO Council and, the Code of 
Conduct prepared by the Council for self-regulation of NGOs in Kenya.
789
 The Board 
operates through a Bureau that receives and processes applications for registration, tax 
waivers and de-registration.
790
 However, the physical capacity of the Board in terms of human 
and financial resources is limited.
791
 The Bureau’s office situated in Nairobi has a total of 50 
staff with a clientele of 6000, making its role in registering NGOs only perfunctory.
792
  
The Board also had discretionary power to cancel or suspend a certificate.
793
 Where the Board 
did so, notification of such action took effect within fourteen days of the service of notice.
794
 
The Board had also power to strike off the register any organization which failed to show 
proof of its existence within thirty days from the date it was served with such notice.
795
 These 
provisions gave very wide discretion to the Board, which allowed it to exercise these powers 
arbitrarily.  For example, the abuse of discretion arose in de-registering of the Centre for Law 
and Research International (CLARION).  CLARION was registered in 1994.  On 20 February, 
1995, it was deregistered by the NGO Board on grounds that it had published reports that 
damaged the credibility of the Government of Kenya in breach of its terms of registration.   
CLARION did not receive any notice of the intended cancellation, neither was it granted a 
right to a fair hearing.  The Board did not define which reports were offensive.  CLARION 
made an appeal to the High Court and its registration was restored by the High Court in June 
1996 shortly after the Board had rescinded its decision.
796
 It turned out that the decision to 
deregister CLARION was a unilateral decision of the Chairperson of the Board who had 
                                                          
787
 F Kisinga ‘The Process of Reviewing the NGO Coordination Act, 1990: A Step-by –Step Road Map’ (1990) 
11 4 International Journal of Not-for-Profit –Law   55-72. 
788
 Section 7 of the NGO Coordination Act No 19 of 1990. 
789
 Section 7 (a) to (h) of the NGO Coordination Act No 19 of 1990. 
790
 Wamuccii and Idwasi op cit. note 566 at 255. 
791
 International Centre for Not-for-Profit Law ‘NGO Law in Kenya’ (2009)  11  4 International Journal of Not-




 Section 16(1) of the NGO Coordination Act No 19 of 1990.  The grounds for cancellation of the certificate 
include; violation of the terms and conditions attached to the certificate, breach of the Act and, upon satisfactory 
recommendation for the cancellation of the certificate.   
794
 Section 16(2) of the NGO Coordination Act No 19 of 1990. 
795
 Section 18 (3) of the NGO Coordination Act No 19 of 1990.   
796
 Kibwana K. ‘The Role of Civil Society in Africa’s Democratization and Rebirth’ in Wanjala,S.& Kibwana K. 
(ed)  Democratization and Law Reform in Kenya ( Nairobi: Claripress Ltd, 1997) 385-396. 
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abused his discretion.  The court found that the purported de-registration of CLARION was a 
violation of its freedom of association contrary to the Constitution of Kenya.
797
  
Earlier, in 1998, six policy advocacy NGOs had been deregistered on allegations of being 
involved in ‘terrorist’ activities but were reinstated when government failed to prove its 
claims.
798
 In 1995, more than one hundred NGOs were denied registration on grounds of 
national interest or public security.
799
 In 1999, during the launch of new accountability 




Appeals against the decision of the Board lie to the Minister within thirty days of the 
decision.
801
 If the Minister decides against the applicant, then an appeal can be lodged to the 
High Court against the decision of the Minister within twenty-eight days of the receipt of the 
decision of the Minister.
802
 But until 1992 when the right of appeal against the Ministers’ 
decision to the High Court was introduced under the Statute Law (Miscellaneous 




However, under the PBO Act, the PBO Authority can accept or reject an application for 
registration.
804
 Where the PBO Authority accepts an application, it would issue a certificate of 
registration in the prescribed form.
805
 The issue of the certificate must be done within sixty 
days from the date of application or else the organisation is presumed to have been 
registered.
806
 If the Authority is not satisfied with the application, it must notify the applicant 
giving reasons for its decision and invite the applicant to rectify the anomaly within a period 
not exceeding thirty days from the date of the notice.
807
 If the applicant fails to comply then 
the PBO Authority would decline to register the application giving reasons of its decision 
within the remaining period in the original sixty day period.
808
 Where the PBO Authority 
                                                          
797
 Article 80 of the old Constitution and now Article 36 (1) of the new Constitution of Kenya, 2010 guarantees 
the right to freedom to assemble and associate including the right to form or belong to an association.  
798
 Kameri-Mbote op cit note 567 at 14. 
799
 Kameri-Mbote op cit note 567 at 17. 
800
 Kameri-Mbote op cit note 567 at 16. 
801
 Section 19(1) of the NGO Coordination Act No 19 of 1990. 
802
 Section 3A of the NGO Coordination Act No 19 of 1990. 
803
 Section 34 (3) Miscellaneous (Amendments) Act of NGOs Act, 1991. 
804804
 Section 16 of the PBO Act No 18 of 2013. 
805
 Section 10 (1) of the PBO Act No 18 of 2013. 
806
 Section 12 of the PBO Act No 18 of 2013. 
807
 Section 9 (2) of the PBO Act No 18 of 2013. 
808
 Section 9 (5) of the PBO Act No 18 of 2013. 
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refuses to accept the application, it must notify the applicant, giving reasons for its refusal 
within fourteen days of its decision.
809
 Grounds for refusal of registration are broad and may 
be subject to abuse.
810
 Unlike the NGO Act, the PBO Act establishes a Tribunal to which 
appeals lie.
811
 Where a complainant is dissatisfied with the decision of the Tribunal, an appeal 
may lie to the High Court and the decision of the High Court is final.
812
 In practice, the appeal 
process as it is is a burdensome procedure particularly for small organisations. 
 The powers of the NGO Board in Malawi are provided for in Sections 20(4) and 21(1) of the 
NGO Act.  These powers include: the authority to accept or reject an application which it 
must do within a period of 90 days.
813
 Where it accepts an application, it must issue a 
certificate of registration as proof.
814
 NGOs acquire corporate personality upon registration 
and can engage in public interest initiatives.
815
 Where the NGO Board rejects an application, 
it must give reasons for doing so.
816
 However, the grounds for the rejection of an application 
are not spelt out.  The NGO Board also has power to cancel or suspend the registration of an 
NGO if it is satisfied that the NGO has ceased to exist, has failed to comply with the Act, that 
the NGO is engaged in partisan politics, including electioneering and politicking or where the 
coordinating body has recommended it for cancellation or suspension.
817
 The law also makes 
provision for a right of an NGO to be heard either orally or in writing.
818
 Whereas the NGO 
Board may exercise its power for good cause, the denial of NGOs to engage in electioneering 
and politicking is inconsistent with democratic practice.  It amounts to a denial of freedom of 
expression and assembly which is a basic foundation of a democratic society.
819
 The 
discretion to determine whether to reject or accept an application may also be subject to 
abuse.  Any NGO which is aggrieved with a decision of the NGO Board may apply to the 
High Court for judicial review.
820
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 16(2) of the PBO Act No 18 of 2013. 
810
 Section 16(1) of the PBO Act No 18 of 2013. Grounds for refusal of registration include; non-compliance 
with the requirements of the PBO Act, where objectives of the proposed PBO contravene any written law, where 
applicant organization has committed breaches of the PBO Act or other laws or regulations, the applicant gives 
false information or the name of the proposed PBO is similar to the name of other institution, organization or 
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811
 Section 50(1), 51(1) and 52(1) of the PBO Act No 18 of 2013. 
812
 Section 52(11) of the PBO Act No 18 of 2013. 
813
 Section 20 (4) (a) of the Malawi NGO Act of 2000. 
814
 Section 21(1) of the Malawi NGO Act of 2000. 
815
 Section 21 (2) (a) and (b) of the Malawi NGO Act of 2000. 
816
 Section 20(4) (b) of the Malawi NGO Act of 2000. 
817
 See Sections 23 (1) (a), (b), (c) and 23(2) of the NGO Act, 2000. 
818
 See Sections 23 (3) (2) of the NGO Act, 2000. 
819
 In re: Munhumeso & Ors 1994(1) ZLR 49 (s). 
820
 See Section 23(4) of the NGO Act, 2000. 
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In South Africa, registration of NPOs is the responsibility of the Directorate.
821
 The NPO 
Directorate has power to register or deny registration to an NPO.
822
 Registration is conducted 
in a transparent and accountable manner.  The Act limits the time periods within which 
administrative action takes place, in order to reduce bureaucratic discretion.  The Directorate 
can only refuse to register an NPO if it is not satisfied that the NPO has complied with the 
mandatory requirements for registration.  For example, where an NPO applies for registration, 
the Director must consider the application within two months of receiving the application, 
and, if satisfied with the application, register the applicant.
823
 The NGO Law Monitor 
however notes that significant delays are reported to cause applications to take even six 
months to be completed.
824
 The Director must issue a certificate of registration as proof and, 
such organisation becomes a body corporate.
825
 
 Applicants who experience dissatisfaction are able to enforce administrative compliance.  For 
example, if the Director is dissatisfied with the application, he must notify the applicant in 
writing, giving reasons for the decision and, inform the applicant that he has one month to 
rectify the anomaly.
826
 Where the applicant receives the notice and does not comply within 
the prescribed period, the Director must notify the applicant in writing of the refusal to 
register, and the reasons for it.
827
 But unlike Zimbabwe and Ethiopia, applicants have a right 
of appeal to a tribunal and a court of law, consistent with the Constitution of South Africa.
828
 
Indeed, within one month of receipt of a notice of refusal, the organization may appeal against 
the decision by submitting a complaint to the Directorate for consideration by an Arbitration 
Tribunal.
829
 The Tribunal has three months within which it must consider the Appeal and 
declare its decision with reasons.
830
  
The Director also has power to cancel registration.
831
 Where cancellation of registration is 
done, the NPO has the right to appeal against the cancellation to an Arbitration Tribunal.
832
 
                                                          
821
 Section 4 of the NPO Act No 71 of 1997. 
822
 Section 13 and 14 of the NPO Act No 71 of 1997. 
823
 Section 13 (2) of the NPO Act No 71 of 1997. 
824
 International Center for Not-for –Profit Law op cit note 145. 
825
 Section 15(1) and (16) (1) of the NPO Act No 71 of 1997. 
826
 Section 13 (3) of the NPO Act No 71 of 1997. 
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 Section 13 (5) and (6) of the NPO Act No 71 of 1997. 
828
 Section 36(1) of the Constitution of South Africa guarantees the right of civil society groups to claim their 
rights by means of a judicial process in courts. 
829
 Section 14(1) of the NPO Act No 71 of 1997. 
830
 Section 14 (2) of the NPO Act No 71 of 1997. 
831
 Section 21(1) of the NPO Act No 71 of 1997.  Grounds for cancellation of certificate include breach of the 
NPO’s constitution, material false representation in its reports (narrative, financial or any other submitted to the 
Director) or failure to comply with notice issued to such organization by the Director. 
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The Tribunal must make a decision and communicate its decision to the appellant within three 
months of receiving the notice of appeal.
833
 Unlike Ethiopia, Malawi, and Zimbabwe, South 
Africa does not prohibit NPOs from criticising the government or advocating politically 
unpopular causes, a position which has been adopted by the PBO Act.
834
 The only limitation 
is that NPOs that have tax exemption cannot use their resources to support or oppose or 
advance the causes of any political party.  
In Namibia, the Registrar of Companies has power to register NPOs under the Companies 
Act.
835
  The Registrar may impose a fine or imprisonment for an NPO that fails to file audited 
annual financial statements.  
Unlike South Africa where bureaucratic discretion is limited, the regulatory bodies in 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi and Zimbabwe have broad discretionary powers which may be 
subject to arbitrary decision making and abuse.  Without a right of appeal for judicial review 
in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe, the broad powers enjoyed by the NGO Boards are more 
controlling than facilitative, and therefore pose a threat to the freedom of association.  
6. 3. 2. 3.  Registration requirements 
 
This section examines the registration requirements, how onerous are they? Is it easy to 
register? How strict are the requirements? 
Zimbabwe imposes strict registration conditions.  Registration is mandatory under the PVO 
Act.
836
 Failure to register attracts penalties, including fines and imprisonment.
837
 An NGO 
seeking registration has to lodge with the Registrar an application together with the 
constitution of the organisation.
838
 The application must be supported with the following: 
application Form PVO 1, Form PVO 2 and proof of advertisement, copies of the 
organisations’ constitution, curriculum vitae of the members of the executive committee,  
proof of notification to local authorities of intent to register, police criminal clearance 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
832
 Section 22(1) of the NPO Act No 71 of 1997. 
833
 Section 22 (2) of the NPO Act No 71 of 1997. 
834
 Section 66(1) of the PBO Act, 2013 permits PBOs to engage in public policy and political activities in Kenya. 
835
 Section 21 Companies Act No 61 of 1973.  
836
 Section 6(1) of the PVO Act of 1995 provides that ‘No PVO shall commence or continue to carry on its 
activities unless it has been registered in respect of the particular object or objects in furtherance of which it is 
being conducted. 
837
 Section 6(3a) of the PVO Act of 1995 provides for a fine not exceeding level four ($ 3750) or imprisonment 
for a period not exceeding three months or to both such fine and imprisonment. 
838
 Section 9 (1) of the PVO Act of 1995. 
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certificates, and a detailed work plan for the next three years.
839
 The Registrar may demand 
additional information as he may deem necessary.
840
 Once an application for registration has 
been lodged with the Registrar of PVOs, the PVO in question, at its own cost, has to publish a 
notice as prescribed by the PVO Act in the national newspapers, calling for any objections to 
be lodged with the Registrar of PVOs within 21 days.
841
 Any person may within the 
prescribed period lodge an objection to the grant of the application with the Registrar, and the 
Registrar must submit such objection to the PVOB.
842
 The applicant has to submit proof to the 
Registrar that such notice has been published.
843
 Registration papers are lodged with the 
Registrar of PVOs, who is also the Director of Social Welfare in the Ministry of Labour and 
Social Affairs, who thereafter, submits the application to the PVOB. 
844
 
 Ethiopia requires all charities and societies to register.
845
 An organisation must apply for 
registration within three months of its formation.
846
 Failure to register within the prescribed 
period is a ground for dissolution of the organisation.
847
 Unlike Zimbabwe, registration 
requirements are less onerous.  An application for registration requires particulars including; 
goals, objectives and activities as per the form, a copy of the rules of the organisation, and 
such information as the Agency may require.
848
 A registration fee must be paid upon 
application.
849
 The CSP does not prohibit participation in activities that include the 
advancement of human and democratic rights, but places restrictions on NGOs that receive 
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840
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 Section 65(4) of the Proclamation for the Registration of Charities and Societies No 621 of 2009. 
848
 Section 68 (3) of the Proclamation for the Registration and Regulation of Charities and Societies No 621 of 
2009. 
849
 Section 68 (5) of the Proclamation for the Registration and Regulation of Charities and Societies No 621 of 
2009. 
850
Section 2 (3) and Section 14 of the Proclamation for the Registration and Regulation of Charities and Societies 
No 621 of 2009. 
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In Kenya, registration of NGOs is mandatory.
851
 It is illegal for any person to operate an NGO 
without registration and a certificate.
852
 Persons convicted of this offence face stiff penalties 
including paying a fine or imprisonment and being disqualified from holding office in any 
NGO for ten years.
853
 The registration of NGOs is governed by the NGO Act,
854
 the Statute 
Law Miscellaneous (Amendments) Act No 12 of 1991, and the NGO Coordination 
Regulations, 1992.  An organisation seeking registration from the NGO Coordination Board 
has to seek approval of its name, and once approved, the organisation has thirty days to file its 
application.
855
 The registration requirements are burdensome.  An application for registration 
must be submitted to the Executive Director of the Bureau in a prescribed form.
856
 
Registration requirements  include;  minutes of the meeting authorising  the application to be 
filed, two copies of the constitution, five copies of a letter from the sponsor, two current 
photographs of the applicant endorsed by the sponsor or referee, personal details of three of 
the NGO officers, notification of the registered office and postal address of the proposed 
organisation, sectors of proposed operations, the districts, divisions and locations of proposed 
activities, proposed average annual budget, duration of activities, all sources of funding, 
national and international affiliations and, such information as the Board may require.
857
An 




Like Kenya, it is a mandatory requirement for NGOs to register in order to operate in 
Malawi.
859
 The registration process is lengthy.  An NGO seeking to register must have a 
minimum of two of its directors or trustees as citizens of Malawi. 
860
 An application for 
registration must be in a prescribed form accompanied by: a certified copy of its constitution, 
registration fees as prescribed by the Board, a plan of action of its activities, a Memorandum 
of Understanding from the line Ministry, proof that the NGO is a member of CONGOMA, a 
                                                          
851
 Section 10(1) of the NGO Coordination Act No 19 of 1990; Section 6(1) and Section 7(a) of the PBO Act No 
18 of 2013. 
852
 Section 22 of the NGO Coordination Act No 19 of 1990; See Section 7 of the PBO Act No 18 of 2013 
provides that ‘No organization shall purport to be a public benefit organization unless that organization is 
registered under the Act’. 
853
 Section 22 (2) and (3) provide for a fine not exceeding fifty thousand shillings ($ 500) or, imprisonment of 
eighteen months or both.    
854
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855
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856
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858
 See Section 10 (3) of the NGO Act, 1990. See Section 8 of the PBO Act, details the requirements for an 
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of the organization, postal and physical address, the prescribed fee and other particulars as may be required’. 
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 Section 20 (1) of the Malawi NGO Act of 2000. 
860
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statement that the NGO shall not engage in partisan politics including electioneering and 
politics and, the source of its funding.
861
 The prescribed form must bear the following 
particulars: the name of the NGO, physical and postal address, contact details, full details of 
Trustees or Directors, contact details of auditors acceptable to the Board and, audited 
accounts, annual financial statements and annual report in respect of existing organisations.
862
 
 There are three registration avenues.  An applicant has to secure approval from the parent 
Ministry;   proof of membership of CONGOMA, before submitting an application to the NGO 
Board of Malawi.  These are onerous requirements. 
In South Africa, registration of NPOs is voluntary and no prior state authorisation is required 
for an organisation to operate legally.
863
 An NPO seeking to register under the NPO Act must 
have a constitution which provides for all matters relevant to conducting its affairs.
864
 The 
applicant organisation is required to fulfil minimal requirements: a prescribed form which is 
properly completed two copies of its constitution and such other information as may be 
required to assist the Director to determine whether the NPO meets the requirements for 
registration. 
865
   
Like South Africa, Namibia encourages voluntary registration for NGOs.
866
 Namibia has 
minimal requirements for registration.  The process of incorporation necessitates filing a 
memorandum of association.  For a section 21 company, registration would require the 
following: the constitution of the organisation, a membership list, or a list of its board of 
directors or trustees, the last financial and annual report, an organisational structure, staffing, 
services provided, and an indication of its partnership potential.
867
  
Unlike Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi and Zimbabwe which require mandatory registration, South 
Africa and Namibia provide for voluntary registration.  Zimbabwe, Kenya and Malawi have 
onerous registration requirements while Ethiopia is less burdensome.  South Africa and 
Namibia have minimal requirements for registration making it easier to register NGOs to 
operate.  Whereas Ethiopia, Malawi, Zimbabwe, and, until recently, Kenya impose 
                                                          
861
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862
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863
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864
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865
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866
See 3.2 of the Civic Organizations Partnership Policy, 2005, available at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/CPSI29465/UNPANO.pdf   [accessed 23 October 2012].  
867
 Section 4.2.3 of the Civic Organizations Partnership Policy, 2005. 
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restrictions on NGOs that engage in human rights and advocacy activities, both South Africa 
and Namibia encourage civic participation including human rights and democracy activities.  
6. 4.  CONCLUSION 
 
This comparative review has examined the regulatory regime in six countries (Kenya, 
Zimbabwe, South Africa, Malawi, Namibia, and Ethiopia), with particular reference to 
existing models (state-led, state-NGO-led, and self-regulation).   
The survey shows that the legislative process in a state-led model is non-participatory.  For 
instance, in Ethiopia and Zimbabwe, NGO participation in the legislative process was very 
minimal.  In contrast with the state-NGO–led model, there was more participation of NGOs in 
the enactment of the NGO Acts of Kenya and Malawi.  For example, in Kenya, consultation 
of NGOs in making the law led to amendments to the NGO Act to accommodate the NGO 
demands.  The highest levels of NGO participation were exhibited with self–regulation.  In 
particular, South Africa and Namibia encouraged the highest levels of civic participation and 
respect for civil society space.   
The reasons for enacting the NGO law also vary.  Whereas the purpose of the PVO Act in 
Zimbabwe and the CSP in Ethiopia is to regulate NGOs; the NGO Acts of Kenya and Malawi 
seek to coordinate NGOs, while the NPO Act of South Africa and the Civic Organisations 
Partnership Policy of Namibia, and have a goal of enhancing the environment for civic 
participation and partnership.  
Relatedly, the appointment process of the regulatory body in a state-led model is less 
inclusive.  For example, the appointment of the Charities and Societies Agency in Ethiopia 
and, to a lesser degree, the PVOB in Zimbabwe, was the exclusive domain of the state.  
Kenya and Malawi allowed considerable NGO involvement in the appointment of the NGO 
Coordination Board and the NGO Board of Malawi respectively.  South Africa, on the other 
hand, allowed public involvement in the appointment of the NPO Directorate.  The 
appointment process was, therefore, most transparent and accountable in a self-regulatory 
model, less transparent in a state-NGO-led, and, least, in a state-led model.  
Considering the powers of the regulatory body, the powers of the NGO Board are more 
controlling and restrictive of civil society space in a state-led model.  For example, the PVOB 
in Zimbabwe and the Charities and Societies Agency in Ethiopia have wide discretionary 
powers which may be subject to abuse and arbitrary decision making.  The powers of both 
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boards are not subject to judicial review.  The NGO Boards of Kenya and Malawi have wide 
discretionary powers but their discretion is subject to judicial review.  The Directorate in 
South Africa, despite having discretionary power, is subject to administrative review to 
reduce bureaucratic discretion, as well as being prone to judicial review of its decisions.  
Finally, registration requirements are more onerous in both the state-led and state-NGO-led 
regulatory models.  For example, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, and Zimbabwe require mandatory 
registration.  Stiff penalties are imposed in case of failure to register in Zimbabwe and Kenya.  
Although the registration requirements are less burdensome in Ethiopia compared to Malawi 
and Kenya, restrictions on NGOs that engage in human and democratic rights are imposed in 
Ethiopia and Malawi.  South Africa and Namibia, on their part, encourage voluntary 
registration.  Both countries have minimal requirements for registration, arguably making it 
more inclusive, participatory, and more enabling.  
This thesis therefore argues that each regulatory model has particular relevance to the political 
context in that country.  Where governments are fragile and less democratic (Ethiopia, 
Zimbabwe), the regulatory framework of NGOs is state-led, more controlling, and restrictive 
of civil society space.  In countries which are relatively more democratic (Kenya, Malawi),  
the regulatory framework is state-NGO led, NGO laws are less controlling and subject to 
judicial oversight.  In constitutional democracies (South Africa, Namibia), the regulatory 
regime is more inclusive, accountable, more participatory, and self-regulation is more 
apparent.  Mindful of these findings, Chapter 7 discusses the regulatory framework governing 
NGOs in Uganda.  Does it guarantee the democratic space for active civic participation?   





THE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK GOVERNING NGOs AND 
ITS IMPACT ON NGO SUSTAINABILITY IN UGANDA 
 
7. 0. INTRODUCTION 
 
The struggle for independence in Uganda is largely attributed to the efforts of pro-democracy 
forces: trade unions, cooperatives, political parties, and youth groups.
868
 Though credited for 
this historic achievement, civil society in Uganda has been the subject of state regulation 
during most of Uganda’s political history: through constitutional restrictions, administrative 
sanctions, judicial, policy, and legal barriers.  NGOs, which are a dominant feature of civil 
society and are mainly a product of the pro-democratic reforms of the late 1980s onward, 
have had to face the brunt of these restrictions.
869
 
In Chapter Six, a comparative review of the regulatory framework of NGOs in six selected 
African countries in sub-Saharan Africa (Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Namibia, South Africa, 
and Zimbabwe) demonstrated a strong link between democracy, associational space, and the 
regulatory regime for NGOs.
870
 Where democratic space is constrained, state regulation is 
invariably the dominant regulatory framework, and the freedom for NGOs to operate is 
likewise restricted.
871
   
This Chapter seeks to answer two basic questions: first, how has the regulatory regime 
affected the democratic spaces available for active citizen participation during the pre-and 
post-independence period in Uganda? Secondly, how has this affected the contribution of 
NGOs to the democratic process? The objective is to advance an argument for a more 
enabling regulatory framework that would promote active citizen participation in Uganda.   
                                                          
868
 Bazaara op cit note 38 at 3.   
869
 Chapter 2 (section 2.4).   See also Nyangabyaki Bazaara Contemporary Civil Society and the Democratization 
Process in Uganda: A Preliminary Exploration, Kampala: Centre for Basic Research, Working Paper No. 54, 
2000, 2. See Akiiki B Mujaju, Civil Society in Uganda (Paper presented at a Conference on ‘Civil Society Issues 
in Eastern Africa’ organized by the Centre for Basic Research held at the Fairway Hotel, Kampala, 12-14 
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In order to analyse the impact of the regulatory model on civic participation and NGO space 
in Uganda, the chapter begins by reviewing the theory of democracy and the concept of civic 
participation.  It then follows this with an historical analysis of the legal and policy 
framework for the regulation of NGOs in Uganda.  The chapter will then examine the current 
NGO regulatory regime, and by way of conclusion draw lessons about the regulatory 
framework and its impact on NGO sustainability, and the theory of participatory democracy. 
7.1  DEMOCRACY AND CIVIC PARTICIPATION 
 
Few subjects raise as much controversy and debate as the notion of democracy in Africa.  To 
some legal analysts, democracy is about the right to stand, be elected and to elect their 
leaders, and ultimately the right to organize and assemble.
872
 This creates the impression that 
the notion of democracy is all about a peaceful change of leadership and the holding of 
regular elections.
873
 Indeed, Ddungu has argued that in Uganda the dominant view among 
advocates of multi-party democracy is that of liberal democracy, given that democracy is 
often equated with the existence of a multi-party system.
874
 
Whereas it is undisputed that holding free and fair elections is important to a democracy, what 
then is the value of active citizen groups in a democracy, if the focus is primarily on elections 
and political parties? Are they important in the decision-making process? Central to the 
concept of democracy is the idea of civic participation and the right to organise.  When 
individuals organise they form associations to have their voices heard, make decisions, and 
hold their leaders accountable.  But no other right creates so much consternation and fear 
among those that govern in Uganda than the right to organise.   Successive regimes in Uganda 
have sought to proscribe the right to organise, and yet without its express recognition and 
implementation no political system can be considered to be democratic in its broadest 
sense.
875
 From the pre-colonial period up to the current National Resistance Movement 
(NRM) government, the right to organise has been under threat.  For instance, opposition 
political parties were declared ‘proscribed assemblies’ in Uganda by Milton Obote in 1969.
876
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 Bazaara op cit note 183 at 5.  
873
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 Ddungu op cit note 185 at 368.   
875
 Joe Oloka Onyango Governance, State Structures, and Constitutionalism in Contemporary Uganda, 
Kampala: Centre for Basic Research Working Paper No. 52/1993, 1993, 31.   
876
 In 1967 Obote abrogated the 1962 independence Constitution, and following an attempted assassination of 
Obote in 1969, he banned opposition political parties except the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) effectively 
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Idi Amin banned political parties in 1971.
877
 Museveni suspended the operation of parties in 
1986, thereby limiting the right of an individual to organise.
878
 It would be presumptuous 
therefore to talk of democracy without affording the people the right to organise and 
participate in the decision-making process.  
 Mamdani argues that when President Museveni restricted political parties from operating and 
introduced the Resistance Council system, later renamed Local Councils (LCs), he asserted 
that this was ‘popular democracy’ and that Ugandans had a right to participate in 
governance.
879
  This is, in my view, a classic example, of the right to associate being 
mistakenly interpreted as a right of participation.
880
 Inherent in the right to organise is the 
freedom of choice.  Every one under the NRM system had to belong to an LC without any 
other political choice.
881 
Although LCs effectively replaced the unelected colonial chiefs who 
were unaccountable, these too, were simply ‘watchdogs’ in that they were only used to 
legitimise a state structure that denied the individual the right to organise.
882
  As is the case in 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
making Uganda a one-party state.  See J Oloka- Onyango, Judicial Power and Constitutionalism in Uganda 
Kampala, Centre for Basic Research, 1993, 26.   
877
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Democracy in Uganda’, (1998) 9, 2   Journal of Democracy, 61.   
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a multi-party democracy, the no-party democracy embodies a strong notion of representation 
but a weak sense of participation.
883
 
  At a minimum, democracy should have a strong element of participation, one where citizens 
share decision making powers at every level of governance; participation that is empowering 
and has the effect of transforming individuals from subjects into citizens.
884
 Both participation 
and the active involvement of the citizenry in voluntary associations free from state 
interference lie at the core of democratic governance.  Democracy, therefore, goes beyond 
representation and confirms the right to participate.
885
 Not only does this right to participation 
improve performance but it also promotes critical consciousness and decision-making as a 




As Mamdani rightly observes, democracy has not only representative but participatory aspects 
as well.
887
 In a democracy, NGOs are given space to organise and to hold the state 
accountable for any abuses that occur.
888
 There is less reprisal, intimidation, and name-calling 
for those who express dissent.  Constructive criticism is allowed.  In a participatory 
democracy, NGOs are autonomous, internally democratic, and accountable to their 
membership and beneficiaries.
889
 NGOs provide the necessary checks and balances against 
the state.  Unlike states that choose to ignore the demands of the electorate, in a democracy, 
the ‘rights and the interests of the community’ are similar to those of the state, and therefore 
the state is responsive to these demands and stands to lose the vote should it fail to take 
corrective action when they have been violated.
890
 The regulatory regime in this democratic 
model provides opportunities for the growth of civic associations, providing space, motivation 
and better linkages with state actors.  On this basis the discussion can now turn to an 
examination of the legal and policy regime for NGOs during Uganda’s constitutional and 
political history.  Did it provide democratic spaces for effective civic action? 
                                                          
883
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7.2. NGOs IN UGANDA: THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK 
 
7.2.1. The Pre-colonial Period 
 
Little can be said of associational life during Uganda’s pre-colonial period.  Not only was 
society preoccupied with survival but both the predominantly Nilotic communities of the 
north and the Bantu of the south lived different lifestyles.  While the Luo speaking north, with 
the exception of the Karimojong who were pastoralists, others were mainly hunters and 
gatherers; the Bantu, mainly Baganda in the central region, the Banyankore and Banyoro in 
the western part were agriculturalists.
891
  
 As noted in chapter 2, the Bantu who organised themselves around Kingdoms, mainly 
Ankole, Buganda, Bunyoro, and Toro, had similar practices characterised by authoritarian 
rule with limited democratic spaces for meaningful self-expression.
 892
 For example, within 
Buganda, it was the Bataka (clan heads) and the Lukiiko who provided some check on the 
king.  Within these kingdoms the use of myths, tradition, customs, and rituals symbolised 
everyday life.
893




Among the communities of the north, society was more segmented.  Due to frequent 
movements in search of water and grass for their animals, there was more room for different 
tribes to make independent choices.
895
 
Whereas it can be argued that voluntary groups did exist during the pre-colonial period in the 
form of ‘self-help groups, co-operative production, distribution, consumption, and 
accumulation organised around communal or kinship ties’, there is little evidence to show any 
active citizen engagement with those in authority.
896
 Given the patriarchal form of leadership, 
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one cannot talk of meaningful democratic spaces in existence allowing organised forms of 
expression.  Society was governed on the principle of deference and fear.  It is argued that in 
such societies that were based on narrow class structures, ‘competition was intense, intrigue 
was prevalent, and ruthless-seeking was the norm of political behaviour’.
897
 
Although Bazaara concurs with Gariyo that associational life did exist in pre-colonial Uganda, 
the nature of associational life was so rudimentary that no meaningful citizen participation 
was allowed.
898
 Thus no form of regulation was needed.  The myths, traditions, customs, and 
rituals at the time dictated the nature of ‘state’ responses to any form of dissent.     
7.2.2. The Colonial Period (1894 to 1945) 
 
There is little evidence of associational life in Uganda before the 1920s.  Most groups that 
existed before this period were in the form of self-help groups reflective of the character of 
the colonial state.  Broad agreement seems to have emerged that active citizen participation 
was not possible under colonial rule due to the undemocratic nature of the colonial 
government.
899
 The colonial state carried over the phenomenon of the chief who, though 
unelected and unaccountable to the citizens, wielded executive, legislative, and administrative 
powers.
900
 This ‘indirect rule’, it is argued, had the effect of killing the soul of the community, 
destroying its associational life, bastardising its traditional structures of authority and 
replacing them with a new realm of chieftaincies that expropriated and subverted traditional 
administrative structures and consensual orientations.
901
 Although it is a fact that colonial rule 
was autocratic, it is misleading to argue that pre-colonial rule was consultative and therefore 
any better.   
There was little in terms of citizen participation during this period.  Associational life during 
this period was charity-oriented; designed to mobilise people towards self-help and a less 
demanding state of accountability.  For example, the establishment of educational and health 
institutions in the form of non-governmental hospitals to treat the sick and mission schools to 
promote education, dominates much of citizen action.  The colonial state encouraged the 
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Church Missionary Society (CMS) to establish hospitals such as Mengo Mission Hospital and 
schools such as Kings College, Budo (1906), Gayaza High School (1905), Busoga College 
Mwiri (1911), and Mbarara High School (1911).
902
  Under the Church of Uganda Social 
Services organisation founded in 1877, a number of agencies such as Sanyu Babies Home 
(1929), the Mothers Union (1908), the Boys Brigade (1933), Uganda Boy Scouts Association 
(1915) and Uganda Girl Guides Association (1914) were established.
903
 Much of the 
voluntary action was in the form of humanitarian and missionary work which had little to do 
with political activity.  It was colonial policy to encourage humanitarian activity and to 
exclude the people from any actions involving the exercise of state power.
904
  
The legal and policy framework reflected a similar attitude.  The Buganda (1900), Toro 
(1900), Ankole (1901) and Bunyoro (1933) Agreements, and the 1901 Order-in-Council that 
brought Uganda under colonial rule did not reflect the interests of the people.  Instead, they 
were concerned with the interests of the British Crown.
905
 The emphasis was on law and 
order, and collecting taxes, symbolising law-governed behaviour as the norm.
906
   
Things began to change around the 1920s when for the first time there was citizen 
engagement of the colonial state and the creation of moderate spaces for dissent began to be 
tolerated.  This was sparked off by a new generation of youth that had benefited from colonial 
education, and who had become of age.
907
 More politically conscious, they had become aware 
of the social injustices that existed at the time.  Alongside these groups were chiefs and clerks, 
who in search of privileges were determined to resist the controlling nature of the colonial 
administration and to protest against social injustices that had resulted in the re-distribution of 
land under various colonial agreements. 
908
 The first organised form of dissent was the Young 
Bataka Association in 1920, followed by associations of urban workers and peasants.
909
 This 
was followed by the Young Basoga Association (1922) and then the Young Men of Toro 
(1922), who protested against excessive rents charged by landowners against tenants and 
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against high taxes imposed by the colonial administration.
910
 This turn of events marked the 
birth of active associational life for the first time in Uganda’s political history, which through 
advocacy and lobbying agitated for reform of the colonial system.
911
 As Nsibambi argues, 
civil society at this time would best be categorised as ‘more of an ensemble of free 
associations with the political and organisational capacities to co-ordinate their activities and 




This birth of civic associations and the loosening of democratic spaces were not by accident.  
It was a response by the colonial state to the agitation of these organizations that forced the 
British to open up space.
913
 The colonial state reacted to the danger of restricting political 
space in a situation where it sought to encourage production, increase taxes, and promote 
community development in the colonies.
914
 This change of approach is reflected in the legal 
and policy framework that encouraged charity work as well as the activities of civic 
associations at the time.  For example, the enactment of the 1928 Busulu and Envujjo law that 
placed a ceiling on the amount of rent a landlord could charge a tenant; and the Colonial 
Development and Welfare Act 1929 that encouraged the formation of voluntary organisations 
through which Africans could voice dissent.
915
  Prior to 1929, British colonial policy had 
given less thought to ways of promoting the welfare of colonial peoples and more particularly 
to how and when the local peoples were to be brought in for consultation.
916
  
The Colonial Development and Welfare Act 1929 was an attempt by the colonial government 
to increase expenditures in social services in the colonies but did not go far enough.
917
 The 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act 1940, which was passed following the 
recommendations of the Moyne Commission report, marked a major shift in colonial policy 
that saw the beginning of a new social and political movement that culminated in the 
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formation of trade unions, civic associations, and political parties.
918
 And as Basdeo notes, the 
Moyne Report marked a turning point in colonial attitudes.
919
 The Colonial Development and 
Welfare Act 1940 allowed individuals to form associations within the control of the state 
through which they would express their grievances, a measure that could thwart their 
involvement in politics.
920
 Though Kevin Singh argues that these welfare efforts were merely 
‘palliative given the circumstances’, this thesis argues that the 1940 Act was a major 
breakthrough in stimulating civic action.
921
 
7.2.3. The Pre-Independence Period (1945 to 1962) 
 
Notwithstanding the limited spaces available for citizen participation, the 1940s heralded the 
beginning of what was to emerge as a vibrant civil society characterised by the dynamic 
growth of popular organisations and civic associations more than at any time during colonial 
rule in Uganda.  The period was characterised by major protests and uprisings spearheaded by 
trade unions, youth associations, and co-operatives during this period but considerable civil 
society activism as well.  For example, the number of civic associations registered grew; in 
support of the view that with the opening of associational spaces, citizen participation 
grows.
922
 As the end of the Second World War drew close, the demand for self-determination 
and the right to association intensified.  In the wake of this democratic transition came the 
demand for independence, freedom, and democracy.  Described as the ‘first wind of change’, 
the decolonisation process brought with it widespread aspirations for freedom that were 
engineered by a powerful nationalist movement.  Given this new wind of change the colonial 
powers opted to cede more space which as history shows brought with it the exercise of multi-
party politics for the first time in Uganda’s history.
923
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921
 Singh Kevin ‘Race and Class Struggles in a Colonial State (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1994) 190. 
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the Democratic Party (DP in 1956); the Progressive Party (1957); Uganda Peoples’ Union (1958) which merged 
with UNC to form Uganda People’s Congress (1960).  The UPC allied with Kabaka Yekka (KY) in the April, 
1962 general elections to form the first independence government in 1962.   
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But this freedom for civic associations and popular organisations to operate was not without 
restrictions.  The colonial state limited the autonomy of social movements through a system of 
state regulation of civic associations and popular organisations.
924
 With registration the 
colonial state had more options, to choose whom to register and to reject. 
925
 Initially, the state 
had suppressed the uprisings of peasants and workers’ strikes but realised that it was better off 
with state regulation since registration could confer rights to and duties on an organisation at 
the whim of the state.  To achieve this goal the colonial state established the National Council 
of Voluntary Social Services in 1953 (NCVSS) to co-ordinate and monitor the activities of 
non-profit organisations.
926
 It has been argued that among the objectives of the NCVSS was to 
monitor that government subsidies were not used for political purposes, more so against the 
colonial state.
927
 A series of enactments constrained the rights to freedom of association and 
assembly.  For example, Section 54 (2) (ii) of the Penal Code Ordinance of 1951 gave power 
to the Governor to issue an Order- in Council declaring a society as ‘unlawful and dangerous’ 
to the good government of Uganda.
928
 
7.2.4. The Independence and Post-Independence Period (1962 to 1986) 
 
If citizen participation was symbolic during the colonial period, it was largely non-existent 
before the 1980’s.  Not only did the post-colonial state control popular associations but it 
stifled any emerging institutions of civil society.
929
 The freedom for non-profit organisations 
to function was completely eroded when Prime Minister Obote abrogated the 1962 
Constitution and replaced it with the 1966 interim constitution, dubbed the ‘pigeon-hole’ 
constitution; and subsequently replaced it with the 1967 republican constitution.
930
 Following 
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an attempted assassination in 1969, Obote outlawed opposition parties and by default made 
Uganda a one-party state, an act which increased his powers and made popular participation 
virtually impossible.
931
 Using the 1967 Constitution to restrict the freedoms to expression, 
association, and assembly, Obote expanded the scope of limitations and enacted additional 
legislation that put more barriers on the freedom of organisations to operate.  For example, 
Article 18 of the 1967 Constitution not only replicated Article 26 (2) of the 1962 Constitution 
but it expanded the scope of limitations to include ‘persons  detained or whose  movement is 
restricted or where necessary for the regulation of industrial labour disputes, proper 
management of trade unions, co-operatives or associations’.
932
  
Beyond the restrictive constitutional framework were a number of laws that closed what had 
remained of the associational space.  Most notorious of these was the Public Order and 
Security Act of 1967 under which a person could be detained without trial.
933
 The Penal 
(Unlawful Societies) Order No. 2 of 1969
934
 re-enacted Section 54(2) of the 1951 Penal Code 
Ordinance of 1951, declaring organisations and political parties unlawful.  Section 54(2) (b) 
revised Section 54(1) of the 1951 Penal Code to bring the number of persons who could 
constitute an ‘unlawful society’ down from ten to two.  At the time Obote was overthrown by 
Idi Amin in 1971, there were more than 50 political prisoners in detention without trial.
935
 If 
the colonial state emasculated the individual’s right to participate in decision-making, Obote’s 
regime liquidated it.  Without democracy, democratic spaces closed and civic participation 
became anathema.   
Like its predecessor, Amin’s dictatorship proscribed all forms of political activity.   Amin 
issued Legal Notice No.1 of 1971 that suspended several sections of the 1967 Constitution.  In 
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1977, he issued a decree that created the National Council of Women with the objective of 
controlling all women’s organisations in Uganda.
936
  
7.3. NGOs IN UGANDA: RELEVANCE, GROWTH AND 
LEGITIMACY  
 
7.3.1. Theoretical and Constitutional Framework 
 
The 1980s in Uganda were characterised by a re-opening of democratic space following the 
overthrow of Amin in 1979.
 937
 A resurgence of active citizen participation in the form of self-
help groups and NGOs took place particularly with the ascendancy of the National Resistance 
Movement (NRM) government to power in 1986.  The NRM spearheaded the writing of the 
1995 Constitution, which was promulgated on 9 October, 1995.  The Constitution provides a 
broad framework for citizen participation and respect for human rights.   
Chapter 4 of the Constitution provides for a bill of rights.  Article 29(1) (e) of the Constitution 
provides, that ‘every person shall have a right to ‘freedom of association which shall include, 
freedom to form and join associations, including trade unions and political and other civic 
organisations’.  Article 38(2) provides that ‘every Ugandan has a right to participate in 
peaceful activities to influence the policies of government through civic organisations’.  These 
rights are not absolute, but are subject to limitations.  Thus, Article 43 (1) provides, ‘in the 
enjoyment of the rights and freedoms prescribed in this Chapter, no person shall prejudice the 
fundamental or other human rights and freedoms of others or the public interest’.  Article 
43(2) (c) further states that ‘public interest’ shall  not  permit, any limitation of the enjoyment 
of the rights and freedoms prescribed by this Chapter beyond what is acceptable and 
demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society.  .  .  ’.  Under the National 
Objectives and Directive Principles of State Policy, Directive Principle V (ii), it is provided 
that ‘the state shall guarantee and respect the independence of non-governmental 
organisations which protect and promote human rights’.  In addition, Directive Principle II 
                                                          
936
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(vii), states that ‘civic organisations shall retain their autonomy in pursuit of their declared 
objectives’. 
The regulatory framework governing NGOs comprises of: the Non-Governmental 
Organisations Registration Act of 1989 (NGO Act), 
938
the Non-Governmental Organisations 
Registration (Amendment) Act of 2006, the Non-Governmental Registration Regulations, 
2009, and the National NGO Policy 2010.  At the Local Government level, districts are 
mandated to monitor and coordinate the work of NGOs under the Local Governments Act of 
1997.
939
 The NGO Registration (Amendment) Act, 2006 confers legal personality on any 
organisation that is registered under it.
940
 Before the amendment, for such organisation to 
acquire legal personality, it must register as a company under the Companies Act of 1961
941
or 
the Trustees Incorporation Act of 1939.
942
 
 But what does the right to freedom of association mean under Uganda’s Constitution? What 
are the permissible limitations to the enjoyment of this right?  Uganda ratified the ICCPR and 
is party to the ACHPR.
943
 The Constitution of Uganda, 1995 is the supreme law but it has to 
be interpreted in accordance with Uganda’s treaty obligations.  
 The Constitutional Court of Uganda has addressed itself to this issue in a number of cases.  
For example, in Dr. Sam Lyomoki & Ors v The Attorney General,
 944
  the petitioners brought a 
petition under Article 137 of the Constitution and the Rules of the Constitutional Court 
(Petitions for Declarations under Article 137 of the Constitution) Directions seeking 
declarations among others, ‘that Section 6(3) of the Trade Union Act, 1976 which establishes 
the National Organisation of Trade Unions (Uganda) was, inconsistent with, and contravenes 
article 29 (1) (e) of the Constitution which provides for the right to freedom of association, 
including trade unions and political and other civic organisations. The Constitutional Court 
observed that the Constitution did not define what the expression ‘freedom of association’ 
means, however, relying on the Privy Council decision in Collymore v. Attorney General,
 945
 
the court held, that ‘freedom of association’ means the right of a person to enter into 
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consensual arrangements to promote a common interest or objects of the association, it does 
not authorise any acts that are a threat to peace, order and good governance of the country 
Does the right to freedom of association permit any limitations that are inconsistent with 
Article 43(1) of Uganda’s Constitution? The Supreme Court in Onyango Obbo and Another v 
Attorney General,
946
  held that ‘any law that limits the enjoyment of the right would be in 
violation of the Constitution’, and as  it was observed in chapter 5, derogations are only 
permissible where such interference is prescribed by law, in the interests of a legitimate 
government aim, and necessary in a democratic society.
947
Similarly, in Paul K Ssemogerere, 
Olum and Kafire v Attorney General, the Supreme Court held that all laws, rules or 
regulations or decisions of any authority in conflict with Article 43(2)(c) are 
unconstitutional.
948
 Within this constitutional and legal framework, Uganda has witnessed the 
emergence and growth of NGOs. 
7.3.2. The Growth and Legitimacy of NGOs in Uganda 
 
NGOs in Uganda embrace a broad range, differing in scale and character.  Their activities also 
vary, ranging from agriculture, health care, education, and environment conservation, women 
in development, poverty reduction, research, training and human rights.
949
 Since 1986, 
Uganda has experienced a phenomenal increase in the number of NGOs as shown in the Table 
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Table 1:NGO Growth in Uganda (1986-2013)
 950
 
Year Number of NGOs 
Registered 
1986- 1990 21 
1990- 1996 1, 000 
1996- 2000 3, 500 
2000- 2005 5, 200 
2005- 2012 10, 000 
2013 10, 336 
            (Source: DENIVA and TROCAIRE Report ‘Survey on the value of CSOs contribution 
to National Development in Uganda’, June 2012)  5.  
As can be seen from Table 1 above, there has been a dramatic increase in the number of 
NGOs registered since 2005.   
Unlike charity and development-oriented NGOs, indigenous human rights NGOs are a more 
recent phenomenon.  Until 1985, when the very first human rights organisation, the Uganda 
Human Rights Activists (UHRA) established by Ugandan exiles in Sweden was relocated to 
Uganda, reporting on human rights in Uganda was mainly a pre-occupation of Ugandan exiles 
in Europe and the United States.
951
 For example, during Amin’s regime, the Human Rights 
Group, Action Group and Uganda Freedom Union led the campaign against human rights 
abuses perpetrated by Idi Amin’s regime.
952
 Established in Kampala in 1985 with a mission to 
monitor the human rights situation, expose human rights abuses and hold the state 
accountable to its human rights record, UHRA was very outspoken in the early years of the 
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 UHRA published a quarterly magazine, The Activist which documented 
human rights abuses particularly torture, extra-judicial executions, arbitrary arrests and 
detention without trial perpetrated by the Museveni regime.  Until 1987 when the Secretary 
General of UHRA was arrested for purportedly inciting people against the NRM government, 
the group periodically issued human rights reports that criticised the government’s human 
rights record in the northern part of Uganda.
954
  
The imprisonment of the human rights defender had a negative effect on human rights and 
democracy advocacy work in Uganda.  It was not until a decade later in 1998 that a domestic 
human rights organisation, the Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI), released 
another human rights report on Uganda.  Between 1987 and 1998, human rights reports were 
regularly issued by Amnesty International, a global human rights advocacy group.
955
 
The Association of Women Lawyers (FIDA-U), that had been established as early as 1974 but 
had remained inactive, was revived to promote the rights of women.
956
 FIDA-U inaugurated 
its first legal aid clinic in 1988.  The group had as its primary objective the empowerment of 
women with legal rights and the provision of legal aid to indigent women and children.  The 
Uganda Law Society (ULS), a professional association of lawyers established under the 
Uganda Law Society Act, 1956, which had been dormant due to the excesses of Idi Amin was 
later revived as an advocacy group to provide legal aid and monitor human rights violations in 
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 The three premier human rights groups broadly took on an empowerment, 
advocacy and watchdog role.   
Until 1989, when the Non-Governmental Organisations Registration Statute 1989, was 
enacted, there was no legislation to govern the activities of NGOs.
958
 It would appear that 
other than political parties whose activities had been restricted, the NRM government had not 
envisaged the emergence of human rights NGOs.  Notwithstanding policy declarations to the 
contrary, what the state preferred most were NGOs that provide services such as, legal aid, 
health, and education.
 959
 As gap-filling NGOs they would be apolitical and, focused on 
service provision, thereby buttressing the legitimacy of the regime.  Gap-filling NGOs would 
not be catalysts for the development of a democratic society, a trend that the advocacy NGOs 
were perceived to have embarked on.   
At present there are over 20 NGOs of 10,000 plus organisations working in the field of human 
rights. Many more groups occasionally speak about human rights and democracy issues in 
Uganda too.
960
 The range of actions that these NGOs engage in include; legal education and 
empowerment, law reform, research and monitoring, co-ordination, and networking.   
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7.4. THE LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK: ENABLING 
OR CONTROLLING? 
 
The ascendancy of the NRM government to power in 1986 marked a turning point in the 
rebirth of NGOs in Uganda.  Not only did the NRM introduce democratic reforms but it put in 
place the 1995 Constitution which guaranteed the rights to association, expression, and 
assembly.
961
 Restrictions were placed on political pluralism, but the space for civil society 
was appreciably liberalised, and indeed NGO numbers rose.
962
 However, in 1989, the state 
enacted the Non-Governmental Organisations Registration Statute 1989.
963
  Was the 
legislative process participatory, and did it reflect the outcome? 
7.4.1. The Non-Governmental Organisations Registration Act 1989 
 
7.4.1.1. The Legislative Process 
 
Historically, efforts to enact a law to control voluntary organisations in Uganda began much 
earlier.  In 1985, a Bill entitled the ‘National Council of Voluntary Social Services 1985’ was 
tabled before Parliament.
964
 The Bill sought to compel social and voluntary organisations 
operating in Uganda to be registered with the National Council of Voluntary Social Services 
(NCVSS).
965
 NCVSS operated under the Ministry of Relief and Social Rehabilitation.  The 
NCVSS Bill did not become law due to the change of government in 1986.   
However in 1989, Government tabled the Non-Governmental Organisations Registration Bill, 
1989 (NGO Bill) which was enacted into law as the Non-Governmental Organisations 
Registration Act No 5 of 1989 (NGO Act).  The NGO Bill was drafted and tabled before 
Parliament by the Minister of Internal Affairs following discussion and adoption of a Cabinet 
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 The reasons given for the introduction of the bill were 
stated as follows: ‘to legalise, formalise, recognise and streamline NGOs’.
967
   
During the debate on the NGO bill and the subsequent amendment, the issue of participation 
of NGOs in decision-making on matters concerning their registration and operation was 
raised.  The principle of partnership and trust was ably argued by some members of 
Parliament in favour of including NGOs on the National Board of Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGO Board), the body established to register, guide and monitor NGOs in 
Uganda.  Although the government, while responding to questions on the floor of Parliament, 
recognised the involvement of NGOs as a healthy democratic process, the proposal for their 
representation on the NGO Board was dismissed on grounds that involving NGOs would 
hamper government policy and undermine the policy goal of directing and guiding them.
968
 
Consequently, section 4(2) of the NGO Act, now section 6(2) as amended excludes NGOs 
from membership of the NGO Board. 
969
Neither does the section make provision for any form 
of consultation of NGOs in the appointment process.  Instead, the section empowers the 
Minister of Internal Affairs to appoint thirteen members of the Board, three of whom are 
drawn from the public and the rest from selected government ministries including security 
officials, without consulting NGOs.
970
  
There is no evidence that NGOs participated in the formulation of the NGO Act of 1989, nor 
the Non-Governmental Organizations Regulations of 1990.
971
 Given that the NGO Act of 
1989 preceded the Uganda Constitution 1995, the procedure of making laws had not been laid 
out clearly, hence the absence of well laid out procedures for consulting the public.  However, 
since the adoption of the Constitution, the procedure has been provided.  Article 79(1) of the 
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Constitution mandates Parliament to make laws.  Under Article 91(1) of the Constitution, 
Parliament exercises this power through bills passed by parliament and assented to by the 
President.  In the discharge of this function, Parliament appoints Committees who have 
powers to discuss and make recommendations on all bills laid before Parliament.
972
 Following 
their Rules of Procedure, the Committees of Parliament have power to summon any person, 
including private individuals to summon or appear before them to give evidence.
973
 Therefore, 
unlike the state-driven process of enacting the NGO Act 1989, the amendment process 
attracted strong input from NGOs.
 974
 
Between 1999 and 2006, Government initiated a process to amend the NGO Registration Act 
1989. The Ministry of Internal Affairs like before, drafted a bill, the NGO Registration 
(Amendment) Bill, 2001 (NGO Bill, 2001).  NGOs were invited to make submissions on the 
bill before the Defence and Internal Affairs Committee of Parliament.  NGOs expressed their 
concerns in several meetings and memos to the Committee.
975
 Six concerns were raised 
before the Committee.  First, that Article (1) (e) of the NGO Bill had a narrow definition of an 
‘NGO’, and there was a risk that the state would curtail the work of NGOs in the areas of 
democracy, governance and human rights.
976
 Second, that Article (2) provided for unfettered 
administrative discretion to the NGO Board to impose conditions in the certificate of 
registration as they may think fit.
977
 Third, that Article 2(4) which prohibited the registration 
of NGOs whose objectives are ‘in contravention of the law’ was prescriptive.
978
 Fourth, that 
Article 2(5) which ‘criminalises’ an organisation which acts contrary to the conditions or 
directions specified in its annual permit or carries out any activity without a valid permit was 
inconsistent with the right to freedom of association provided in Article 29(1)(e) of the 
Constitution.
979
 Fifth, that Article 4(1) restricted membership to the NGO Board only to 
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 See Chapter 2 (section 2.1.2).  Section 1(d) of the NGO Act defines an ‘NGO’ to mean  an ‘organization 
which is a non-governmental organization established to provide voluntary services including religious, 
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Government appointees and left out NGOs was not inclusive and, did not constitute 
democratic representation.
980
 Sixth, that Article 9 that restricted the right of appeal of an 
organisation aggrieved by the decision of the board to the Minister of Internal Affairs, gave 
arbitrary power to the Minister, and limited the right to judicial review.
981
  
Notwithstanding these submissions and meetings with the Committee, without further 
consultations, the NGO Bill was passed on 7 April 2006, at a hasty parliamentary session 
without any meaningful consideration of the proposals.  The NGOs petitioned the President, 
who, without affording them a hearing, assented to the Act on 25 May 2006. 
982
 
The process of adopting the NGO Regulations 2009 was much similar.  The Ministry of 
Internal Affairs developed the regulations to facilitate the implementation of the NGO 
Registration (Amendment) Act, 2006 without the participation of NGOs.  NGOs petitioned 
the Minister of Internal Affairs expressing concerns over some provisions.
983
 Dissatisfaction 
was expressed against Regulation 5(1) that provides for burdensome registration 
requirements, and Regulation 13 that prohibits an organisation from carrying out any activity 
without giving seven days’ notice to the Local Councils and Resident District Commissioner; 
Regulation 17(3) that provides for involuntary dissolution of an NGO by the Board and, 
Regulation 19(1) that requires a self-regulatory body to register with the Board.
984
 A meeting 
of NGOs, the NGO Board, and the Minister was held on 15 January 2008 to consult on the 
regulations.  It was agreed that a Government- NGO Committee be set up to review the 
regulations.  Despite the input of NGOs in the joint committee, the regulations were adopted 
without any significant changes.
985
  
The adoption of the National Policy on NGOs (policy) was more participatory.  The Office of 
the Prime Minister initiated a process of developing the Policy in 2007.
986
 NGOs were invited 
to make submissions.  The views of the NGOs were considered in the final policy.  Among 
these was the acknowledgment by government of the role NGOs play in promoting public 
accountability, that a stronger NGO sector can contribute to a culture of civic inclusiveness 
and participation, that the NGO sector must be vibrant and accountable to promote citizen 














 Ibid, at 6-8. 
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transformation.  However, NGOs raised concerns on provisions in the policy that restrict 
NGOs from participating in politics, and the onerous requirements for registration.    
As it was noted in Chapter 6, where the views of NGOs were ignored like Zimbabwe and 
Ethiopia, the NGO Act was restrictive and controlling, just like the NGO Act of 1989 and 
2006, as well as the NGO Regulations of 2009.  And in cases where the legislative process 
was inclusive and participatory like South Africa, just like the process of adopting the NGO 
Policy 2010, the NGO framework is enabling.
987
 Mindful of the legislative process, how is the 
regulatory body constituted? What is the criterion for its appointment, membership, security 
of tenure and level of independence? 
7.4.1.2. The NGO Regulatory Mechanism 
 
The NGO Act 1989 establishes a National Board for NGOs (NGO Board) to register, monitor, 
regulate, and advise Government on NGOs.
988
 The NGO Board is composed of twelve 
members, appointed by the Minister of Internal Affairs, one from each of the following 
ministries: internal affairs, justice and constitutional affairs, lands and surveys, finance, 
planning and economic development, foreign affairs, local government, women in 
development, office of the Prime Minister, two from state security agencies and two members 
from the public.
989
 The two members from the public were appointed without any 
consultations with NGOs nor were they drawn from the NGO sector.  The Board has its 
secretariat located in the Ministry of Internal Affairs headed by a Secretary who is a public 
servant, appointed by the Minister.
990
 The NGO Board is state-controlled.  The members of 
the Board can be removed or substituted any time by the Minister for failure to perform their 
functions.
991
 Members are appointed for a term of three years, and are eligible for 
reappointment although the number of terms is not prescribed.
992
 Unlike the NGO 
Coordination Board of Kenya whose membership comprises of representatives of NGOs, the 
NGO Board is state-dominated.  No criterion is given for a person to be appointed to the NGO 
Board.  The next section examines the powers of the Board.  Are they controlling or enabling? 
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7.4.1.3. Powers of the NGO Board 
 
The NGO Board has broad discretionary powers.  The Board has power to accept or reject an 
application for registration of an NGO without giving any categorical reasons.
993
 The NGO 
Regulations set twenty-one days within which the Board has to notify an organisation of its 
decision to reject an application.
994
 The Act does not provide objective reasons on which an 
NGO application can be denied.  Decisions are subject to the discretion of the Board to accept 
or reject an application for registration.  Is the denial of registration based on false, inadequate 
information, or duplication of efforts? The answer lies only with the Board.  The NGO Act 
does not set a time- limit within which the district local government must consider an 
application for registration in case of a community based organisation (CBO).  Like the 
Board, the district local government can deny registration of a CBO without giving any 
reasons.  Using such powers, the Board has rejected several applications for registration of 
NGOs.  For example, the National Organisation for Youth in Development (NAYODE) was 
denied registration on grounds that it could unite and co-ordinate all youth organisations in 
the country against the state.
995
 The Pan African Movement was denied registration on 
grounds that it had political objectives.
996
 The NGO Forum had on several occasions had its 
application denied for fear of becoming a platform for opposition politics.
 997
 
If the Board rejects an application for registration, the applicant aggrieved by the decision 
may within one month of the date of notification of the decision appeal to the Minister who 
makes a final determination of the matter.
998
 No time limit is provided within which the 
Minister must hear the appeal neither does the Act make provision for an appeal against the 
decision of the Minister. However, under Article 42 of the 1995 Constitution, an aggrieved 
person may appeal to the High Court in respect of any administrative decision taken against 
him or her. 
If the Board accepts an application for registration, it issues a certificate of registration in 
Form B or a permit in Form C of the schedule of the NGO Regulations 2009, subject to such 
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conditions as it deems fit.
999
Such conditions include restrictions to the operational area, 
activities, and staffing requirements.
1000
 For example, under Regulation 18(3) the district local 
government issues a certificate of registration specifying the area of operation and the 
activities the organisation is authorised to implement.  Regulation 14 of the NGO Regulations 
2009 requires every organisation to submit to the NGO Board a chart showing its structure 
and staffing, particularly specifying: foreign workforce requirements and a planned period to 
replace foreign employees with qualified Ugandans.  
The Board also has power to renew a certificate of registration.  The certificate is issued in the 
first instance for a period of one year.  Thereafter, the certificate is renewed for three years, 
and thereafter once every five years on condition that the NGO fulfils the requirements for 
renewal.  Receipt of a certificate of registration is not adequate.  Besides the application for a 




The Board may also revoke a certificate of registration and incorporation on three grounds: 
first, if the organisation does not operate in accordance with its constitution; second, if it 
contravenes any of the conditions or directions inserted in the certificate, and third, if in the 
opinion of the Board it is in the ‘public interest’ to do so.
1002
  However, ‘public interest’ is not 
defined.  Regulation 16 of the NGO Regulations also requires NGOs to submit to the Board 
annual returns in Form C as specified in the schedule to the regulations and any information 
that the Board may consider to be in ‘public interest’. ‘Public interest’ is a vague and 
overbroad ground that could result in unwarranted state interference in the affairs of the 
organisation.  As noted earlier, the 1995 Constitution restricts ‘public interest’ to actions that 
do not limit the enjoyment of rights and freedoms beyond what is acceptable in a democratic 
society.
1003
 This was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court decision of Paul K Ssemogerere, Olum 
and Kafire v Attorney General
1004
 where the Supreme Court held that all laws, rules or 
regulations or decisions of any authority in conflict with the standard set in Article 43(2) (c) 
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are unconstitutional. Moreover, once organisations are registered under the NGO Act 2006, 
they become a body corporate, can sue or are sued.
1005
   
The power to revoke a certificate is prescriptive and may be subject to arbitrary use.  For 
example, in the case of Kaggwa Andrew & Ors v The Minister of Internal Affairs,
 1006
 the 
applicants were members of an NGO, COWE. COWE was registered under the Non-
Governmental Organisations Registration Act, 1989 on 27th July, 2001 and a certificate duly 
issued.  On 4th April, 2002 the Secretary to the National Board of NGOs notified them of the 
revocation of their registration in the ‘public interest’.  The applicants were aggrieved with the 
decision and appealed to the Minister of Internal Affairs who upheld the Board’s decision to 
de-register them without giving any reasons.  The court invoked Article 42 of the Constitution 
and ruled that COWE was entitled to a fair hearing and should have been notified of the 
grounds upon which the certificate was cancelled.  It accordingly declared the Board’s 
decision null and void, and directed the NGO Board to re-instate COWE as a Non-
Governmental Organisation.  Notwithstanding the affirmation of the right to be heard, no 
reform of the NGO Act took place neither did the Court direct itself to the unconstitutionality 
of the NGO Act, and therefore the decision in this case could not be relied on in other cases 
where registration was denied.  This case illustrates the arbitrariness of the Board’s powers.  
The NGO Act can be used as an instrument of control and a threat to the right of individuals 
to operate without unnecessary interference.  For example, the Uganda Human Rights 
Documentation Centre (UHEDOC) was deregistered allegedly for campaigning against 
corruption in 1999
1007
; the Uganda Banyarwanda Cultural Development Association 
(UMUBANO) was deregistered in 2012 allegedly because of in-fighting and in public 
interest.  M/S Atlas Logistique, a French company registered by the Board in July 1994, and 
involved in providing logistical support to organisations that extended relief to Rwanda and 
Eastern Congo had its certificate cancelled on 30 May 1995 without giving any reasons.
 1008
 
As noted in Chapter six, the exercise of broad powers is a threat to the freedom of association.  
With a wide bureaucratic discretion, and without a right of appeal for judicial review, the 
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powers enjoyed by the NGO Board may be more controlling than facilitative.
1009
 What about 
the registration requirements, are they onerous? Is it easy to register?  
 
7.4.1.4. Registration requirements 
 
The NGO Act 1989 imposes strict registration conditions.  The NGO Act does not permit 
individuals to act collectively through unregistered organisations.
1010
 The registration 
requirement extends to Community Based Organisations which must register before they 
operate.
1011
 The law makes it illegal to operate without a valid permit.
1012
 There are penalties 
for carrying out activities through unregistered organisations which include the payment of a 
fine or imprisonment or both.
1013
 Beyond the mandatory requirement for a valid permit the 
NGO Act also provides for burdensome registration procedures. 
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 Section 4 (e) of the NGO Act (as amended), 2006 makes it an offence for an organization to carry out an 
activity without a valid permit or to contravene any of the provisions of the Act; making it an offence punishable 
on conviction to a fine not exceeding twenty five currency points( $100).  A currency point is equivalent to 
twenty thousand shillings (about $4 to a currency point).  In case of an offence involving contravention of any of  
the provisions of the Act, any director or officer of such organization whose act or omission gave rise to the 
offence is liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding fifty currency points ($200) or imprisonment not 
exceeding one year or both.  In case of an offence that involves carrying out any activity without a valid permit 
or certificate of incorporation or operates contrary to the conditions or directions specified in the permit, such 
officer is liable to a fine not exceeding twenty currency points ($80)  or imprisonment not exceeding six months 
or both.   
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  Organisations must submit an application for registration to the Secretary to the NGO 
Board.
1014
 Section 2 of the NGO Act and Regulation 5 of the NGO Regulations list the 
information required for an application for registration.  Such information includes an 
application form (Form A), specification of the area of intended operation (geographic area 
and field of operation), organisational chart, a valid reservation of name by the Uganda 
Registration Services Bureau (URSB), two copies of the organisation’s constitution, a work 
plan and budget for one year, a chart showing organisational structure of the organisation, 
written recommendation by two sureties, and if it is a local organisation, a written 
recommendation by the Chairperson of the Local Government Executive Committee of the 
sub-county council and by the Resident District Commissioner.  The application has to be 
signed by at least two promoters.
1015
  
Before submitting to the NGO Board, the applicant must reserve a name with the Uganda 
Registration Services Bureau (URSB).  After reserving the name, an application is lodged 
with the NGO Board which issues a certificate of registration and incorporation.  Each of 
these applications has to be accompanied by a prescribed fee, a Return in Form D and 
documents specified in the guidelines.
1016
 The fee payable is two currency points ($8) in case 
of a certificate of registration and a similar fee for the permit.  The renewal of both the 
certificate and permit also attracts fees.  After acquiring a certificate of registration and 
incorporation, the organisation is required to register both the constitution and resolutions at 
the USRB under the Registration of Documents Act, Cap. 81.
1017
  
The application process detailed above is unnecessarily lengthy, and lacks procedural 
safeguards.  While there are no legal barriers per se, NGOs seeking registration may be 
subject to bureaucratic delays.  The involvement of political leaders at every level of the 
registration process may cause undue delay and unwarranted state interference.  The periodic 
renewal of the certificate of registration and the permit gives broad discretion to the 
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authorities to deny or delay registration.  The range of authorities involved including the 
USRB, Local Councils, District Resident Commissioners, sureties, and ultimately the NGO 
Board, makes the process burdensome.   
Unlike Ethiopia and South Africa, as noted in Chapter six, Uganda has onerous registration 




7.5. CONCLUSION  
 
Article 38(2) of the Constitution of Uganda 1995 provides that ‘every Ugandan has a right to 
participate in peaceful activities to influence the policies of government through civic 
organisations’. Indeed, Uganda has witnessed an increase in the number of organisations since 
1986, partly in response to the democratic process and an enabling constitutional framework 
that guarantees the right to freedom of association. 
Notwithstanding this favourable constitutional framework, the NGO regulatory framework as 
the discussion has shown, presents several difficulties.  For example, the legislative process, 
despite efforts to involve the NGOs did not accommodate their views.  The Non-
Governmental Organisations Registration Act of 1989 and its amendment, the Non-
Governmental Organisations Registration (amendment) Act of 2006 grant unfettered powers 
to the NGO Board that may be subject to arbitrary decision-making.  The lack of 
representation of NGOs on the NGO Board does not meet the requirements of participatory 
democracy.  Unlike the NGO Co-ordination Board of Kenya and the NGO Board of Malawi 
which have representation of NGOs, the NGOs in Uganda cannot actively participate in 
appraising prospective applicants for registration by the Board to ensure accountability and 
transparency of applicants.  
The registration process needs to be simplified.  The current system of registering NGOs that 
separates registration and incorporation is costly and time consuming.  A single legal regime 
of registration that grants legal personality to an organisation duly registered with the NGO 
Board is overdue. 
 While international law permits states to regulate NGOs, compulsory registration is 
reminiscent of states that seek to control civic action.  Registration of NGOs should be 
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encouraged to promote coordination and ensure transparency and accountability within the 
NGO sector, but it should be done under conditions that allow freedom of NGOs to operate 
without undue interference.  For example, the requirement of an annual permit alongside a 
certificate of registration is controlling and burdensome.  
Although Uganda is credited for providing space for citizen participation, which accounts for 
the rapid growth of the NGO sector, it needs to adopt a regulatory framework that is inclusive 
and participatory.  Besides this, the NGO sector should adopt a mechanism of self-policing to 
promote accountability, transparency and effectiveness. 
The thesis has established that the current regulatory framework falls short of a model that is 
accessible, clear, speedy, apolitical, participatory, and inexpensive.  The next chapter will 
provide possible solutions to the shortcomings identified above.     






8. 0.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This study set out to investigate the existing regulatory models and possible reforms to 
ensuring an appropriate NGO regulatory framework that upholds the internationally accepted 
human rights principles in Uganda.  The study has revolved around two major interrelated 
issues. The first was whether the existing NGO regulatory model meets the basic 
requirements of the right to freedom of association as prescribed in the Constitution of 
Uganda, 1995, and international and regional human rights treaties to which Uganda is a 
party, and the second was to identify areas of possible reform for an appropriate regulatory 
model.  Its aim was to demonstrate that Uganda’s regulatory framework of NGOs does not 
meet the basic requirements of the right to freedom of association, and more importantly, to 
suggest possible reforms. 
 
The study began by giving a brief history of NGOs in Africa.  An attempt was made to define 
the term ‘NGO’ within the broader context of civil society.  Given the definitional challenge 
experienced in the study of the varied meaning associated with the term NGO, it was 
appropriate to secure a working definition to be applied to this thesis.  A theoretical 
perspective of democracy provided a normative framework within which an appraisal of the 
NGO regulatory regime could be done.  Through a comparative study of the regulatory 
framework in six  countries in Eastern and Southern Africa, mainly common law countries, 
the three regulatory models: state-led, state-NGO led, and self-regulation were analysed 
against international human rights and democratic principles.  
 
Considering the two major questions investigated, two arguments can be advanced in this 
thesis: that the regulatory framework of NGOs in Uganda does not meet the basic 
requirements for the right to freedom of association; and that the new model of regulation in 
Uganda must take into account the following: relevant principles of constitutional and 
international law relevant to freedom of association; emerging global trends and above all 
NGO effectiveness.  It is the view of this thesis that the value of these factors has been ably 
demonstrated. The main findings and conclusions of the study as set out in the various 
chapters are as follows: 
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8. 1.  MAIN FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS   
 
8. 1. 1.  Participatory democracy provides the best model for NGOs to function 
 
The place and value of NGOs has been a subject of intense debate.  In chapters 2 and 3 this 
study has examined the issue by taking an historical account of the evolution of NGOs in 
Africa, by reviewing the various theories of democracy and by appraising relevant 
constitutional as well as international and regional treaty provisions. It found that 
participatory democracy as a model of democracy affords maximum space for individuals and 
interest groups to enjoy the right to form associations free from unnecessary state 
interference. This model typically provides for a constitutional framework within which 
citizens can hold the state accountable, safeguards against arbitrary actions against 
individuals, and incorporates a bill of rights that would promote participation and active 
citizenship.  This means that where a state is democratic, it would not adopt a more restrictive 
regulatory model, instead it would adopt a model that is more empowering, upholds the 
‘sovereignty of the people’ and encourages active interest group participation.  Are NGOs 
accountable, participatory and democratic? 
 
8. 1. 2.  NGOs must address the challenge of legitimacy and democratic governance 
 
The human rights discourse that forms the esprit de corps of the human rights movement 
demands that NGOs be accountable, transparent, democratic and participatory.  In Chapter 4, 
the study has examined this question and established that state-NGO tensions are partly 
attributed to the lack of accountability and transparency among some NGOs within the sector.  
This raises questions about the mandate, independence, funding, representativeness, and 
accountability of NGOs.  States impose registration as a way of holding NGOs accountable.  
The study recommends that NGOs set clear objectives, be committed to their mandate, 
expand their membership base, identify independent sources of funding, and adopt self-
regulatory practices such as codes of conduct in order to address the challenge of legitimacy.  
Where states seek to regulate the activities of NGOs, what are the minimum standards 
expected of them? 
8. 1. 3.   States can regulate the Operations of NGOs 
 
State regulation of NGOs has often raised considerable debate.  This question has been 
investigated in this study in Chapter 5.  The right to freedom of association recognises the 
190 |  
 
right of every individual to form, join, and participate in an association.  In a democracy the 
state should provide the space and the legal framework for individuals to organise in the form 
of associations in order to express their opinions and hold leaders accountable.  This duty 
extends to the obligation of the state to provide the legal and regulatory framework within 
which NGOs operate.  
 
Although registration is not compulsory, associations have to register in order to operate 
within the law. International law does not permit states to prohibit the formation of 
associations except where the objectives for which they are formed are unlawful.  The 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights to which Uganda is a party do not permit registration procedures that are 
lengthy and result in undue delay.  The study concludes that registration procedures should be 
simple, speedy, apolitical and inexpensive.  Can the state reject an application for registration 
or revoke registration of an NGO? 
 
8. 1. 4.  Criteria for registration must be laid out clearly 
 
Whether the state can reject an application for registration or revoke registration is an issue of 
concern.  This study has addressed itself to this matter.  The regulatory law must spell out the 
criteria upon which an application can be denied or registration cancelled.  The exercise of 
such power should not be arbitrary neither should the authority have broad discretionary 
powers.  Grounds on which rejection can be based must only be those prescribed by law and 
well defined; the law must be precise and should not contravene human rights principles.  
Acceptable grounds have been provided under Article 22 (2) of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights which limits such restrictions to acts that threaten national security, 
public order, the rights and freedoms of others. What amounts to ‘prohibited activities’ should 
be defined under the NGO Act as it is in Malawi.  How much information is required for one 
to register to an NGO? 
8. 1. 5.   Registration requirements must be reasonable and less restrictive 
 
The amount of information required and conditions imposed for one to register an NGO has 
often raised considerable concern.  How onerous are the registration requirements? How strict 
are the requirements? The study has addressed itself to this issue as well.  The thesis has 
examined this issue and found varying experiences among the countries studied.  In countries 
that have adopted a state-led regulatory model such as Ethiopia and Zimbabwe, registration is 
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mandatory, and failure to register attracts penalties.  Registration requirements are 
burdensome in some and less demanding in others.  In some countries like Ethiopia, 
restrictions are imposed on funding of NGOs that carry out human rights or democracy-
related activities, which violates their constitutional and treaty obligations.  States that have a 
state-NGO led regulatory model like Malawi also impose strict registration conditions but 
unlike countries that have a state-led model, they do not impose funding restrictions on human 
rights NGOs.  Meanwhile, in states that follow a self-regulatory model like South Africa, 
registration is voluntary, and they impose minimal registration requirements, and above all, 
encourage human rights and democracy-related activities.   
 
 This thesis finds that regulatory laws that impose strict and burdensome conditions for 
registration do not meet the requirements of the right to freedom of association.  The study 
recommends minimal requirements for registration.  When registration takes place, what are 
the acceptable reporting requirements? 
 
8. 1. 6.   Reporting Obligations must be reasonable 
 
NGOs have to fulfil reporting requirements to government as provided by the law.  The NGO 
Act often prescribes such reporting obligations. The frequency of the reporting and the 
consequences should one fail to report have often caused concern. Should renewal of 
registration be dependent on reporting? Chapter 5 addressed itself to the issue of reporting 
requirements.  International law does not prescribe a minimum reporting period although it 
encourages a reasonable period.  The study has examined the reporting periods required by 
international and regional bodies.  The African Commission on Human Rights requires NGOs 
with observer status to submit a report of their activity every two years.  The United Nations 
and the Council of Europe require NGOs to submit a report every four years.  The study 
recommends a period of four years to minimise state interference in the affairs of the 
organisation.  Where NGO laws are adopted, how participatory should the legislative process 
be? 
 
8. 1. 7.  The Legislative Process should be participatory 
 
The process of formulating the NGO law has been a subject of study in this thesis.  To what 
extent are NGOs involved in formulating the NGO law?  The thesis reviewed the legislative 
process in six selected countries of Eastern and Southern Africa in Chapter 6.  The study 
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noted that there is a link between the legislative process and the outcome of the NGO law.  
Where the aim of the law is to control the NGOs like Zimbabwe, the country adopted a state-
led regulatory model and there was least participation of NGOs in the enactment of the law.  
Where the purpose of the law was to co-ordinate NGO activities like Malawi and Kenya, the 
country adopted a state-NGO led model, and the degree of involvement of NGOs in the 
formulation process was much higher.  In countries that sought to promote the NGO sector 
like South Africa, such countries adopted a self-regulatory model and the legislative process 
was more transparent, more inclusive, and more participatory.  The study recommends the 
adoption of a self-regulatory model as one that is best suited to involve NGOs in the 
legislative process.  What about the NGO regulatory body, how representative should it be? 
 
8. 1. 8. The NGO Regulatory Mechanism must be representative 
 
The appointment process, membership, security of tenure and independence of the NGO 
regulatory body affects the state-NGO relations.  The study, in Chapter 6, has investigated the 
criteria for the appointment and the composition of the National NGO Board in the six 
countries chosen for the comparative review and found variations in the degree of public 
involvement and independence of the NGO Boards.  In some countries like Ethiopia and 
Uganda, the NGO Boards are part of Government departments controlled by the relevant 
Government Ministry, and in others like Kenya, they are semi-or autonomous regulatory 
bodies.  In some countries like South Africa, the NGO Board is composed entirely of 
government nominees, in others like Kenya and Zimbabwe the Board has both government 
nominees and NGO representatives appointed by government on the recommendation of 
NGOs.  In some countries like South Africa, the criterion for the appointment of members to 
the NGO Board is laid out, while in others such as Ethiopia, it is silent.  The study has 
established a link between the regulatory model, the appointment process and composition of 
the Board.  Where the country has adopted a state-led regulatory model, the criteria for the 
appointment of members to the Board are not laid out, and the state is more controlling of the 
NGO regulatory body; less controlling with a higher likelihood of having the criteria for the 
appointment process laid out in a state-NGO led model, and more independent, transparent, 
and with well laid out criteria in a self-regulatory model.  The study recommends an inclusive 
and representative appointment process, where NGOs are represented on the regulatory body.  
Where a regulatory body has been appointed, what are its powers? Are they controlling or 
enabling? 
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8. 1. 9.  The Powers of the Regulatory body must be subject to review 
 
Can the Board reject an application for registration or refuse the renewal of registration? Does 
it have power to de-register an organisation? Can it interfere with the internal matters of the 
organisation? Are decisions of the Board subject to appeal or judicial review? The study has 
examined this issue in Chapter 6.  The study found varying experiences in the six countries 
that were reviewed.  In countries that have adopted a state-led regulatory model like Uganda 
and Zimbabwe, the NGO Board has broad discretionary powers.  The Board has power to 
accept an application for registration and issue a certificate of registration on such conditions 
as it deems appropriate.   The Board can also reject an application for registration without 
giving any reasons; neither does the NGO law provide the time-limit within which its decision 
must be given.  In such countries, government can suspend NGO officers, take over 
management or leadership of the NGO or suspend a licence where the NGO Board believes 
that the NGO has used the organisation for an unlawful purpose.  The powers of the Board are 
not subject to judicial review.  
 
In countries that have adopted a state-NGO led regulatory model like Kenya and Malawi, the 
Board has wide discretionary powers, but these powers are subject to a right of appeal to a 
higher body usually a Minister or a tribunal, and the right of appeal to the High Court is 
entrenched.  The Board has power to accept an application for registration and issue a 
certificate of registration on conditions as it deems fit, but a time-limit is provided within 
which it must make a decision on whether to accept or deny an application.  The grounds for 
rejection of an application must also be given.   
 
In countries that have a self-regulatory model like South Africa, the regulatory body has wide 
but not arbitrary powers.  The body can only deny registration only in cases where an 
applicant has failed to comply with the registration requirements.  A time-limit is given within 
which a decision must be communicated to the applicant on whether the application has been 
accepted or rejected.  Even where a refusal takes place, the applicant has a right to an 
administrative review of the decision before an administrative tribunal.  Even the tribunal has 
a time- limit within which it must give its decision with reasons. 
 
The study finds that broad and discretionary powers can result in arbitrary decision-making, 
and as the study has shown lead to unwarranted state interference.  This violates the right to 
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freedom of association.  The study therefore recommends that the powers of the Board must 
always be subject to review to avoid bureaucratic discretion.  
 
Chapter 7 examines the legal and regulatory framework governing NGOs in Uganda and as 
the discussion has shown, it does not meet the basic requirements of a regulatory model that 
meets the internationally accepted human rights principles.     
 
In view of these findings and conclusions, what follows is a summary of the key proposals for 
the improvement of the NGO regulatory framework for Uganda.  
 
8. 2. SUMMARY OF KEY PROPOSALS FOR THE REFORM OF THE 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK GOVERNING NGOs IN UGANDA 
 
International law permits states to regulate NGOs provided they do not deprive them of the 
right to free political expression.
1019
 Uganda adopted a state-led regulatory model of 
regulation, which, as the previous discussion has shown, is more controlling than enabling.   
 
The study has noted that the registration of NGOs has its origins in the colonial state which 
used it as an instrument of control.  With the democratic reform of the 1980s, there was a 
‘retreat of the state’ that saw a rebirth of NGOs.  NGOs have since become a driving force in 
promoting democracy, accountability, and public participation in governance.  But to achieve 
this, NGOs need legal frameworks that allow them the freedom to operate.   
 
The regulatory framework must take into account the registration process, accountability, and 
organisational autonomy.  To what extent do these guarantees exist in this framework?  The 
process of developing the law should be consultative and borrow from good practice.  The 
objective of the law should be to increase efficiency, transparency, and accountability.  The 
NGO Act should strike a delicate balance between enabling NGOs, providing space, 
mobilising citizen participation, and avoiding unwarranted interference of the state.  In several 
of these respects the NGO Act fails, as the study has shown.   
 
In the state-NGO led model, there is more flexibility, respect for organisational autonomy and 
emphasis on participation other than control.  Whereas the state remains a primary actor in 
regulation, there is considerable value in self-regulation.  The Kenyan model of having an 
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Independent Regulatory Authority alongside a National Federation of Public Benefit 
Organizations adds value to state regulation.  NGOs have the benefit of developing common 
standards, ethical codes of conduct, professional skills, and enhancing participation.  Having a 
one-stop centre for registration and a tribunal for dispute resolution enhances the transparency 
of the regulatory mechanism.  More importantly, having an independent Regulatory Authority 
free from outside control and direction would promote integrity, efficiency, professionalism, 
and trust in the current regulatory framework.  In view of the above discussion this thesis 
recommends a review of the regulatory framework as follows: 
 
8. 2. 1.  Registration requirements   
 
Section 4(a) of the NGO Act that prohibits an organisation to operate without being registered 
is restrictive and inconsistent with Articles 20(1), 29 (1) (e), 43 2(c) of the Constitution, and 
should be repealed.  Although the state has a duty to regulate organisations, limiting their 
fundamental right of association to the act of mandatory registration is inconsistent with 
Article 20(1) and Article 29(1)(e) of the Constitution of Uganda; Article 22(1) of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and Article 10(1) of the African 
Charter to which Uganda is a party.  Article 20(1) of the Constitution of Uganda provides that 
fundamental rights are inherent and not granted by the State.  Although the right to freedom of 
association as provided under Article 29 (1) (e) of the Constitution is not absolute, it can only 
be limited in accordance with article 43-(2(c) which upholds practices consistent with the 
standards accepted in a free and democratic society.
1020
 In a constitutional democracy as it is 
the case in South Africa, registration is voluntary.   
 
The wide discretion granted to the NGO Board, and to the Minister (sections 2, 2(2), 8, 9, 10,  
and section 4(a)) of the NGO Act to deny registration or revoke a certificate of registration 
limits the exercise of associational rights provided under articles 20 (1), (2), 29 1(e) of the 
Constitution.  The NGO Act should be amended to provide narrow and objective standards to 
guide the authorities.  For example, the NGO Act should spell out the grounds upon which the 
Board can deny an application for registration.  The NGO Act should specify a time limit 
within which a decision has to be made to register a new NGO or revoke a certificate of 
registration.  Even where the Board accepts an application for registration and issues a 
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certificate of registration, it should spell out the conditions clearly.  The law should also spell 
out the grievance procedure in case of refusal or revocation of registration.   
 
The requirement for annual permits and the demand for re-registration are expensive and 
cumbersome, and give unfettered powers to the Board that are liable to abuse.  A certificate of 
registration renewable every five years should be adequate.   
 
Where an NGO chooses to appeal to the Minister, a time-limit should be prescribed within 
which the Minister responds.  The appeal process should clearly indicate that the complaint 
should be in writing, giving reasons for the appeal.  The NGO Act should clearly indicate that 
the applicant has a right of appeal against the Minister’s decision to deny registration or order 
an involuntary dissolution.  The Minister should be obliged to give reasons for his decision in 
case of a denial of an appeal.   
 
Regulation 13(a) that prohibits an NGO from making direct contact with the people in their 
area of operation without giving seven days’ notice in writing of its intention to do so to the 
local councils and the Resident District Commissioner is controlling and inconsistent with 
democratic practice.  The rule should be relaxed by encouraging NGOs to inform the 
authorities as part of their reporting obligations.   
 
8. 2. 2.  The Composition of the National Board for Non-Governmental Organisations 
 
The NGO Act does not provide the criteria for the appointment of members to the National 
Board for NGOs, neither do NGOs have representation on a body that regulates their 
activities.  This thesis argues that NGOs have a right to participate in decision-making in 
matters that affect them, and therefore advocates for an inclusive, transparent, and 
participatory appointment process.  NGOs should be consulted in making appointments to the 
regulatory body.  This thesis recommends that the NGO Act should provide for NGOs to have 
representatives on the regulatory body to allow for inclusive and participatory decision-
making.   
 
8. 2. 3.   Self-Regulation of NGOs 
 
The National NGO Policy recognises self-regulation, if effectively applied by all NGOs, as 
the most cost-effective means of fostering discipline and benchmarking quality assurance 




 It notes that such a mechanism minimises the need and extra costs of 
implementing a government-driven policing regime.
1022
 The current regulatory regime, 
notwithstanding this policy declaration, is state-led.  In order to promote maximum 
participation of NGOs and respect for associational rights, this thesis recommends that 
Section 4 (2) of the NGO Act (as amended) be repealed to introduce state-NGO led 
regulation.  An Independent NGO Regulatory Authority should be established to replace the 
current National Board for NGOs.  The Independent Authority should be autonomous.  The 
membership of the Authority should comprise of experts drawn from different fields, relevant 
ministries as well as representatives of NGOs.  The members of the Authority should be 
appointed by the Minister through a competitive process involving applications and 
interviews.  The Authority will advise on voluntary registration procedures, complaints 
handling, appeals process, certification, and quality assurance, tax benefits, and voluntary 
dissolution processes.   
 
The NGO Act should also provide for self-regulation.  Every organization should have the 
freedom to join in association with another organisation or other organizations.  Organizations 
should have the freedom to form a National Federation of NGOs within which they can 
regulate their conduct.  The National Federation of NGOs should be independent of the 
Authority.  Borrowing from the experience of the European INGO Participatory Status 
Procedure of the Council of Europe, the Authority should be obliged to seek the opinion of 
the National Federation of NGOs in making decisions on applications for registration of 
NGOs.  This thesis further recommends that such opinion should be sought from the 
Federation in case of de-registering of an NGO.  The self-regulating body of NGOs should, 
among its objectives and functions, promote self-regulation of NGOs, formulate a Code of 
conduct by which NGOs commit themselves to good governance, transparency, non-
discrimination as well as increase stakeholder participation.  
 
8. 2. 4.  Reporting Obligations for NGOs 
 
The Board has power to issue an Annual Permit to an organisation on condition that the NGO 
submits its Annual report, Audited Accounts and any additional information as the Board may 
require.  As noted earlier, the requirement for an Annual permit gives excessive discretion to 
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the Board which may renew or de-register an organisation.  The African Commission on 
Human Rights requires NGOs with Observer status with the Commission to report every two 
years.  The United Nations requires NGOs with UN Consultative status to report every four 
years.  The Council of Europe also requires NGOs with Participatory status with the Council 
to report every four years.  This thesis recommends that the NGO Act should be amended to 
change the reporting period, from annual reporting to every four years in accordance with the 
standard set by the regional bodies.   
 
8. 2. 5.  Democracy, Accountability, Participation 
 
The NGO Act makes it an offence for any organisation to operate contrary to the conditions 
or directions specified in its permit or certificate of incorporation, and the director or officer 
of such an organisation also commits an offence, and is liable on conviction to a fine or 
imprisonment or both.
1023
 Restrictions on the right to freedom of association are only 
permissible where such actions would be a threat to national security, public order or the 
rights and freedoms of others.
1024
  The right to freedom of association enjoins states not to 
adopt laws or policies or repeal pre-existing domestic laws that are incompatible with the 
standards set by the covenant.
1025
  Failure to honour conditions set by the Board is not an 
acceptable ground for restricting the enjoyment of the right to association.  This thesis 
recommends that the provisions should be repealed to ‘decriminalise’ NGO activism and 
specify that the primary role of human rights NGOs is to open space for democratic forces to 
operate.  The NGO Act should make specific provision recognising NGO participation in 
policy making.   
 
Uganda, like many sub-Saharan African countries in transition to democracy, should aspire 
for a regulatory framework for NGOs that is inclusive, accountable, more participatory and 
transparent.  This thesis recommends that a state-led regulatory model does not match 
Uganda’s future aspirations.  Instead, Uganda should adopt a state-NGO led (hybrid) system 
of regulation that allows self-regulation alongside state regulation.  This would require the 
amendment of the NGO Act to provide for an Independent Regulatory Authority that is 
composed of government nominees as well as representatives of NGOs.  Besides the 
regulatory body, the law should create a self-regulating NGO Federation that oversees the 
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credibility and transparency of NGOs through a quality assurance mechanism.  The National 
Federation of NGOs would spell out procedures for the conduct of democratic nominations 
for representatives of NGOs to the Independent NGO Regulatory Authority.  
 
8. 3.  FINAL REMARKS   
 
The proposals put forward in this study would ensure that Uganda adopts an appropriate 
regulatory model that meets the internationally accepted human rights principles. The 
proposals are feasible.  The reforms if implemented, would improve the state-NGO relations 
which are currently at their lowest level since the NRM Government took power in 1986.  
What is required is an amendment of the NGO Act to implement the suggested reforms.  The 
aim is to meet the requirements for the right to freedom of association as provided in 
Uganda’s Constitution, and international and regional treaties to which Uganda is a party.  
 
Uganda should take immediate steps to improve the regulatory regime for NGOs to avoid 
unnecessary litigation.  Already, the Andrew Kaggwa case has shown that the NGO Act is in 
conflict with Uganda’s constitutional obligations and is in need of urgent reform. 
1026
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